A Cognitive Process Approach to Interpreting Performance on the Booklet Category Test and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test by Wolfe, Phillip R.
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
All Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 
5-1992 
A Cognitive Process Approach to Interpreting Performance on the 
Booklet Category Test and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
Phillip R. Wolfe 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wolfe, Phillip R., "A Cognitive Process Approach to Interpreting Performance on the Booklet Category Test 
and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test" (1992). All Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 6007. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/6007 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open 
access by the Graduate Studies at 
DigitalCommons@USU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in All Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For 
more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
Copyright© Phillip R. Wolfe, 1992 
All Rights Reserved 
A CO ,NITTVE PROCESS APPROACH TO lNTERPRETlNG PERFORMA NC E 




Phillip R. Wolfe 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
rn 
Psychology 




I am indebted to the many brain -injured patients whose successes and 
frustrations in performing problem-solving tasks have taught me much about 
brain function and human behavior. Without those patients, this study would 
not have been possible. 
lL 
I am indebted also to my friend and former wife whose support and 
encouragement throughout my graduate education has helped me complete this 
study, and who listened patiently for many hours to my "thinking aloud" about 
this project. 




ACKNOWLEGMENTS ............................................................................................... 11 
LIST OFT ABLES.......................................................................................................... vu 
ABSTRACT··················································································································· X 
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF TI-IE PROBLEM....................... 1 
II. REVIEW OF TI-IE LITERATURE ...................................................................... 6 
The Halstead Category Test ............................................ , .............................. 6 
Historical Background...................... ................................................... 6 
Development of Halstead's Battery ................................................... 8 
Predictive Validity ............................................................................... 13 
Localization Studies............................................................................. 15 
Moderator Variables............................................................................ 20 
Construct Validity ................................................................................ 26 
CT/ IQ Covariation .................................................................. 31 
Factor Analytic Studies.......... .................................................. 44 
Appraisal .......................................................................... -..................... 49 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test................................................................... 51 
WCST Development ............................................................................ 52 
Localization of Brain Damage .................. .............................. ........... 59 
Construct Validity ........................................................ : ...................... 72 
Moderator Variables .. ...... ...................... ... .. ............................ ........... 7 4 
Age and Education Correlates............................................... 74 
IQ Correlates ................................................................... - ........ 77 





III. METHODS AND PROCEDURES..................................................................... 88 
Modified Administration Procedures........................................................... 88 
Cognitive Process Variables................. .......................................................... 90 
Perrine's Model of Concept Formation............................................. 93 
The Attribute Identification Score..................................................... 95 
The Conceptual Abstraction Score .................................................... 97 
The Rule-Learning Score..................................................................... 98 
Summary and Ratio Scores................................................................. 100 
Hypotheses ..................................................................... ,.................................. 101 
Purpose... ........................................................................................................... 103 
Objectives .......................................................................................................... 103 
Procedures.............................. ........................................................................... 104 
Subjects.................................................................................................. 104 
Test Administration............................................................................. 108 
Coding of Responses .............................................. ,............................ 110 
Data Entry............................................................................................. 111 
N. RESULTS....... ....................................................................................................... 113 
Results of Group Comparisons...................................................................... 114 
Hypothesis 1 ......................................................................................... 114 
Hypothesis 2 .................... ,.................................................................... 116 
Factor Analyses of Cognitive Process Variables.......................................... 120 
Hypothesis 3 ......................................................................................... 120 
Subtest III ....................................................................... ,........... 122 
Factor pattern................................................................ 122 
Comparison with unimpaired subgroup.................. 124 
Comparison with impaired subgroup ...................... 125 
Subtest N .................................................................................. 129 
Factor pattern................................................................ 129 
Comparison with impaired subgroup ...................... 131 




Subtest V .................................................................................... 134 
Factor pattern................................................................ 134 
Comparison with impaired group............................. 136 
Comparison with unimpaired group........................ 138 
Subtest VI.................................................................................. 140 
Factor pattern................................................................ 140 
Comparison with impaired group............................. 142 
Comparison with unimpaired group........................ 144 
Total Score................................................................................. 146 
Second Order Factor Analysis Across Subtests ................... 148 
Relationship of Cognitive Process Factors to Error 
Scores................................................................................... 150 
Covariates of Cognitive Process Factors............................... 156 
Hypothesis 4 ......................................................................................... 158 
Comparison of Verbalized versus Nonverbalized 
Scoring ........................... ...................................................... 159 
Factor Analysis of WCST Scores............................................ 160 
Verbalized administration.......................................... 160 
Conventional administration ..................................... 162 
· Covariates for WCST Cognitive Process Factors ... ;............. 163 
Comparisons Betweenthe Category Test and the WCST .......................... 166 
V. DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................... 169 
Comparison of Verbalized versus Conventional Administration............ 169 
Reliability of Coding Verbalized Responses................................................ 171 
Factor Analysis of Cognitive Process Variables.......................................... 173 
Category Test........................................................................................ 173 
M ... s a1nta1rung et ........................................................................ . 
Shifting Determinants ............................................................. . 
Second Order Factor Analysis ............................................... . 








Summary Of CT Factor Analyses.......................................... 181 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test.............................................................. 185 
Comparison of verbalized and nonverbalized scores ........ 186 
Covariates for WCST cognitive process factors................... 187 
Comparisons Between the CT and WCST .................................................... 188 
Conclusions....................................................................................................... 189 
WCST Results ....................................................................................... 189 
CT Results.............................................................................................. 191 
Comparison of WCST and CT Factor Scores ................................... 193 
Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research ............... 193 
REFERENCES .. .. .... .. .. .. .... .. .. ...... ............ .. .. ...... .... .. ...... .. .. .... .... .. .. .... .. .. ........ .. ... . . .. .. .. .. .. 196 
APPENDICES............................................................................................................... 215 
A. Instructions For Modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test...................... 216 
B. Instructions For Modified Booklet Category Test................................. 218 
C. Modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Form........................................ 222 
D. Modified Scoring And Recording Form For The Booklet 
Category Test................................................................ .............................. 225 
E. Decision Tree For Coding Configural Attributes On BCT ................... 233 
F. Decision Tree For Coding Abstract Attributes On BCT ....................... 236 
G. Decision Tree For Coding Scoring Rules On BCT ................................. 240 
H. Definitions For CT Ratio And Summary Variables............................... 242 
I. Definitions For WCST Ratio And Summary -Variables ........................ 244 
CURR! CUL UM VITAE................................................................................................ 247 
VII 
LIST OFT ABLES 
Page 
l. Description of Original Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery. 10 
2. Definitions of Attribute Identification (Concrete) Codes........................ 96 
3. Definitions of Abstract Pattern Codes........................................................ 99 
4. Examples of Scoring Cognitive Process Variables..... .............................. 100 
5. Definitions of Rule-Learning Codes........................................................... 101 
6. Diagnostic Classification Within Each Patient Group............................. 107 
7. Demographic Characteristics of Patient Groups........ .............................. 108 
8. Distribution of Decade Age Ranges Within Patient Groups .................. 109 
9. Comparison of Mean CT and WCST Summary Scores........................... 115 
10. Probabilities of Group Differences Between Variables............................ 117 
11. R2 for Age, Education, and IQ Regressed on CT/ WCST Variables....... 118 
12. R2 Change for Age, Education, and IQ Interrelationships..................... 119 
13. Mean CT Scores for Unimpaired Versus Impaired Subgroups.............. 121 
14. Factor Pattern Matrix for Full Group on Subtest III................................. 122 
15. Factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest ill............ 125 
16. Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest III ................. 126 
17. Factor Pattern Matrix for Full Group on Subtest IV ................................ 129 
18. Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest IV .......... ....... 132 
19. Factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest IV............ 133 
20. F_actor Pattern Matrix for Full Group on Subtest V .................................. 135 
21. Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest V................... 137 
viii 
LIST OF TABLES (Continued) 
Page 
22. Factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest V ............. 139 
23. Factor Pattern Matrix Subtest VI................................................................. 141 
24. Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest VI................. 143 
25. Factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest VI............ 145 
26. Factor Pattern Matrix for Full Group on Total Score............................... 147 
27. Second Order Factor Analysis of All Subtest Factors.............................. 149 
28. Adjusted R2 for 2nd Order Factors on CT Error Scores........................... 151 
29. Adjusted R2 for Subtest Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out .... 152 
30. R2 Change for CT Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out .............. 152 
31. R2 Change for Subtest Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out.. ..... 153 
32. R2 Change for Subtest Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out ....... 154 
33. Correlation of Full Model With Separate Right/ Wrong Factors........... 155 
34. R2 Change for Unrotated Factor Scores with Covariates Partialed 
Out................................................................................................................... 156 
35. R2 for Age, .Education, and IQ Regressed on Cognitive Factors............ 157 
36. Correlations Between Verbalized and Conventional WCST Scores...... 159 
37. Descriptive Data for Right-Shift, Missed Lrng Oppor., and NPSV % ... 160 
38. Factor Pattern Matrix for WCST Verbalized Administration................. 161 
39. Factor Pattern Matrix for WCST Conventional Scores............................ 162 
40. R2 for Age, Education, and IQ Regressed on WCST Factors.................. 163 
41. R2 for Age, Education, and IQ Regressed on WCST Factors.................. 165 
42. Prediction of CT /WCST Variables, Controlling for Covariates............. 166 
ABSTRACT 
A Cognitive Process Approach to Interpreting Performance on the Booklet 
Category Test and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
by 
Phillip R. Wolfe, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University, 1992 
Major Professor: Michael R. Bertoch, Ed.D. 
Department: Psychology 
X 
Modified administration techniques that relied on patient verbalization of 
reasoning on each item were devised. For the WCST, verbalized scores 
correlated highly with conventional scores. However, patterns of age, education, 
and IQ covariates for each scoring condition were very different, raising 
questions concerning what such verbalized scores measured. Further research 
based upon a prospective research design was suggested to address this 
question. Factor analysis of WCST scores for each scoring condition resulted in 
almost identical three-factor solutions in each case: (a) ineffective, perseverative 
responding; (b) nonperseverative number errors; and (c) Maintaining Set. A 
three-part hierarchy of response determinants for the CT was utilized, consisting 
of (a) concrete perceptual attributes; (b) cognitive organization of perceptual 
attributes into abstract patterns; and (c) relating abstract patterns to the 
corresponding number responses. Decision trees were devised to prescribe a set 
of rules for coding each score. Utilization of this approach yielded adequate test-
retest reliability for recoding responses. Sets of variables for each subtest were 
factor analyzed, with second order factor analysis of all factors from each subtest 
XI 
in order to determine if common cognitive process scores on each subtest 
described cognitive process scores on other subtests. Results revealed similar 
factor solutions for each subtest, but subtest-specific factors were not predictive 
of similar factor scores on other subtests, except for Subtests V and VI, which are 
based upon the same principle. Factors related to Maintaining Set predicted 
most of the variance in subtest error scores. Factor scores related to Determinant 
Shifting were predictive of error scores to a much lesser degree than Maintaining 
Set factor scores. Determinant Shifting factor scores appeared to be independent 
of Maintaining Set factor scores, and also showed much more independence from 
age, education, and IQ covariates. The relationship between CT and WCST 
factor scores was slightly lower than the relationship between CT error scores 
and WCST summary scores. Suggestions for further research were discussed. 
(259 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND ST A TEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
CJinica] neuropsycho1ogy is that branch of psychology which is concerned 
with the assessment of behavior changes resulting from brain dysfunction 
(Lezak, 1983). Commonly, clinica] neuropsycho]ogists are asked to eva]uate 
whether an individual patient displays evidence of cortical dysfunction, and if so 
what course of recovery or debilitation might be expected. Questions posed to 
neuropsychologists by referral sources often include requests for predicting 
performance of everyday activities such as self-care, driving an automobi]e, 
living independently, managing finances, returning to work, or any of a number 
of other behaviors. Increasingly, the results of neuropsychological eva]uation are 
used to guide cognitive rehabilitation planning. Not surprisingly, these disparate 
goals of neuropsycho]ogical eva]uation call for different strategies. 
Neuropsychology in this country evolved from the psychometric tradition in 
p sychology of measuring individual differences. The first ful1-time 
n europsycho]ogy laboratory was established at the University of Chicago in 1935 
b y Ward Campbe11 Halstead (Kleve, 1974) for the purpose of investigating the 
biological basis of intelligence, particularly with respect to the functioning of the 
frontal lobes of the human brain, which was thoughtto have particular 
:significance for higher cognitive functions (C~apman & Wolff, 1959). Toward 
this goal, Halstead meticulously mapped location and extent of brain damage in 
patients referred by cooperating neurologists, and quantified the performance of 
these patients on a series of tasks which he developed or adapted for that 
purpose, in comparison with the performance of nonbrain-damaged subjects on 
those same tasks (Halstead, 1947a). Although other researchers had long 
attempted to specify cognitive impairments characteristic of particular lesion 
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]ocations, Halstead was the first to apply standardized measurement techniques 
to cognitive tasks sufficient]y sensitive to demonstrate clear differences in 
adaptive behavior as a consequence of specific brain damage. This series of tasks 
evolved into the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery (HRNB), which 
remains among the most commonly used standardized batteries of 
neuropsychological tests in this country (Guilmette, Faust, Hart, & Arkes, 1990). 
The focus of interest in such an assessment strategy is on the quantifiable features 
of the patient's test behavior that allow each individual 's test performance to be 
compared to group test results--a statistical or quantitative norm--which 
permits inferences to be made concerning the relative adequacy of performance 
(Goldstein, 1987). 
These data may be viewed from a variety of perspectives, and Ralph Reitan, 
Halstead's first graduate student at the University of Chicago (Boll, 1981), who 
has refined and extensively validated this battery of tests over the past 40 years, 
has strongly recommended a four-pronged approach to evaluating test 
performance: (a) ]evel of performance; (b) patterns and relationships among 
individual test results; (c) specific deficits and pathognomonic signs; and (d) 
patterns of performance that may be attributed to differential functioning of the 
two sides of the brain (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985). This strategy may be referred to 
as an actuarial strategy, which, when applied to neuropsychological functioning, 
is well suited to addressing questions of whether cerebral pathology is present, 
and to a lesser degree the course of the disease process, and what part of the 
brain is preferentially affected. Predictions concerning the behavioral capacity of 
individual patients may also be inferred from such normative data. Such 
conclusions are consistent with Halstead's original research goals of identifying 
the behavioral correlates of brain function (Reitan, 1986). 
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These endeavors have long been identified as comprising the raison d'etre of 
clinical neuropsychology (Diller, 1987). However, the use of neuropsychological 
evaluation for cognitive rehabilitation planning has become increasingly 
important in recent years. This goal necessitates a shift in focus and purpose from 
the structure and function of cerebral systems to cognitive processes and 
behavioral adaptation (Sohlberg & Mateer, 1989). DilJer (1987) conceptualized 
that relationship between neuropsychology and rehabilitation in the following 
terms: 
The primary language of neuropsychology is one of impairment. 
Impairments are deficits which are dysfunctions in underlying mental or 
physical structures. Deficits are identified by responses to standardized tests. 
The primary language of rehabilitation is one of disability. Disabilities are 
limitations in actual functioning in daily activities ... The neuropsychologist 
has a problem in translating the language of impairment into a language of 
disability without a complex chain of assumptions . While the 
neuropsychologist can categorize the complaint, the data are too nonspecific 
to ilJurninate management issues at more refined levels. (p. 4) 
Clearly, a different methodology is necessary to meet this challenge . 
Rehabilitation of cognitive disabilities requires careful specification of skill 
parameters which are impaired as well as those which are not, and a conceptual 
model which relates cerebral dysfunctions to these skill domains (Sohlberg & 
Mateer, 1989). The data of actuarial assessment--quantifiable scores--represent 
"the final orchestrated result of many different cognitive functions" (McKenna & 
Warrington, 1986, p. 32), and fail to specify how those scores are related to the 
cognitive processes which must be targeted in a systematic treatment approach. 
That goal may be better accomplished by process approach. This 
methodology retains the standard administration of psychometric instruments 
but data collection techniques are systematically modified to permit testing the 
limits of patients' abilities in order to more specifically describe cognitive 
strengths and weaknesses. An hypothesis testing approach is employed on 
4 
many tasks in order to better specify the cognitive processes which contributed to 
patients' performances. This approach has been applied with success to the 
assessment of diverse cognitive processes, but ironically while more complex 
cognitive functions tend to be most sensitive to the effects of brain-damage, these 
abilities lend themselves Jess readily to process analyses (Mi]berg, Hebren, & 
Kaplan, 1986). Induded among these so-called higher cognitive functions are 
reasoning and problem-solving ability, concept formation, cognitive flexibility, 
abstract thought, and a variety of executive skil1s. These are the abilities which 
are most called upon in accomplishing the tasks of daily living and therefore 
tend to be the focus of treatment goals (Goldstein & Levin, 1987). 
Two tests which are most often employed to assess these skills are the 
Halstead Category Test (CT), one measure of the HRNB, and the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test(WCST). Many similarities in the constructs measured by these 
tasks have been noted in the clinical literature, but in the few studies in which 
error scores on both tests have been compared, only approximately 30% shared 
variance has been found. Consequently, the CT and WCST have each been 
considered to contribute unique information concerning higher cognitive 
functioning to the neuropsychological evaluation. Yet little research effort has 
been directed toward delineating precisely what unique information each test 
contributes (Anderson, Damasio, Hones, & Tranel, 1991) or the nature of the 
problem-solving strategies which are reflected in the scores reported for these 
tests. Consequently, although validation research has shown that performance on 
these tasks is among the most sensitive indicators of brain damage (Kl0ve, 1974), 
and differential performance on these tasks may be of some value in localizing 
the site of damage (Boll, 1981; Lezak, 1983), that information is of limited value in 
planning and implementing intervention strategies. Patients may show deficits 
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in comp]ex, nonverbal problem-solving skiHs (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) due to 
cognitive perseveration, assuming a very stimulus-bound approach to the task, 
inability to generate alternative hypotheses, inability to maintain cognitive set, or 
a variety of other reasons. All of these approaches may yield similar quantitative 
(error) scores, leading to similar interpretive conclusions in the 
neuropsychological evaluation, yet these scores are of little va]ue in directing 
attention to the specific cognitive skills which are deficient in producing this 
result or in suggesting specific remediation strategies. 
The problem which this study addressed was that conventional 
administration of both the CT and the WCST yie]ds only quantitative scores 
which do not support inferences concerning the cognitive strategies used on 
these tasks by individual patients. It has been suggested that asking patients to 
verbalize their reasoning on these tasks may be one method for assessing the 
cognitive processes employed by patients as they seek to solve the problems 
presented to them by these tasks (Bond & Buchtel, 1984). Others have also 
recommended this methodology as a means of clarifying the reasoning 
underlying patients' responses (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985), but use of this approach 
has not previously been reported in the clinical or research literature; 
In view of the need for a more accurate description of the cognitive deficits 
that characterize the problem-solving behavior of patients with brain injuries, the 
purpose of this study was to devise a coding system to classify CT and WCST 
responses using a "think aloud" methodology, in order to achieve the following 
goals: (a) describe the cognitive strategies employed by individual patients in 
performing these tasks, and (b) differentiate the cognitive strategies assessed by 
the CT versus the WCST. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Both the Halstead Category Test and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test have 
been extensively validated, but the focus of much of this research activity has 
been concerned with accurately discriminating brain-damaged from a variety of 
nonbrain-damaged groups, or differentiating a variety of brain-damaged groups 
from each other. While this approach is useful from a diagnostic perspective, it is 
entirely "conceptually opaque" (Bertram, 1984), and adds little to understanding 
what is being measured. This literature, therefore, is generally peripheral to the 
purpo ses of the proposed research, and will be only selectively reviewed here 
within the conte xt of providing background history. The theme of the review of 
the literature which foJJows will be to describe research to date which elucidates 
the nature of the cognitive processes required for successful performance on the 
CT and WCST. Toward this end, literature relating to the development and 
construct validity of the CT will be considered first, followed by a review of the 
literature relating to the development and validation of the WCST. Those few 
studies which have directly compared performance on both tests will also be 
described, with a view toward elucidating the basis of common and unique 
variance. 
The Halstead Category Test 
Historical Background 
Until the beginning of this century, most theories of cerebral functioning 
sought to associate specific cognitive "faculties" with discrete areas of the brain, 
although this was by no means a universal view. Flourens (1794-1867), for 
example, anticipated the notion of equipotentiality, arguing that the extent of 
tissue damage is more critical than the specific site of damage (Walsh, 1987). 
However, the theory of functional localization gained preeminence with Paul 
Broca's demonstration that articulate speech was impaired in patients with 
lesions in the posterior portion of the left frontal lobe. That discovery 
precipitated intensive efforts to localize other faculties in specific regions of the 
brain (Filskov, Grimm, & Lewis, 1981). However, a combination of influences 
produced a reaction against the excesses of functional localization. In the 
interval between the two world wars, the experimental work of Karl Lashley 
supported a shift of emphasis to more global theories of cerebral functioning 
(Lezak, 1983). In studies of the effects of cortical ablations on maze learning in 
rats, Lashley demonstrated that the mass of intact brain tissue is more critical 
than location of lesions . Thus, different cortical regions were seen as 
equipotential in subserving specific functions (Filskov et al., 1981). 
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Aga inst this background, Kurt Goldstein's work with brain-injured 
individuals prompted him to theorize, drawing upon Hughlings Jackson's work 
(Chapman & Wolff, 1959), that the brain is organized in hierarchical levels, with 
higher levels inhibiting and subsuming the functions of lower levels. Goldstein 
postulated that cerebral insults caused regression to more primitivelevels of 
functioning due to disinhibition of lower levels. Such regression could be chiefly 
distinguished by manifestation of the "concrete attitude" and loss of capacity for 
the "abstract attitude" (Goldstein, 1940). That distinction was described as 
follows: 
The concrete attitude is realistic. It does not imply conscious activity in the 
sense of reasoning, awareness or a self-account of one's doing. We surrender 
to experiences of an unreflective character: we are confined to the immediate 
apprehension of the given thing or situation in its particular uniqueness. This 
apprehension may be by sense or percept, but is never mediated by 
8 
discursive reasoning. Our thinking and acting are directed by the immediate 
claims which one particular aspect of the object or of the outerworld situation 
makes .... The abstract attitude embraces more than merely the "real" 
stimulus in its scope. [t implies conscious activity in the sense of reasoning, 
awareness and self-account of one's doing. We transcend the immediately 
given situation, the specific aspect or sense impression: we abstract common 
from particular properties; we are oriented in our action by a rather 
conceptual viewpoint, be it a category, a class, or a general meaning under 
which the particular object before us falls. We detach ourselves from the 
given impression, and the individual thing represents to us an accidental 
example or representation of a category. (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1941, pp. 2-4) 
Goldstein and his co-workers devised a series of sorting tasks to assess the 
abstract attitude, but evaluated patients' performances qualitatively as they 
viewed abstract vs. concrete thought as dichotomous. Goldstein argued: 
Even in its simplest form, ... abstraction is separate in principle from concrete 
behavior. There is no gradual transition from the one to the other. The 
assumption of an attitude toward the abstract is not more complex merely 
through the addition of a new factor of determination; it is a totally different 
activity of the organism. (Goldstein, 1940, p. 258) 
Within this historical context, the emergence of the assumption that 
organicity was characterized by "a central and therefore universal defect" 
(Lezak, 1983) appeared reasonable. It is not surprising, consequently, that 
unidimensional tests of "organicity" to distinguish brain-damaged from 
nonbrain-damaged patients proliferated (Boll, 1981). However; that goal was 
elusive. Goldstein's qualitative sorting tasks appeared to have some potential in 
this regard, but inadequate quantification procedures impeded further 
development (Berg, 1948). 
Development of Halstead's Battery 
Halstead (1947a) approached the problem from a somewhat different 
perspective. He was keenly aware that these attempts to diagnose organicity 
failed to address the essential question of how biological changes in brain 
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damage influenced behavioral or psychologicaJ events. This, then, became his 
goal. Toward that end, Halstead developed or adapted a variety of tasks which 
tested various domains of behavior, carefully specifying location and extent of 
brain lesions in his patients who had been referred to him by cooperating 
neurologists in the University of Chicago Department of Medicine. He selected 
those tests which were readily subject to quantification, and submitted the results 
of 50 patients who had undergone Jobectornies and 30 control subjects to both 
Holzinger (Halstead, 1945) and Thurstone for factor analysis . Both solutions 
produced four discrete factors, but Thurstone's analysis formed the basis for 
Halstead's Theory of Biological Intelligence (1947a), by which he sought to relate 
the adaptive coping of the individual to the intact functioning of the central 
nervous system. These four factors included: 
1. A central integrative field factor C. This factor represents the organized 
experience of the individual. It is the ground function of the "familiar" in 
terms of which the psychologicaHy "new" is tested and incorporated. It is 
a region of coalescence of learning and adaptive intelligence. Some of its 
parameters are probably reflected in measurements of psychometric 
intelligence which yield an intelligence quotient. 
2. A factor of abstraction A. This factor concerns a basic capacity to group to 
a criterion, as in the elaboration of categories, and involves the 
comprehension of essential similarities and differences. It is the 
fundamental growth principle of the ego. 
3. A power factor P. This factor reflects the undistorted power factor of the 
brain. It operates to counterbalance or regulate the affective forces and 
thus frees the growth principle of the ego for further ego differentiation. 
4. A directional factorD. This vector constitutes the medium through which 
the process factors, noted here, are exteriorized at any given moment. On 
the motor side it specifies the "final common pathway," while on the 
sensory side it specifies the avenue or modality of experience. (p. 147) 
Included in the group of 10 tests (see Table 1) validated by Halstead was the 
Category Test, which had evolved from stimuli similar to Goldstein's sorting 
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Table l 
Description of Original Halstead-Reitan Neuropsycho]ogical Battery 
Test Description 
l. Category Test: Subject is presented with 208 stimulus figures on a milk 
glass screen projection apparatus. Below the screen are four numbered 
levers, and the subject is instructed to pull the numbered lever which 
corresponds to the number which is suggested by the figure presented. If 
the response is correct, a bell sounds; if not, a harsh buzzer sounds. 
2. Critical Flicker Test Frequency: An electronic instrument with a short flash 
duration provides light of variable frequency. The subject's task is to adjust 
a knob until the variable frequency light appears to fuse into apparently 
steady light. Score is light frequency, in cycles per second. 
3. Critical Flicker Test Deviation: Deviation from mean values of Critical 
Flicker Frequency for five successive trials. 
4. Tactual Performance Test -Total Time: A form board with 10 geometric 
figures cut into the board is placed on a stand in front of the subject, along 
with wooden blocks which fit into each space. The subject is blindfolded 
and must fit each block into the correct space, first using only the preferred 
hand, then only the nonpreferred hand, then both hands together. Score is 
total time for the three trials. 
5. Tactual Performance Test - Memory. After completion of the third trial 
(described above), the subject is asked to draw a picture of the board, 
which he/ she has never seen, with as many of the geometric figures as 
possible in the correct placement on the board. Score is expressed in terms 
of number of geometric shapes correctly recalled. 
6. Tactual Performance Test - Localization: Score is number of geometric 
shapes correctly localized in drawing described above. 
7. Rhythm Test This is a subtest of the Seashore Test of Musical Talent. The 
subject is required to differentiate which of 30 pairs of rhythmic sounds are 
the same and which are different. Number of correct responses are 
transformed into a rank score, ranging from 1-10. 
8. Speech Sounds Perception Test: 60 oral nonsense words, which are variants 
of the "ee" sound, are presented. Subject must determine which of four 
alternatives were presented. Score is number of errors. 
9. Finger Oscillation (Tapping) Test: Subject must tap a finger tapping device 
with the index finger of each hand for five trials of 10" each. 
10. Time Sense Test - Memory Component: Subject presses a key which 
permits a sweep hand to rotate on a clock face. The task is to stop the 
sweep hand after 10 rotations in the same position in which it started. 
After 20 trials, the clock face is removed, and the subject must duplicate the 
visually controlled performance as closely as possible. The score is error 
made for memory trials. 
Adapted from Reitan (1966b) 
Cut-Off 
Score 








5 figures and 
below 




8 errors and 
above 
Mean score of 
50 and below 
261 and above 
1] 
tasks. These tasks required subjects to sort objects into hierarchical categories 
(Weigl, 1941). Halstead's initial quantitative analysis of the results clearly 
differentiated brain-lesioned patients from normal subjects, though qualitative 
analysis did not support Goldstein's prediction that the strategies employed by 
the two groups would be qualitatively distinct (Bertram, 1984). In Thurstone's 
factor analysis, this test loaded most highly on the abstraction factor (A), with 
secondary loading on the central integrative factor (C) (Halstead, 1947a). These 
results suggested that the Category Test demands abstraction of salient features 
of the stimuli presented and the capacity to integrate new with previously 
learned information. 
Further development and validation of HaJstead's battery of tests was 
undertaken by his former student, Ralph Reitan, who initiated a series of studies 
with the goal of validating the usefulness of Halstead's 10 measures (derived 
from seven tests) in differentiating brain-damaged from nonbrain-damaged 
patients . Although he stated that he employed the "same tests administered in 
the same way" (Reitan, 1955a, p. 29), in fact, in consultation with Halstead 
(Wetzel, 1983), he shortened the Category Test to 208 items and deleted two of 
the nine original subtests, proportionally decreasing the criterion error score 
from 80 to 50 errors. 
The current version of the CT retains that format. As presently constituted, 
the CT consists of photographic slides of geometric figures of systematically 
varied complexity, organized into seven subtests presented in sets of similar 
items ranging in number from 3 to 17, though a number of items are presented 
singly. Test subjects are informed as follows (after completing the initial practice 
items which comprise Subtest I): 
... This test is divided into seven subtests. In each subtest there is one idea 
or principle that runs throughout the subtest. Once you have figured out 
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what the idea or principle in the subtest is, by using this idea you will get the 
right answer each time. Now we are going to begin the second subtest and 
the idea in it may be the same as the last one or it may be different. (Reitan, 
1979, p. 33) 
These instructions are reiterated throughout the test in abbreviated form, in 
order to clarify the task as much as possible. Further, Reitan emphasized that the 
subject's task is discovering the organizing principle in each subtest, not 
discovering what is required by the .task. Therefore, rephrasing and repeating 
instructions as necessary is encouraged. 
The slides are displayed on a screen with four numbered response keys below 
the screen, and the subject is instructed, "Something about the pattern on the 
screen will remind you of a number between one and four ... " (Reitan, 1979, p. 
33). The subject presses the key corresponding to that number for each slide to 
obtain feedback concerning response accuracy. A correct response sounds a bell, 
while an incorrect response causes a harsh buzzer to sound. 
The first two subtests are essentially practice items, and few subjects, even 
those who are severely impaired, miss more than one or two items. Subtest I 
consists of 8 items and requires the simple matching of Roman Numerals to the 
appropriate response key. Subtest II has 20 items and requires simple counting 
of the number of designs on each slide. Subtest ill contains 40 items and requires 
identification of the linear position of the form which is most dissimilar from the 
other three. Subtest IV also has 40 items and requires identification of the 
quadrant of the design, numbered clockwise, which is discrepant. Each 
quadrant on the first six items of this subtest contains a Roman Numeral 
corresponding to the number of the quadrant, thereby providing practice items 
to familiarize the subject with the correct principle. Subtests V and VI each 
consist of 40 items and are based upon the same principle. The subject is 
required to select the lever that corresponds to the numerator of the fraction of 
the figure which is pictured (1 / 4, 2/ 4, 3/ 4, 4/ 4). The final subtest contains 20 
items which review the principles contained in the first six subtests, and is 
commonly regarded as a memory task (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985). 
Predictive Validity 
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Reitan's (1955a) original cross-validation of Halstead's battery established the 
methodology for much subsequent validation research in neuropsychology 
(Goldstein, 1969). In this initial demonstration of that model, Reitan compared 
50 pairs of subjects, matched for age, sex, education, and ethnic origin, with one 
member of each pair with confirmed brain damage, and the other member of the 
pair serving as a control subject 1. Results of these pairwise comparisons 
indicated that al1 tests in the battery, with the exception of two measures based 
on Critical Flicker Fusion, discriminated between the two groups of subjects at 
levels equal to or greater than those in Halstead's originalstudy. 
In this analysis, the Category Test proved to be the most accurate 
discriminator of all the tests administered, second only to Halstead's Impairment 
Index, a summary measure computed as the proportion of measures which 
exceed the criterion for discriminating impaired vs. normal performance. In a 
subsequent study, Reitan (1956) demonstrated that the CT error score correlated 
substantially with the Impairment Index (r=.71 for brain-damaged subjects and 
r=.50 for nonbrain-damaged subjects), and he concluded that the CT is a 
multidimensional task in terms of cognitive and perceptual elements. That 
complexity is confirmed by findings (Reitan, 1955a) that the sensitivity of the CT 
1Control subjects consisted of 13 paraplegics, 17 depressed inpatients, 6 patients with acute 
anxiety state, 2 obsessive-compulsive neurotics, and 12 "normals." 
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to cerebral impairment is not confined to specific lesion sites. These resu1ts have 
subsequently been confirmed by numerous other investigators. For example, in 
their cross-validation of Reitan's (1955a) results, Vega and Parsons (1967) 
compared the performance of a group of 50 persons with confirmed brain-
damage representing a variety of etiologies and 50 control subjects without 
evidence of brain pathology on Halstead's measures, which by this time were 
referred to as the Halstead -Reitan Neuropsychological Battery. Again, all 
measures discriminated between the two groups at a level far exceeding chance 
(p <.001) for all but the Time Sense Test. However, using the recommended cut-
off score on the Impairment Index (.6), 54% of the control subjects were 
misclassified as brain-damaged, but upward adjustment of the cutoff score to .7 
yielded a correct classification rate of 73%. The less than expected efficiency of 
this battery, including the CT, in accurately discriminating groups was attributed 
to the fact that the control subjects were "malfunctioning individuals" (p. 623) 
resembling "pseudoneurologic" patients and were older than subjects in other 
studies reported in the literature . 
Heilbrun (1962) suggested that it is precisely this form of discrimination 
which is most useful in clinical neuropsychological evaluations. Most often, 
neuropsychologists are asked to assist in ruling out organic pathology when 
patients present neurologic-like symptoms. Addressing this problem, Matthews, 
Shaw, and Kl0ve (1966) compared the performance of 32 brain-damaged patients 
with 32 "pseudoneurologic" patients, hospitalized with complaints of headaches, 
paraesthesias, motor weakness and/ or incoordination, gait disturbance, visual 
difficulties, or ictal episodes simulating epilepsy, but for whom extensive 
neurological testing yielded negative results. Both groups were matched on age, 
sex, and years of education, thus maximizing the similarities between the groups. 
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Again, all measures, including the CT, significantly discriminated between the 
groups. The authors reported that no single measure by itself was able to obtain 
accurate agreement with neurological findings for members of both groups on 
this difficult task, but the example they provided for the composite Impairment 
Index, comprised of 10 separate measures, indicated a rate of correct 
classification of 83%, which compared very favorably with the accuracy of other 
techniques. 
Shaw (1966) found a significant correlation (r=.64) between magnitude of total 
error score on the CT and Severity Continuum scores, computed as an expanded 
Impairment Index utilizing nine HRNB variables, for a heterogenous group of 
674 subjects referred for neuropsychological evaluation, indicating 41 % common 
variance between these measures . Numerous other studies have confirmed the 
usefulness of the CT in discriminating brain-damaged from nonbrain-damaged 
groups (Hevern, 1980; Kl0ve, 1974), although it has been much less successful in 
discriminating between brain-damaged and psychiatric patients, possibly 
because of the organic basis of many psychiatric disorders (Goldstein, 1969). 
Localization Studies 
Despite Halstead's initial claims that the CT effectively discriminated between 
patients with frontal lobe lesions and posterior lesions (Halstead, 1939; Halstead, 
1940; Halstead, 1947a; Halstead & Settlage, 1943; Shure & Halstead, 1958), 
subsequent researchers have failed to confirm consistent localizing effects for 
either caudality or laterality. Walsh (1987) noted that the original claims were 
based upon small group comparisons and levels of statistical significance were 
accepted which were far short of those which are conventional today. Chapman 
and Wolff (1959) reanalyzed Shure and Halstead's (1958) data, controlling for 
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size of cerebral lesions, laterality, and locus (frontal vs. nonfrontal), and found no 
significant main effects for side or site of lesion, but degree of impairment on the 
CT was directly related to the mass of cerebral tissue affected. Those findings 
were confirmed by Matthews and Booker (1972), who correlated 
pneumoencephalographic measurements of ventricular size with 
neuropsychological test performance. The CT was one of only 3 of 24 
neuropsychological measures that showed significant differences on all three 
ventricular size group comparisons (largest vs. sma11est planimeter and linear 
measurements of the lateral ventricles and largest vs. smallest third ventricle 
measurements). 
McFie and Piercy (1952a) found that left brain-damaged patients performed 
significantly worse on a task (Weigl, 1941) with which the CT shares common 
ancestry, in comparison with right brain-damaged patients, appearing to suggest 
a role for language mediation on this task, but no difference in performance was 
found for aphasics vs. nonaphasics within the left brain-damaged group, as 
might be expected if this task were facilitated by linguistic analysis. De Renzi, 
Fagliori, Savoiardo, and Vignola (1966), employing a modified version of Weigl's 
Test, also found poorer performance by left-brain-damaged patients, but only 
those with aphasic symptoms, in comparison with right brain-damaged and 
nonbrain-damaged hospitalized control patients. Left brain-damaged 
nonaphasic patients performed more like right brain-damaged patients and 
control patients. De Renzi et al. postulated that these discrepant results reflected 
different proportions of patients with prefrontal lesions in their left brain-
damaged group in comparison with those studied by McFie and Piercy, due to 
differing etiologies, and frontal dysfunction has been specifically associated with 
impaired abstracting ability (Milner, 1963) 
Although this task is similar in some respects with the CT, similar results 
have been inconsistently obtained with the Category Test. Reitan (1960) 
investigated the relationship between thinking and language by comparing 
performance on neuropsychological testing, including the CT, of 32 dysphasic 
patients and 32 nondysphasic patients, matched, insofar as possible, on sex, 
color, chronological age, years of education, and type of brain lesion. Verbal 
subtests of the Wechsler-Bel1evue Scale of Adult Intelligence significantly 
discriminated between groups, but both groups were approximately equally 
impaired on the CT, prompting Reitan to conclude that language skills are less 
important in complex thinking than was generally presumed. 
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Similarly, Doehring and Reitan (1962) found no significant difference in CT 
total error scores for 50 left brain-damaged patients in comparison with 50 right 
brain-damaged patients, although both groups were significantly impaired in 
comparison with a nonbrain-damaged comparison group, and both brain-
damaged groups displayed a pattern of performance on the Wechsler-Bellevue 
Adult Intelligence Scale consistent with site of lesion.· Subtest analysis of all three 
groups revealed a similar pattern of relative performance across all CT subtests, 
suggesting that differential patterns of brain damage did not result in 
qualitatively different patterns of cognitive processing. 
Parsons, Jones, and Vega (1971) obtained similar results in comparing the CT 
performance of left and right brain-damaged patients matched for general level 
of psychological impairment. Both groups were impaired in comparison with a 
nonbrain-damaged comparison group, but did not differ from each other with 
respect to total error score. However, the left brain-damaged group made 
significantly more errors on Subtest IV in comparison with Subtest III than the 
other groups. It was suggested that these results may have resulted from the 
verbal content (Roman Numerals) of the sample items on this subtest, with 
which left brain-damaged patients might be expected to have difficulty. 
However, that pattern is discrepant with results obtained by Doehring and 
Reitan (1962). 
18 
Schreiber, Goldman, Kleinman, Goldfader, and Snow (1976), using 
neurological diagnosis as a criterion, evaluated the accuracy of the HRNB in 
discriminating brain-damaged from nonbrain-damaged patients and localizing 
lesion site. They found the CT to be the single most sensitive test of brain 
damage, but it was not useful in identifying lesion site. Similar results have been 
reported by Matthews and Booker (1972), Goldstein and Shelly (1973), Russell 
(1974), and Bornstein (1986). 
Thus, somewhat paradoxically, although CT performance is regarded as a 
reflection of perceptual organization or visuospatial skills, which are genera11y 
attributed to predominantly right hemisphere functions (Lansdell & Donnel1y, 
1977), it has repeatedly been found to be insensitive to lesion site. Reitan 
attributed this paradox (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) to the complexity of skills 
required by this task which necessarily involves, in addition to visuospatial 
elements, adequate visual memory, abstract reasoning skills, and the ability to 
translate visual stimuli into verbal concepts (Rothke, 1986), reflecting the overall 
integrity of the cerebral cortex. 
On the other hand, Doehring and Reitan, in an earlier study (Doehring & 
Reitan, 1961), compared the performance of brain-damaged patients with right 
or left homonymous visual field defects, brain-damaged patients without visual 
field defects, and nonbrain-damaged patients on neuropsychological tests, 
including the CT. All tests administered significantly discriminated the 
nortbrain-damaged · comparison group from the three brain-damaged groups and 
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visual field defects did not produce significantly more impaired performance 
than brain-damage not associated with visual field defects. Surprisingly, patients 
with left visual field defects were significantly more impaired on the CT than 
patients with right visual field defects, implicating right hemisphere dysfunction 
with poorer CT performance. The authors postulated, given a similar pattern of 
results on Total Time on the Tactual Performance Test, that right hemisphere 
mediated deficits in shape recognition may account for these results, a conclusion 
which seems intuitively reasonable given the strong association of the CT with 
the Block Design subtest on the WAIS, which is generally viewed as a 
predominantly right hemisphere -mediated task. 
However, the failure of subsequent studies to replicate those results has led to 
inferences that the CT lacks localizing significance due to the complexity of the 
task which calls upon multiple cortical systems (Bornstein, 1986) Nonetheless, a 
more recent study which has obtained results reminiscent of Doehring and 
Reitan's earlier findings again raises questions concerning possible lateralization 
· of CT performance. Winkleman (1982), in seeking an optimal combination of 
measures not dependent upon intact motor/ sensory skills that would accurately 
discriminate right hemisphere deficits, unexpectedly found that the CT alone 
discriminated lateralization of lesions nearly as well as a combination of 
measures identified through a review of the literature. The CT, in combination 
with the Picture Arrangement subtest of the WAIS, equaled the discriminating 
power of the literature-derived battery. Winkleman suggested that these 
discrepant results may have been due to differences in the rehabilitation 
population she studied in contrast to the acute care population referred for 
neuropsychological evaluation in most medical centers, from which most 
previous studies have drawn their subjects. The possibility that a systematic 
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difference in severity between right and left hemisphere groups may have 
accounted for these results was considered, but rejected. Rather, Winkleman 
suggested that recovery of function by nonfocally affected cortical tissue may 
have produced systematic differences in her rehabilitation population in 
comparison with an acute care population. This suggestion is reminiscent of 
Hughlings Jackson's argument that the signs and symptoms produced by specific 
brain lesions can only . be understood within the context of the manner in which 
those lesions affect the remaining intact cortical areas (Reitan, 1966b). 
Moderator Variables 
Discrepant results such as these point to the methodological problems faced 
by neuropsychological researchers who attempt to specify the cognitive 
processes tapped by a wide variety of behavioral measures. Since it is not 
feasible (nor desirable if it were) to randomly assign subjects to lesion groups in 
order to control for a host of organismic variables which may affect results in 
unknown ways, it is especially important to define .moderator variables which 
may systematically influence performance on the psychological measures of 
interest. A number of such individual variables have been identified whi .ch 
correlate substantially with CJ performance. 
In Halstead's (1947a) original validation of his battery of tests, he carefully 
specified age, sex, education, socioeconomic status, and occupation of his 
subjects, but apparently did not treat these demographic v.ariables as covariates 
of test performance . Nonetheless, in Reitan's (1955a) cross-validation, brain-
damaged and nonbrain -damaged subjects were matched for race, sex, age, and 
years of formal education, to control for possible confoundiµ.g effects produced 
by these demographic variables. This procedure yielded better discrimination 
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between groups than in HaJstead's original study (Parsons & Prigatano, 1978). 
Consequently, Reitan (1955b) investigated chronological age as an independent 
predictor of test performance for new groups of brain-damaged (N =194) and 
nonbrain-darnaged (N=133) subjects on Halstead's neuropsychoJogical battery of 
tests. Each group was divided into 5-year cohorts ranging in age from 15 to 65. 
For the brain-damaged group, age was only weakly correlated with the 
Impairment Index, a summary measure representing the proportion of tests 
performed within the brain-damaged range (r=.23), but the correlation was much 
more substantial for the nonbrain-damaged group (r=.54). Further analysis 
revealed that this relationship was primarily generated by subjects over 45 years 
of age. Under that age, no significant relationship between age and test 
performance was apparent. These results appeared to support evidence of 
organic brain changes in older adults, although it was noted that some 
individuals in each age group continued to score within the normal range. 
Subsequently, Reed and Reitan (1963a) compared the relative performance of 
a young brain-damaged group and a young nonbrain-darnaged group with the 
relative performance of an old nonbrain-damaged group (age 40-49) and an older 
nonbrain-damaged group (age 50 and above). The scores for each test on 
Halstead's battery were ranked from poorest to best performances for each group 
and the resulting distribution of ranks were converted to a normalized T-score 
distribution with a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10. T ratios were then 
computed for each test. The results for the young groups indicated the 
sensitivity of each test to the presence of brain damage, while for the older 
groups the resulting T ratios indicated the sensitivity of each test to differences 
associated with age. Results of the rank-order distributions for the two sets of 
comparisons suggested that the decrements in performance associated with 
brain-damage for the young group were similar to the decrements in 
performance associated with age for the older group (r=.49). Analysis of 
covariance revealed that educational differences between the two older groups 
were not responsible for these results. 
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Vega and Parsons (1967) obtained similar results in their cross-validation of 
Reitan's (1955a) validation study, although they found a substantial correlation 
with education (r=.56) as well as age (r=-.57) for their control group, whereas 
both correlations were significantly attenuated in the brain-damaged group 
(r=-.33 and r=.20, respectively). Both correlations were significant at p = .01 for . 
the nonbrain-damaged group, but for the brain-damaged group only age was a 
significant predictor, and only at the p = .05 level. The CT was the measure most 
highly correlated with age for both the brain-damaged and nonbrain-'damaged 
groups, followed by other complex measures (Tactual Performance Test and 
Impairment Index). It was concluded that this battery of tests, especially 
including the CT, is sensitive to any factor which impairs the integrity of physical 
and psychological functioning. 
The confounding role of nonbrain-damage variables, including age, 
education, and psychiatric status, was more specifically addressed in Prigatano 
and Parsons' (1976) cross-validation of Vega and Parsons' (1967) results. 
Whereas in the earlier study the brain:..damaged group was severely impaired, in 
the cross-validation study degree of impairment was more moderate. 
Additionally, the nonbrain-damaged g·roup in the cross-validation consisted of 
psychiatric patients referred for neuropsychological evaluation to differentiate 
neurological from pseudoneurological deficits. Age was again significantly 
correlated with all test variables for the nonbrain-damaged group, but education 
was not for either group, and the relationship between age and test performance 
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was attenuated by the presence of brain damage. The CT and other complex 
tasks continued to be strongly associated with age in this study, although the 
relationship was attenuated somewhat in the psychiatric control group. The fact 
that partialing out the contribution of education to test performance in the 
nonbrain-damaged group in the earlier study attenuated the relationship 
between age and test performance, but had no such effect on the nonbrain -
damaged psychiatric group in the cross-validation, appeared to suggest that . 
these patients failed to bring prior learning experiences to bear on solving 
problems, which the authors suggested may have prompted their referral for 
neuropsychological evaluation. 
This series of studies appears to suggest rather convincingly that 
chronological age is associated with predictable organic brain changes in most, 
but not all, individuals which impact problem-solving skills on 
neuropsychological tests in a manner similar to brain damage in younger 
subjects. However, in the presence of confirmed brain damage, the impact of 
chronological age is much less predictable. The contribution of educational level 
appears to be much more moderate. 
The specific pattern of cognitive changes associated with aging was 
investigated by Meyerink (1982). He studied 125 subjects with no evidence of 
neurological injury or disease, divided into five age groups: (a) 20-29 years of 
age; (b) 30-39 years of age; (c) 40-49 years of age; (d) 50-59 years of age; and (e) 
60-70 years of age. Multivariate analysis of variance, based uponHRNB 
performance, suggested that tests related to prior learning showed little change 
across age groups, and sensory input functions and simple motor functions also 
showed little change, but as tasks became more complex, greater deterioration of 
functions across age groups became evident. Thus, substantial decrement of 
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complex visual-spatial abilities occurred with advancing age, and tasks involving 
reasoning, abstraction, and logical analysis showed pronounced deterioration. 
Among the tasks most representative of these complex cognitive skills is the 
CT. Reed and Reitan (1963b) asked three experts to rate 29 tests, including the 
HRNB, on a continuum of those most highly dependent upon prior experience 
and learning to those most dependent upon immediate adaptive ability, with 
consideration given to the complexity of problem-solving involved. The CT was 
rated most dependent upon immediate adaptive ability and complex problem -
solving skills, and was also the task which best discriminated the performance of 
an older group (mean age = 52.96; S.D. = 6.27) and a younger group (mean 
age = 28.05, S.D. = 5.07). The differences between the groups on tasks rated most 
dependent upon previous experience and learning were minimal. These results 
were subsequently replicated on a group of 283 subjects with long -standing 
confirmed cerebral dysfunction, divided into old (mean age = 49.66, S.D. = 10.72) 
and young (mean age = 24.21, S.D. = 5.98) groups (Fitzhugh, Fitzhugh, & Reitan, 
1964). 
Mack and Carlson (1978) compared the performance of 41 bright, aged 
normal subjects (mean age= 69.76, S.D. = 4.87), 40 young normal subjects (mean 
age= 25.03, S.D. = 3.70), and 43 neurological1y impaired patients (mean 
age= 41.70, S.D. = 16.47) on the CT. Although the older group scored 
significantly higher on IQ testing (mean WAIS FSIQ 119.90) than either of the 
other two groups, they scored significantly worse than the young normal group 
and similar to the neurologically impaired group on all CT subtests and on total 
error score, although the young normal group .barely exceeded the cutoff for 
impaired performance. Both the aged and neurologically impaired groups 
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experienced significantly greater difficulty on the most complex subtests (III and 
V) than those which were somewhat less complex (V and VI). 
While the contribution of age to CT performance has been fairly consistent 
1cross studies, the contribution of education has been more variable. As noted 
>reviously, Vega and Parsons (1967) found significant education effects among 
heir nonbrain-damaged group, although less substantial than age effects, but 
)rigatano and Parsons (1976) cross-validation did not find significant 
:orrelations of education with CT performance for either their nonbrain-
iamaged psychiatric group or their brain-damaged group. However, Finlayson, 
ohnson, and Reitan (1977) did find that education substantially influenced CT 
>erformance, as did Ernst (1987), utilizing the Booklet Category Test (BCT), a 
>ortable form of the CT which yields comparable results (Defilippis, 
vfcCampbelJ, & Rogers, 1979). 
In view of this variability, Heaton, Grant, and Matthews (1986) performed a 
arge normative study (N=553), drawing normal subjects from three diverse 
;eographical areas, and investigating possible interaction effects among age, 
~ducation, and sex. Subjects were divided into three age categories (less than 40 
rears of age, 40-59 years of age, and over 59 years of age) and three education 
:ategories (less than 12 years of education, 12-15 years of education, and over 15 
1ears of education). Males and females were matched on age and education 
variables. Results indicated that age accounted for approximately 32% of the 
variance in CT total error score, while education accounted for about 13% of the 
variance. However, age by education interaction effects were evident. These 
effects suggested that the least educated individuals show the least adequate 
erfortnance initially and display the greatest decline from the young to middle 
age periods, but the best educated persons tend to "catch up" in old age, 
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showing little superiority at that point over the least educated individuals. 
Heaton et al. postulated that these results may reflect accumulated insults to the 
central nervous system that occur during the life span of the individual. 
This hypothesis receives some indirect support by the results of Reitan and 
Shipley's (1963) study concerning the relationship between changes in serum 
cholesterol levels and neuropsychological test performance. Serum cholesterol 
levels of 156 medically healthy individuals between the ages of 25 and 65 were 
measured at the beginning of the study, 6 months later, and again 12 months 
later. Differences in neuropsychological test performances at the beginning of 
the study and at the end were compared for younger (under 40 years of age) vs . . 
older (40 years of age or more) subjects, who had decreased serum cholesterol 
blood levels by 10% or more ·vs. those who had not decreased serum cholesterol 
levels. Results indicated that test-retest changes could not be attributed to 
decreased serum cholesterol levels for the younger group, but individuals in the 
older group who had not decreased serum cholesterol levels showed progressive 
decline in neuropsychological test performance in each 5-year interval between 
age 40 and 65, while those who had lowered serum cholesterol showed no such 
decline. These results appear to suggest increased vulnerability to cerebral 
insults among older persons, which may be reflected in relative impairment on 
tasks designed to assess cerebral integrity. 
Construct Validity 
Goldstein (1940) argued that the loss of the abstract attitude accompanying 
brain damage produced a qualitative difference in the cognitive behavior of 
brain -damaged persons in comparison with nonbrain-damaged persons. lf so, 
quantitative scores on a given task would be measures of different abilities, 
27 
precluding group comparison upon which research concerning the behavioral . 
consequences of brain damage was based. Reitan (1958) addressed this issue by 
reasoning that if performance on Halstead's battery assesses different cognitive 
processes in the two groups, that performance would be revealed by 
significantly different interrelationships between scores comprising the battery. 
Using results obtained in his (Reitan, 1955a) cross-validation study, Reitan found 
that the correlations between CT subtest scores for each group did not 
substantially differ. Subsequently, these results were cross -validated (Reitan, 
1959a). Each CT subtest is based upon a different principle, except for Subtests 
V and VI, which require a response based upon the proportion of the design that 
is pictured. Consequently, Reitan reasoned that if brain-damaged patients' 
performance is based upon qualitatively distinct processing characterized by an 
incapacity for assuming the abstract attitude, they will be unable to demonstrate 
improvement from Subtest V to Subtest VI, unlike nonbrain -damaged subjects. 
Results revealed that while absolute level of performance on CT subtests 
significantly discriminated the groups, the relationships among subtests were not 
significantly different for the two groups. Reitan concluded, therefore, .that 
similar cognitive processes were utilized by both groups in these studies, 
although the efficiency with which they did so was significantly different. 
Reitan assumed that the abstract organizing principle of proportionality was 
the governing principle utilized by both groups, with differing levels of 
efficiency, but inspection of the stimuli reveals that these are the only two 
subtests (other than one of the introductory subtests on which few patients make 
any errors) where a simple counting response would be reasonably successful. 
Thus, utilizing a concrete approach to this task may achieve a level of success 
statistically comparable to that achieved by deducing the abstract principle; 
Perhaps as a result of the quantitative tradition out of which the CT 
developed, only one study to date has examined such item-by-item response 
determinants. Simmel and Counts (1957) conducted extensive analysis of 
response determinants of CT performance for 21 patients who participated in a 
study of the effects of lobectomy on psychomotor epilepsy, 14 patients with 
psychomotor seizures who did not undergo surgery, and 26 student nurses. 
Results revealed that both patients' and nurses' responses to CT stimuli are 
stable and systematic, whether responses were correct or incorrect. 
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Simmel and Counts (1957) reported a large number of "correct" responses are 
"incidentally" rather than "essentially" correct; that is, correct responses were 
given for the wrong reasons. The most persistent response tendency identified 
was some form of counting conspicuous parts of the stimulus configuration --
number of stimuli presented, number of stimuli that were identical or similar, 
number of stimuli that were unlike the others, number of component parts in the 
stimulus configuration, number of similar or dissimilar stimub in spatial 
contiguity, et cetera. This was observed not only initially for each subtest, when 
subjects were attempting to discover the organizing principle, which they had 
been informed would remain the same throughout each subtest, but also often 
when the stimulus configuration within a subtest changed, even though they had 
previously demonstrated having learned the organizing principle. Simmel and 
Counts remarked, 11 ••• It appeared almost as if our subjects said to themselves: 
'If in doubt, count"' (p. 137). This response tendency was attributed to several 
factors. First, the combined effect of the apparatus, the instructions, and the 
stimulus material encourage counting (see Appendix D). For example, the 
subject is instructed that the numbered response keys are to be used to 
communicate "a number suggested ... by the pattern on the screen" (p. 137). 
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Second, the organization of the CT reinforces counting responses. One of the 
introductory subtests, which serves as a training set, is based upon the principle 
of counting stimuli, a principle which requires apparently no learning trials, 
since few subjects make any errors on this subtest. Consequently, counting as a 
response tendency is well established prior to the presentation of the test stimuli. 
Simmel and Counts described counting as a "necessary but not sufficient 
condition for attaining essentially correct responses" (p. 137). Throughout the 
remainder of the test, counting continues to be rewarded, and the correct answer 
can be obtained by counting some feature on 75% of the 180 items in subtests III-
VII (excluding only the introductory subtests) . This would be sufficient to obtain 
a score within the normal range, if utilized consistently 2• 
Simmel and Counts (1957) reported that approximately one half of the items 
on the CT in this study showed nonrandom error distributions, indicating a 
systematic basis for subjects' incorrect responses. Further, it was noted that the 
same items which were difficult for patients were difficult for the student nurses, 
and both groups tended to make the same errors on those items . Those findings 
lend support to Reitan's conclusions concerning the comparability of cognitive 
processing for brain-damaged and nonbrain-damaged groups, although the 
reasoning on which those conclusions were based is not supported by this study. 
Slightly under one half of the items did show random error distributions, but 
Simmel and Counts observed that statistical random error distributions do not 
necessarily suggest that individual subjects are responding randomly to those 
items. For any given stimulus configuration, several alternative hypotheses are 
2Only 35 % of the items on subtest N will be correct using counting responses, but correct 
responses can be obtained on 85 % of the items on subtests III, V-VII using counting responses, 
although counting rules may need to change. 
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available as response determinants, Hypothesis A, Hypothesis B, Hypothesis C, 
et cetera. On those items where the stimulus characteristics do not "favor" a 
given alternative, which would bias the distribution of errors, each subject may 
systematically problem-solve among those alternatives, but choose different 
hypotheses for a given item. Thus, the group error distribution may appear 
random, when in fact it was individually systematic. Simme] and Counts (1957) 
commented: 
This assumption [the a priori assumption of the random nature of errors] is 
frequently stated explicitly, and even more often quietly implied in the 
treatment of correct and incorrect responses of a test, i.e., the "scoring" of the 
test. Specifically, it stated that, for any given test item, errors are made only 
because the subject does not know the correct answer, and that each of the 
various error alternatives is therefore equally likely to be selected. In other 
words, this assumes that the knowledge of the right answer is the one and 
only determinant of the subjects' responses, just as it is in fact the only 
determinant for the person who scores the test. Everything else is irrelevant 
for the tester, ergo it is thought to be for the subject. (p. 152) 
Frequently, both correct and incorrect responses may be the product of partial 
insight, or what Simmel and Counts called "working rules" (p. 147). This results 
from incidentally correct responses that are reinforced, at least on certain 
configurations, and therefore the hypothesis on which those responses were 
based is not rejected, but is not adequate to produce correct responses on all 
configurations. For example, on Subtests V and VI, on which Reitan's (1959a) 
study was based, the abstract principle is "proportion of the figure which is 
pictured within the solid lines," but "counting parts" of the figure can result in 
incidentally correct responses to as many as 73 of 80 items. This characteristic of 
the CT prompted Simmel and Counts to question the degree to which this may 
actually be considered a test of abstraction. They noted: 
Abstraction does demand the rejection of conscious and unconscious mental 
sets induced by the immediate perceptual characteristics of the stimuli, by the 
explicit and implicit features of the various aspects of the surroundings, by 
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learned content, and everyday common procedures and manipulations. 
However, while this holds for the principle of correct responses, it does not 
necessarily -- or even typically -- hold for the individual correct responses 
which are actually given by the subjects ... Therefore, a high number of correct 
responses does not necessarily reflect the attainment of the principle, nor does it 
indicate the level of abstraction at which the subject actually operated, nor the degree 
of abstraction. of 1Dhich e might be capable [italics theirs]. (p. 155) 
Simmel and Counts concluded, however, that the stimuli comprising the CT 
might serve as the basis for a test of abstraction and permit the response 
tendencies which they identified to be explored systematically. They suggested 
that individual differences manifesting in different response tendencies might 
have clinical implications. This suggestion has not been implemented in 
subsequent research, however . 
CT/ IO Covariation 
Simmel and Counts noted a substantial connection between IQ and CT 
performance for the patient population, although not for the student nurses, and 
suggested that errors may reflect abstraction difficulties or may be related to low 
intelligence. Other researchers have also found level of intellectual functioning 
to exert a substantial influence on CT performance for both brain-damaged and 
nonbrain-damaged subjects. In fact, it is the nature of that relationship which has 
served as the focus of investigations concerning the construct validity of the CT. 
The failure of psychometric tests of intelligence to reflect the biological 
condition of the brain is the factor which prompted Halstead (1947a) to devise 
measures of what he referred to as "biological intelligence," which he described 
as follows: 
[W]hat I mean by biolog ical intelligence raises a difficult problem in brief 
communication. Some years ago Cannon used the title The Wisdom of the 
Body for one of his books. I do not believe that Cannon intended to omit the 
nervous system in his concept. In biological intelligence I am trying to direct 
attention to the "wisdom of a healthy nervous system." It is my belief that 
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psychometric intelligence, as reflected by the I.Q., does not adequately 
indicate this 'wisdom' of the healthy or of its alterations in the pathological 
nervous system. We have repeatedly found normal or superior I.Q.'s in 
neurosurgical patients lacking up to one-fourth of the total cerebrum 
foJJowing frontal lobectomy. Yet our measurements of biological inteUigence 
indicate that these are not normal individuals ... Biological intelligence, we 
bebeve, with high adaptability, is the normal outcome of the functioning of a 
healthy nervous system. (Halstead, 1947b, cited in Reitan, 1956, p. 537) 
The insensitivity of psychometric intelligence testing to cerebral dysfunction 
was the subject of some controversy in the 1930's and 1940's when Halstead 
devised his tests of "biological intelbgence." This controversy focused on the 
function of the frontal lobes, which some researchers, including Halstead, 
believed had some special significance in subserving human intelligence. Some 
researchers reported decrements in inteJJectua] functions subsequent to frontal 
Jobe injury, while others found none (Walsh, 1987). In part, these discrepant 
findings stemmed from the nature of tasks employed. Intelligence tests at that 
time were highly verbal in content (Lansdell & Donnelly, 1977) and presumably 
heavily influenced by prior learning . This is the type of task which Heaton et al. 
(1986) found to be least sensitive to cerebral dysfunction. Halstead was the first 
researcher to devise a series of quantifiable tasks which reliably reflected brain-
behavior relationships (Goldstein, 1969). As noted previously, the CT is among 
the most sensitive of Halstead's measures of biological intelligence (Reitan, 
1955a), but somewhat paradoxically has been criticized for failing to assess 
cognitive abilities separate from psychometric intelligence (Rattan, 1986). This 
discrepancy is central to understanding what constructs are, in fact, measured by 
the CT. 
In Halstead's (1947a) factor analysis, the CT loaded predominantly on the 
abstraction (A) factor (.63), but also showed a secondary loading on the central 
integrative (C) factor (.49). Two other measures which also loaded substantially 
33 
on those same factors included the Henmon-Nelson Test of Mental Ability (.27, 
.58, respectively), a test of verbal intel1igence, and the Carl Hollow-Square Test 
(.45, .25), a test of nonverbal intelligence. Although these results have not been 
subsequently replicated and the latter tests have since disappeared from common 
usage, these factors appear to correspond to Horn and Cattell's (1966) theory of 
fluid and crystallized intelligence. Crystallized abilities referred to the influence 
of "experiential-educative-acculturation" variables, reminiscent of Halstead's 
conceptualization of psychometric intelligence, while fluid abilities were 
described as "the measurable outcome of the influence of biological factors" 
(p. 254), which Halstead called "biological intelligence." These results, then, 
suggested substantial overlap between psychometric and biological intelligence, 
but indicated also that these were not measures of identical constructs. 
Subsequent research has generally supported these conclusions, but discrepant 
findings have also been reported. 
Presently, the most commonly employed individual measure of adult 
intelligence in the United States is the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) 
or its successor, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R) (Lezak, 
1983). These measures, like their predecessor, the Wechsler-Bellevue Adult 
Intelligence Scale (W-B), consist of 11 subtests, each of which is converted to a 
standard score, allowing inter-subtest comparisons. Six of these subtest scores 
are summed to yield a Verbal Scale IQ score and five are summed to yield a 
Performance IQ score. The sum of the Verbal Scale scores and the Performance 
Scale scores yield an age-corrected Full-Scale IQ score. A variety of factor 
analytic studies have been conducted to ascertain the relationships among these 
subtests. These studies have consistently yielded three factor solutions, which 
have been referred to as Verbal Comprehension, Perceptual Organization, and 
Memory/ Freedom from Distractibility (Cohen, 1957; Leckliter, Matarazzo, & 
Silverstein, J 986; Matarazzo, 1972). While recent studies have found two stable 
factor patterns, Verbal Comprehension and Perceptual Organization, that have 
appeared little affected by neurological or psychiatric dysfunction (Fowler, 
Zillmer, & Newman, 1987; Zillmer, Fowler, Newman, & Archer , 1986), others 
have found that factor structure varies according to type of brain damage 
(Zimmerman, Whitmyre, & Fields, 1970). 
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Reitan (1956) correlated Wechsler-Bellevue IQ scores with performance on all 
HRNB variables, including the CT, for 50 brain-damaged subjects matched on the 
basis of sex, race, chronological age, and years of formal education with 50 
nonbrain-damaged subjects. Correlations between Verbal, Performance, and 
Ful1-Scale IQ scores and the CT ranged from .58 to .72 for both the brain-
damaged and nonbrain-damaged groups. These results suggest that 
approximately 34-52% of the variance on one measure can be accounted for by 
the other measure. All Wechsler-Bellevue subtest scores also showed substantial 
correlation with the CT. Unlike the age and CT relationship, the presence of 
brain damage did not significantly attenuate the IQ/ CT relationships. 
Reitan interpreted these results as supportive of Halstead's concept of the 
factorial structure of biological intelligence. This interpretation appears 
warranted not only on the basis of the shared variance between biological and 
psychometric measures of intelligence, but also in view of findings which 
demonstrate that IQ measures also are moderately successful in differentiating 
groups of brain-damaged from nonbrain-damaged patients. 
Goldstein and Shelly (1984) compared the discriminative validity of the 
HRNB, the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery (LNNB), and the WAIS. 
Results revealed that the WAIS correctly classified 65.5% of subjects, in 
comparison with 77.4% correct classifications for the HRNB and 79.8% for the 
-:..NNB. Misclassifications for the WAIS included significantly more false 
aegatives. 
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A variety of approaches for differentiating brain-damaged from nonbrain-
damaged subjects on the basis of W-B or WAIS performance have been 
presented, with variable results. Wechsler (1944) devised a Mental Deterioration 
Index (M.D.I.) which was computed as a ratio of subtest scores which did not 
vary significantly as a function of age, "Hold" subtests, and those subtest scores 
which show marked deterioration with increasing age, "Don't Hold" subtests. 
Wechsler proposed that Hold subtests on the Wechsler-Bellevue included 
Vocabulary, Comprehension, Picture Completion, Object Assembly, and 
Information. Don't Hold subtests included Arithmetic, Digit Span, Digit Symbol, 
and Block Design. Subsequent validity studies applying this procedure reported 
some success was achieved in discriminating nonbrain-damaged from brain-
damaged groups (Rogers, 1950a), but application to questions of differential 
diagnosis found disappointing results (Allen, 1948). Allen sought to improve 
discriminant validity by comparing performance on the two subtests seen as 
most resistant to cerebral dysfunction, Information and Comprehension, with 
performance on the two subtests seen as most sensitive to cerebral dysfunction, 
Digit Span and Digit Symbol, but these efforts were largely ineffectual (Blake & 
McCarty, 1948; Rogers, 1950b). Similar ratios were also proposed (Hewson, 1949; 
Reynell, 1944), but these were not substantially more successful in clinical 
application (Gutman, 1950). 
These approaches were characterized by an assumption that brain-damage is 
a diagnostic entity that will be manifest unidimensionally, while, in fact, as 
Reitan (1966a) noted, the effects of brain-damage are enormously complex and 
multidimensional. Somewhat more success has been achieved relating various 
patterns of performance on IQ tests to more specific patterns of brain damage. 
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Kl0ve (1959a) compared groups of patients manifesting a variety of 
differential EEG patterns, including a group with EEG abnormalities maximized 
over the right hemisphere and a group with EEG abnormalities maximized over 
the left hemisphere. Results of comparisons of these groups revealed that the left 
hemisphere group achieved Verbal IQ scores which were significantly lower than 
those achieved by the right hemisphere group, and vice versa with respect to 
Performance IQ scores, although in the latter case the difference was less 
pronounced, perhaps because three of five Performance Scale subtest 
comparisons were not significantly different. Two of these nonsignificant 
findings, for Picture Completion and Digit Symbol, might have been predicted as 
these are not viewed as lateralizing subtests. 
Doehring, Reitan, and Kl0ve (1961) compared the performance of patients 
with right homonyrnous field defects, indicating left hemisphere dysfunction, 
with the performance of patients with left homonyrnous field defects, indicating 
right hemisphere dysfunction, and two control groups. They found a pattern of 
performance similar to that reported by Kl0ve (1959a), with less consistent 
lateralization effects for Performance IQ scores, but subtest comparisons between 
the two groups revealed only 4 of 11 comparisons were significantly different 
and only one, Comprehension, reached the p<.01 level of confidence. 
Russell (1979) compared the performance of four groups of subjects 
manifesting differing patterns of cerebral functioning: (a) nonbrain-damaged 
control subjects for whom neurological examination had ruled out neurological 
problems; (b) neurology patients with slowly progressive diffuse cortical 
degenerative disease; (c) patients with acute right hemisphere lesions; and (d) 
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patients with acute Jeft hemisphere lesions. Results revealed three different 
patterns of performance on the WAIS. The first pattern was demonstrated by the 
control group and was characterized by normal performance or above on all 
subtests. The second pattern was characterized by relatively high verbal scale 
subtests, with Arithmetic somewhat more impaired, and relatively low 
Performance Scale subtest performance, except for Picture Completion. Thjs 
pattern was obtained by both diffusely impaired patients and right hemisphere 
impaired patients. The thlrd pattern consisted of slightly better Performance 
Scale scores, except for Digit Symbol, than Verbal Scale scores, but the difference 
did not obtain statistical difference. This pattern was achieved by left 
hemisphere impaired patients. 
Russell suggested these results appear to be produced by interactions of three 
effects of brain damage on IQ test performance. First, a general effect of brain 
damage appears to impair performance on all subtests, as evidenced by the 
signilicantly better performance of the control group across all tasks. However, 
some tasks are more sensitive to the effects of general cerebral impairment than 
others, presenting a pattern of deterioration somewhat similar to that observed 
by Wechsler and others, although the pattern of subtest deterioration appears to 
correspond roughly to the verbal/ performance dichotomy, except for Picture 
Completion, rather than in terms of formulas previously proposed. Second, in 
right hemisphere damage, which preferentially affects visual-spatial skills, Block 
Design, Picture Arrangement, and Object Assembly are significantly more 
adversely affected than verbal subtests. Third, in left hemisphere damage, the 
opposite pattern obtains, but is attenuated by the fact that these Performance 
subtests are also Don't Hold tests whlch are differentially sensitive to the general 
effects of brain-damage in comparison with Verbal Scale subtests, whlch are 
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Hold tests. Thus, the decrement in verbal skills associated with left hemisphere 
dysfunction tends to be offset by a similar decrement in nonverbal skills, as 
represented by Block Design, Picture Arrangement, and Object Assembly, 
because these are the tasks on the vVAIS which are most representative of 
Halstead's (1947a) concept of biological intelligence or Horn and Cattell's (1966) 
concept of fluid intelligence, and are differentially sensitive to general cerebral 
dysfunction. The marked difference between Verbal and Performance Scales for 
the right hemisphere impaired group reflected lateralization effects reinforced by 
deterioration effects. The pattern for the diffusely impaired patients was not 
differentiable from the right hemisphere group due to the greater sensitivity of 
Performance Scale subtests, except for Picture Completion, to general cerebral 
impairment, while for the left hemisphere patients lateralization effects on verbal 
subtests were offset by deterioration effects on performance subtests. 
While these individual effects of brain damage on IQ test performance have 
been previously well established (Reitan, 1955c), this pattern of interactions 
between lateralization effects and differential deterioration effects has not been 
identified. Russell noted that previous studies may have failed to discern the 
pattern of interactions due to the use of heterogenous samples of brain-damaged 
subjects and use of T-score means, which in normalizing subtest variability tends 
to minimize differentiable subtest sensitivity. Moreover, as Reitan (1959b) noted, 
no two groups of brain-damaged subjects are exactly comparable. This is 
especially true in studies comparing the performance of lateralization groups on 
psychological test variables, since not only may one group of subjects with 
lateralized brain damage not be comparable with a similarly defined group in 
another study, lateralization groups within the same study may not be 
comparable with respect to variables other than locus of lesion. For example, 
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severity of impairment may be systematicalJy different between right and left 
hemisphere lesion groups since severely impaired left hemisphere lesion subjects 
may be expected to display receptive and/ or expressive aphasia to the extent of 
being unable to comply with test instructions, whereas equivalent severity with 
respect to right hemisphere impairment may not preclude testing. In such a case, 
the relationship between test variables may vary as a function of severity rather 
than lateralization effects or deterioration effects per se, or some interaction 
between them. Nonetheless, some support for Russell's hypothesis may be 
found in Matthews and Reitan's (1964) meta-analysis comparing the Wechsler-
Bellevue performances of 20 groups of subjects (six right hemisphere, six left 
hemisphere, and eight nonlateralized brain-damaged groups) derived from six 
separate published studies (Doehring et al., 1961; Fitzhugh, Fitzhugh, & Reitan, 
1962; Kl0ve, 1959a; K10ve, 1959b; Kl0ve & Reitan, 1958; Reitan, 1955a). A 
correlation matrix for the 20 groups based upon rank orders of Wechsler-
Bellevue subtest means was computed. Somewhat greater consistency of 
correlations among rank-ordered subtest means was found for right hemisphere 
groups than for left hemisphere groups (median coefficients of .80 vs .. 67, 
respectively), and somewhat more consistency was also found among right 
hemisphere vs. nonlateralized group comparisons than among left hemisphere 
vs. nonlateralized group comparisons. These relationships are in the direction 
predicted by Russell, despite marked differences among the groups on a variety 
of other variables. 
Taken together, these studies provide suggestive support for the 
hypothesis that the factor structure of the WAIS and W AIS-R is invariant for a 
variety of diagnostic groups, but the relationship among subtests may be 
attenuated for at least some brain-damaged groups due to the greater sensitivity 
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of some Performance Scale subtests to the general effects of cerebral dysfunction. 
The nature of that relationship has not been identified, but the variability of the 
correlation between the CT and inteJlectual performances among different 
groups may provide some insight. 
Shore, Shore, and Pihl (1971) reported that WAIS Full Scale scores were the 
best predictor of CT total errors, correlating at =.87, for 29 nonbrain-damaged 
subjects. Correlations between CT total errors and Cohen's factors on the WAIS 
were similarly high: .84 with Verbal Comprehension, .72 with Perceptual 
Organization, 1.00 with Memory, and .76 with General Intellectual Functioning. 
Shore et al. concluded that these results were not consistent with the use of the 
CT to diagnose "organicity" independently of intelligence. 
However, Lin and Rennick (1974) obtained inconsistent results when they 
compared performance on the CT and the WAIS for two larger samples (N=177 
and 62) of epileptic subjects. In the first sample, correlations between CT total 
errors and Verbal Scale subtests were relatively moderate, ranging from .35 to 
.47, while correlations with Performance Scale subtests were somewhat higher, 
ranging from .37 to .59. The highest correlation was with Cohen's Perceptual 
Factor (.61), consisting of the sum of scaled scores on Block Design, Picture 
Arrangement, and Object Assembly. However, on the second sample, the 
relationships were reversed, and correlations with Verbal Scale subtests were 
now higher than for Performance Scale subtests. The highest correlations (r=.68) 
were with Verbal IQ and Cohen's Verbal Factor (sum of Information, 
Comprehension, Similarity, and Vocabulary) and Information (r=.69). 
Insufficient information is available to explain this variability, but Lin and 
Rennick suggested that the greater severity of the first sample may have 
influenced results. Additionally, many subjects in the second sample had 
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previously taken the WAIS and a practice effect may have elevated their scores, 
producing greater heterogeneity which tends to increase intercorrelation 
patterns. 
Lansdell and Donnelly (1977) factor analyzed the WAIS, CT, and Finger 
Tapping Tests of 94 patients, including 59 with psychiatric diagnoses (primarily 
depression) and 24 with neurological disorders (principally epilepsy). The mean 
CT total error score of the psychiatric subjects was 70.6, considerably greater than 
the mean error score of the neurological patients, 50.0, which was barely in the 
normal range. Factor analysis of scores for the combined group produced a four 
factor solution, including the usual three factors common the other factor 
analytic studies of the WAIS: Verbal Comprehension, Perceptual Organization, 
and Freedom from Distractibility (which Lansdell and Donnelly called 
numerical). The CT loaded predominantly on the Perceptual Organization 
factor, as did most Performance Scale subtests. Lansdell and Donnelly concluded 
that the CT does not measure an ability separate from nonverbal intelligence. 
Cullum, Steinman, and Bigler (1984) found higher correlations between 
Performance IQ and CT total error scores (r=.52) than between CT error and 
Verbal IQ scores (r=.31) or Full Scale IQ (r=.47) for 92 cerebral trauma patients 
with confirmed brain damage, although the authors did not report whether these 
correlations were significantly different statistically. They computed prediction 
formulas for estimating expected CT performance on the basis of given 
Performance IQ scores, although the normative value of predictions based upon 
a brain-injured population is of questionable use clinically. For example, 
predicted CT scores do not reach the normal range until Performance IQ exceeds 
120. In contrast, Logue and Allen (1971) computed a prediction formula using 
WAIS Full Scale IQ scores, based upon the relationship between CT total error 
score and Wechsler-Be11evue Full Scale IQ reported by Reitan (1959b) for 50 
normal subjects (r=.65), which did not predict impaired performance on the CT 
until Full Scale IQ scores fell below 70. 
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Corrigan, Agresti, and Hinkeldey (1987) also found a stronger relationship 
between Performance IQ and CT total errors (r=-.644) than between Verbal IQ 
and CT performance (r=-.111) for 102 patients in a rehabilitation hospital with 
diagnosis of either dosed head injury (CHI) or cerebrovascular accident (CVA). 
Multiple regression analysis revealed that Performance IQ accounted for 
approximately 36% of the variance in CT total errors, and age, which entered the 
equation next, accounted for an additional 26% of the variance. This combination 
of variables was viewed as somewhat redundant since Performance IQ is already 
age-corrected, and the addition of the age variable might be expected to 
contribute little additional variance. Consequently, the analysis was recomputed 
without an age correction, by summing the scaled scores for Block Design, 
Picture Arrangement, and Object Assembly, the triad comprising Cohen's 
Perceptual Organization factor. This nonage corrected variable was the only one 
that accounted for substantial variance (59%). The authors conduded these 
results suggest age affected both CT performance and this combination of WAIS 
subtest scores. 
Wiens and Matarazzo (1977) investigated the relationship between WAIS and 
CT performance for two groups of 24 young normal subjects with above average 
intelligence (mean age 23.6 and 24.8; mean FSIQ 117.5 and 118.3). Group II was 
used to cross-validate the results for Group I. Results revealed that only 
performance on the Block Design subtest significantly predicted CT performance 
for both groups, although when only Group I was considered, both Performance 
IQ and Full Scale IQ were significantly associated with CT performance (r=.68 
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and r=.56, respectively). These results suggest that for normal subjects with 
above average intelligence, individual differences in intellectual abilities may be 
of only minor significance with respect to problem-solving skills that are 
measured by the CT. 
Moses (1985) investigated the contribution of level of performance variability 
on HRNB measures, including the CT, for a heterogenous group of 480. He 
computed a series of multiple regression analyses, using each HRNB measure as 
the dependent variable and WAIS subtest scores as the predictor variables. With 
respect to the CT, the Block Design subtest accounted for approximately 34% of 
the variance in CT performance, followed by Arithmetic, Picture Arrangement, 
Vocabulary, Picture Completion, and Object Assembly, which together 
accounted for an additional 9% of the variance. 
When level of performance was estimated by the Impairment Index (not 
including the contribution of the CT in the ratio), which was entered into the 
equation first, results were virtually identical, with the same subtests entering 
into the same order, except for Object Assembly. This result was predictable in 
view of previous findings that the CT is essentially equivalent with the 
Impairment Index in discriminating brain damage (Reitan, 1955a). However, 
when level of performance was estimated employing a T-score mean (TMean) of 
all HRNB variables, derived from published score distributions, and again 
entered into the equation first, a substantially greater proportion of the variance 
in CT performance was explained, 56%. The TMean alone contributed 31% of the 
variance, followed by Block Design (an additional 20%). Digit Symbol, Picture 
Completion, Vocabulary, Arithmetic, and Picture Arrangement entered the 
equation next, accounting for an additional 2% of the variance. 
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Moses subsequently employed Russell, Neuringer, and Goldstein's (1970) 
Average Impairment Rating (AIR) as a level of performance estimator. The AIR 
rates performance on each measure of the HRNB on a four-point scale, to permit 
finer gradations in ratings of severity of impairment than the Impairment Index 
allows for. Entering AIR into the regression equation first accounted for 39% of 
the variance in CT scores, followed by Block Design, Vocabulary, Arithmetic, 
Picture Arrangement, and Digit Symbol, which together contributed another 7% 
of the variance. 
These findings have several implications. First, despite the substantial degree 
of relationship between CT and WAIS subtest performances, these were clearly 
not measures of identical constructs, and a greater proportion of the variance 
remained unexplained than was explained. Second, perceptual organization 
skills, especially as represented by the Block Design subtest, displayed a much 
stronger relationship with CT performance than verbal comprehension skills, yet 
CT performance does not vary with lateralization, as do perceptual organization 
skills. Third, a substantial proportion of that variance appeared to be 
represented by a factor related to intact cerebral functions, as represented by 
Russell et al.'s Average Impairment Rating. This factor appears similar to 
Halstead's biological intelligence or Cattell and Horn's fluid intelligence. 
Factor Analytic Studies 
The CT is the product of a factor analytic approach to identifying the 
cognitive sequelae of brain-damage. It is fitting, therefore, that factor analysis 
should be the methodology utilized for further investigations concerning the 
cognitive process variables which determine CT performance. A number of 
researchers have utilized this approach, usually assessing the CT in the context of 
all or part of the HRNB and a variety of other neuropsychological measures. 
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This technique offers the advantage that variance common to a number of tasks 
may be extracted and the cognitive processes contributing to such common 
variance may be more readily identified. Aftanas and Royce (1969) factor 
ana]yzed the performance of 100 normal persons ranging in age from 16 to 70 on 
a battery of 25 tests, chosen from an extensive literature review on the basis of 
validity, reliability, and objectivity of scoring procedures. The entire HRNB, 
except for Finger Oscillation, was included in this battery, but it did not include 
the Wechsler Scales. Factor analysis yielded 12 factors, but only three of these 
were readily interpretable. The CT achieved a modest loading (.443) on a factor 
interpreted as Perceptual Organization. Other variables which had high loadings 
on this factor included the TPT, Ravens Colored Progressive Matrices, Porteus 
Mazes, Memory-for-Designs, and Hooper Visual Organization Test. A common 
element required in all of these tests is the ability to integrate relevant aspects of 
nonverbal, perceptual stimuli for problem-solving. In that sense, this factor 
appears to relate to adaptive problem-solving behavior with limited reliance on 
previously learned skills, characteristics which are used to describe Halstead's 
biological intelligence. However, the relatively modest loading of the CT on this 
factor lends support to interpretations concerning the complexity of cognitive 
processes involved in CT performance -- at least for this normal population. 
Few other factor analytic studies utilizing normal subjects have been 
performed, but Barnes and Lucas (1974) performed separate factor analyses on 
test results of 39 subjects referred for routine psychological and 
neuropsychological evaluation for whom no neurological deficits were 
subsequently discovered, but who were diagnosed with neurosis or character 
disorders, and 77 subjects who were found to display definite neurological 
dysfunctions. All subjects completed the HRNB and WAIS, although only the 
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WAIS Full Scale score was entered into the correlation matrix. Both analyse s 
:iesu]ted in six factor solutions, with the CT loading on Factor I in both cases. The 
(T loaded on a factor which Barnes and Lucas named Basic Adaptive Ability or 
}iological Intelligence . A variety of measures that are especially sensitive to 
,erebral dysfunction loaded highly on this factor, including WAIS Full-Scale IQ. 
~hese results, therefore, do not support the distinction of psychometric versus 
iiological intelligence for either the psychogenic group or the organic group, but 
he failure to enter WAIS subtest scores separately leaves that question open. 
lames and Lucas suggest that cerebral dysfunction may impair cognition less 
7ervasively, if more severely, than nonpsychotic personality problems, but 
1bserve that Reitan (1956) has suggested that psychogenic -organic differences 
7robably relate more to a pattern of impairment than a dichotomous 
<haracteristic. 
Boyle (1988) also included normal subjects in his factor analytic study of the 
<onstruct validity of a shortened form of the CT, following the suggestion of 
Chelune (1983) that analyses of data across diagnostic groups have the advantage 
,£ increasing variability so that relationships are more easily seen. Like Barnes 
.nd Lucas, Boyle did not enter WAIS subtest scores in the correlation matrix, but 
lid enter Verbal and Performance IQ scores, as well as Full-Scale score . Results 
:evealed a high loading for all IQ scores on the same factor on which the CT also 
oaded highly. Boyle referred to this factor as a general intelligence factor. 
-Iowever, the high loading of education (.76), combined with the low loading for 
,ge (.19), and the substantially higher loading for Verbal IQ (.98) than 
Jerformance IQ (.66) might suggest, rather, that this factor represents 
Jsychometric intelligence. That conclusion would appear to be supported by the 
fact that the shortened CT loads only moderately (-.42) on this factor. The 
principal portion of the remaining variance in the CT was unexplained. 
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Boyle also reanalyzed Halstead's original (1947a) correlation matrix, using 
modern factor analytic techniques, and reported results similar to his own factor 
analytic study, with both nonverbal (Carl Hollow Square) and verbal (Henmon-
Nelson) intelligence measures loading to approximately the same degree on the 
same factor as the CT. Boyle again concluded that this factor represents a general 
cognitive-intellectual dimension, although again the equivalent loadings of the 
IQ measures on this factor (.56 and .59, respectively) might equa11y well support 
an interpretation similar to Halstead's Abstraction (A) factor . 
Other factor analytic studies have yielded findings more nearly comparable to 
Halstead's interpretation. Russell (1982) found the CT loaded principally on a 
nonverbal or figural factor, in an investigation of the factor structure of a research 
version of the Revised Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-R), and Goldstein and 
Shelly (1972) found the CT loaded on a factor which appeared to represent 
complex, primarily nonverbal problem-solving ability , in a large factor analytic 
study. All of the WAIS Performance Scale subtests, along with TPT and Trails B, 
loaded substantially on this factor, in addition to the CT, while no Verbal Scale 
subtest did. The Performance Scale subtests also loaded to a lesser degree, with 
the CT, on the same factor on which Verbal Scale subtests loaded highly. 
Goldstein and Shelly noted the similarity of this factor structure to that obtained 
by Halstead. 
Russell (1982) also found the CT loaded principally on a nonverbal or figural 
factor, in an investigation of the factor structure of a research version of the 
Revised Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-R). Similar findings were reported by 
Corrigan and Hinkeldey (1988), who concluded that this factor may represent 
more than one component, and suggested that it may be sensitive to 
nondominant cerebral hemisphere functioning and reflect active processing of 
nonverbal information. They suggested that unique patterns of performance 
may be related to particular clusters of patient abilities, and may be useful for 
clinical inference and rehabilitation . 
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. Several researchers have moved in that direction by separately considering a 
variety of variables which relate to CT task performance. Royce, Yeudall, and 
Bock (1976), in a continuation of the research of Aftanas and Royce (1969), 
addressed the task of identifying the brain correlates of cognitive factors in a 
factor analytic study in which CT subtest performance was analyzed separately. 
CT subtests loaded on three different factors. Subtest IV, which requires 
identification of the clockwise numbered quadrant of the design that is 
discrepant, loaded moderately (.40) on a perceptual organization factor, which 
also included most elements of the TPT, the Trail Making Test, parts A and B, 
and WAIS Block Design and Object Assembly, among other tests. This factor 
was interpreted as comparable to the Perceptual Organization factor identified 
by Aftanas and Royce. 
All CT subtests also loaded oh two factors identified as Halstead Abstraction I 
and II. Subtests V and VI comprised Halstead Abstraction I, with a lesser loading 
for Subtest VII (-.45), which is regarded as a memory subtest involving items 
from the previous six subtests. Subtests III and IV comprised Halstead 
Abstraction II, again with a lesser loading for Subtest VII (-.39). Royce et al. 
(1976) suggested that this multifactorial loading of CT subtests reinforced 
previous suggestions regarding the multidimensionality of abstract, problem-
solving behavior (Haynes & Sells, 1963). That interpretation is reinforced by 
different correlation patterns between each of these factors and brain-damage 
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sites. Royce et al. reported that factor scores on Halstead Abstraction I correlated 
with damage throughout the right hemisphere, whereas Halstead Abstraction II 
correlated with damage restricted to the frontal and parietal regions of the right 
hemisphere. This distinction supported suggestions that Halstead Abstraction I 
represented more factorially complex abilities than Halstead Abstraction IL 
Assumptions regarding the multidimensionality of the CT were reinforced by 
Holland and Wadsworth's (1976) findings that while none of five concept 
formation scores, including CT total errors and CT subtest scores considered 
separately, could discriminate schizophrenic from brain.damaged subjects, 
subtest IV minus subtest V did significantly discriminate between groups 
(although at a level well short of that required for clinical usefulness). 
Appraisal 
The CT has been described as a measure of complex concept formation, which 
has been defined in the following terms: 
It requires sophisticated ability in noting similarities and differences in 
stimulus material, postulating hypotheses which appear reasonable with 
respect to recurring similarities and differences in the stimulus material, 
testing these hypotheses with respect to positive or negative reinforcement 
... and the ability to adapt hypotheses in accordance with the reinforcement 
accompanying each response. (Reitan, 1967) 
Halstead defined this ability as "abstraction," and factor analysis revealed 
that the CT loaded more highly on this factor than any other test in his battery. 
Simmel and Counts' (1957) careful item-by-item analysis of patients' responses 
confirmed that this process appears relevant for essentially correct responses, but 
not necessarily for incidentally correct and incorrect responses. As a result, they 
noted, performance on the CT does not necessarily reflect abstraction or concept-
formation skills of particular subjects. 
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While the discriminant validity of the CT has been well-established, there has 
been no follow-up on Simmel and Counts' suggestion that individual variations 
in response determinants may well be clinically significant. Reitan (1958) sought 
to establish that both brain-damaged and nonbrain-damaged groups utilized 
similar cognitive processes in approaching the task presented by the CT, but his 
results may well have been obtained if one or both groups predominantly 
utilized concrete counting responses, rather than abstract principles, as he 
supposed. Criterion-related validity studies, using brain lesion sites and age and 
intelligence as criteria, and factor-analytic studies have confirmed that CT 
performance is sensitive to the integrity of the cerebral cortex, but the question of 
the nature of cognitive processes called upon in performing the task presented by 
the CT has produced much conflicting information. Research findings have 
generally suggested that the CT taps nonverbal problem-solving skills and so 
varies with Performance IQ (or Perceptual Organization ability), though CT 
performance is more sensitive to cerebral dysfunction than is Performance IQ. 
Results of studies have indicated, however, that skills assessed by the CT are 
essentially equivalent to those measured by Performance IQ and so are 
redundant in the neuropsychological evaluation. Still others have found the CT 
to correlate more highly with Verbal IQ. Other unresolved questions 
surrounding the CT relate to whether the relationship with Performance IQ is a 
function of the Perceptual Organization skills tapped by both measures, or if it 
relates to the distinction between previously learned skills and adaptive 
problem-solving skills not calling upon previous learning, or some interaction 
between these two skill domains. Questions have been raised, too, concerning 
the "odd" relationship of the CT to Perceptual Organization skills, wherein the 
latter are clearly lateralized to the right hemisphere but CT performance is not. 
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These inconsistencies have typically been resolved in the literature by 
describing the CT as a measure of complex nonverbal problem-solving skills, or as 
multidimensional. While this is clearly the case for group results, it may be less 
true in individual cases. As Simmel and Counts (1957) noted, individual 
patients' performances may be characterized by different cognitive features: 
Perhaps the behavior of some subjects is determined more strongly by the 
perceptual characteristics of the stimulus than that of others. Some subjects 
might be more affected by what they have learned on an immediately 
preceding group of items and may have special difficulty in rejecting what 
was, but is no longer, rewarded. Still other subjects may find it particularly 
difficult to free themselves of specific procedures which are practiced in 
everyday life and which have in the course of their long history achieved a 
considerable degree of automaticity. Still others may be more victimized by 
the mental sets induced by the explicit or implicit characteristics of the 
surroundings, e.g., the apparatus, the response keys, etc. Some subjects may 
have special difficulty in rejecting a dichotomous response tendency . For 
some, the variation of basic stimulus figures may be disorganizing, while 
others may profit from the changes and thereby attain principles of greater 
generality. (p. 156) 
The relevance of these individual differences for the cognitive behavior of 
individual subjects needs to be more fully explored, as suggested by Simmel and 
Counts. 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) is often regarded as similar to the 
CT with respect to the cognitive constructs measured by each. Both are 
purported to assess "abstract thinking," "concept formation," "conceptual 
flexibility," "problem-solving," and "new learning" (Strang, 1983). Both the CT 
and WCST were developed from common roots, but followed different paths of 
development (Perrine, 1984). Unlike the CT, much of the research related to 
development of the WCST focused on determination of the response 
determinants in contrast to clinical validation. A variety of quantitative process 
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g:ores were developed to describe subjects' performance. Only after testing 
11rocedures and scoring protocols were established within the context of concept 
brmation theory was the WCST applied to clinical uses. 
WCST Development 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test also combined many features from the 
Weigl (1941), Goldstein-Scheerer (1941), and Vigotsky Tests (Hanfmann & 
fasa nin, 1936) sorting tests employed by Goldstein and coworkers to assess 
,bstract thinking, with the difference that it permitted objective, quantitative 
~oring (Grant & Berg, 1948). Berg (1948) observed that neurologically intact 
Ihesus monkeys at the University of Wisconsin Primate Laboratory responded to 
mifts of positive and negative stimuli with no observable clues other than a 
<hange in stimulus object rewarded, but brain-lesioned monkeys lost their ability 
b follow shifting problems, although they were able to solve discrimination 
problems which did not require shifting. Consequently, she sought to apply this 
nethodology to assess human abstraction and shift of problem-solving set. 
Unlike the CT, the WCST was developed from the context of concept formation 
heory using nonclinical subjects. Berg devised 60 response cards, which 
yictured one to four geometric figures (stars, crosses, triangles, or circles), of 
iifferent colors (red, blue, green, or yellow). Thus, each card might be sorted or 
iategorized in terms of three dimensions: shape of stimuli, number of stimuli, 
.nd color of stimuli. Four stimulus cards were also created: (a) one red triangle; 
b) two green stars; (c) three yellow crosses; (d) four blue circles. Each of these 
rrimulus cards were also exactly reproduced in the response cards. Thus, 
~sponse cards might match stimulus cards on only one dimension, on two 
imensions, or all three dimensions. 
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Fifty-one psychology students at the University of Wisconsin were used as 
subjects. They were instructed, "I want you to put these cards into four groups, 
underneath the ones lying on the table. I will tell you whether you are 'right' or 
'wrong.' " If the subjects asked for more direction, instructions were repeated, "I 
will tell you whether you are 'right ' or 'wrong.'" The initially correct category 
was chosen arbitrarily in advance, and after each subject sorted five successive 
cards correctly, the "correct" category shifted without explanation, so that now 
the previously correct percept received feedback of "incorrect'' and a different 
category received feedback of "correct." When again the subject obtained five 
successive correct responses to the new percept, the category shifted to a third 
principle without warning. This continued until the subject had completed nine 
categories. 
Results revealed three different patterns of behavior for test subjects. Slightly 
less than one third of the subjects, Group A, readily deduced the nature of the 
task and were able to verbalize the rules without difficulty. Approximately 40% 
of the subjects, Group B, became confused when previously correct sorting 
principles received "incorrect'' feedback, and they showed perseveration to the 
former principle, even though it was no longer effective, and were unable to 
precisely verbalize the rules of the task. Nonetheless, these subjects were able to 
complete all nine categories. Slightly under one third of the subjects, Group C, 
showed extreme perseveration or extreme variability in their responses, 
sometimes continuing to sort to the previous principle for more than 100 trials. 
Testing was discontinued for subjects in this group due to time limitations. The 
difference in mean errors between Groups A and B was not significant until the 
fourth category, reflecting the greater learning curve of Group A. In contrast, the 
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difference between Group C and Groups A and B was significant by the second 
category. 
These suggestive findings were further explored by Grant and Berg (1948) in 
an investigation concerning the influence of reinforcement strength on shift of 
set. The card sorting task was modified somewhat in this study. Response cards 
were increased to two sets of 64 cards, representing all possible combinations of 
color (C), form (F), and number (N). Additionally, the initially correct sorting 
category was predetermined to be color, whereas previously it was randomly 
selected. This was followed by number, then shape, in the following sequence, 
C, F, N, C, F, N, and testing was discontinued after completion of six categories. 
Cards were presented in standardized order within sets as well, so that no like 
color, form, or number was presented consecutively. 
Psychology students at the University of Wisconsin again served as subjects, 
and were divided into seven groups of approximately 20 students in each group. 
Number of consecutively reinforced trials, ranging from three through eight and 
ten, was varied for each group. It was hypothesized that increased number of 
reinforced trials would decrease likelihood of shifting set. Responses were 
classified as (a) correct; (b) errors; (c) perseverative responses; or (d) 
nonperseverative errors. A perseverative response was defined as one which 
would have been correct in the immediately preceding category3. These 
responses were usually, but not always, errors and represented failures to shift 
solution. 
31£ responses were ambiguous (matched the stimulus card on more than one dimension, one of 
which was correct in the immediately preceding category) and were both preceded and followed 
by a perseverative error, it was counted as a perseverative response. For example, if the 
following responses were obtained, C, C, C, CF, C, CNF, C, F, F, F, F, F, after shifting from color 
(C) to form (F), scoring would be psv error, psv error, psv error, psv correct, psv error, psv 
correct, psv error, correct, correct, correct, correct, correct. 
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Contrary to expectations, increased number of consecutively reinforced trials 
did not decrease likelihood of shifting set; rather, the opposite result was 
obtained: Increased reinforcement increased the likelihood of shifting set when 
the previous response was no longer reinforced. This difference reaches 
statistical significance for categories five and six, when groups were combined 
into less reinforced and more reinforced groups. This effect was even more 
pronounced in a subsequent study by Grant and Cost (1954), where the number 
of consecutively reinforced trials was increased to 5, 10, 20, and 40, presented in 
the following order: C, F, N, C, F, N. Grant and Cost noted, however, that the 
distributions were markedly skewed and recommended the use of the following 
score transformation for purposes of group comparisons: tx = R(x+.5), where tx 
is the transformed score and x is the original frequency score. 
Subsequently, Grant, Jones, and Tallantis (1949) investigated the comparative 
difficulty of the various dimensions -- color (C), form (F), and number (N) -- as an 
influence on what was called for the first time the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. 
It was hypothesized, based on Heidbreder's (1948) and Heidbreder and 
Overstreet' s (1948) research concerning transformations in concept formation, 
that form would be the easiest category attained, followed by color, then number. 
The procedures described above were followed, except that the order of correct 
concepts was varied, with all 24 sequences utilized in which no concept was 
consecutively repeated and all concepts were utilized prior to repetition. Shifts 
occurring without explanation following ten consecutive correct responses. 
Contrary to expectations, results revealed that number was the concept most 
easily obtained, followed by form, and color was most difficult. However, none 
of these differences reached statistical significance, although a significant 
relationship was demonstrated between ease of acquisition of the number 
56 
concept and perseverative errors on the following category. Thus, the number 
concept was more easily acquired and tended to perseverate longer. Grant et al. 
(1949) suggested that these results may have been due to perceptual features of 
the cards, in which the configuration of figures rather than number per se was 
the salient characteristic4. 
Grant (1951) confirmed that suggestion by alternating the standard 
systematically arranged response cards and a set of specially created response 
cards in which the figures were arranged unsymmetrically, so that they did not 
perceptually match the stimulus cards. Order of administration was C, F, N, C, 
F, N. Scoring procedures were revised somewhat so that the initial perseverative 
response, following a shift, was not scored, nor were ambiguously correct 
responses. Additionally, correct responses did not include responses in the 
criterion run of 10 consecutive correct responses, so that the larger the number of 
correct responses, the lower the subject's efficiency in shifting from the previous 
percept to the new. These results revealed that unsystematic configurations were 
more difficult for subjects to acquire than systematically arranged figures which 
matched the configuration of the stimulus cards, and when asked to explain 
"what they were doing and had been doing" (p. 28), 38% of the subjects 
confirmed they had sorted to color, form, and configuration. 
These results suggested that the conclusions of Grant et al. (1949) concerning 
relative difficulty of the three sorting categories were probably due to this 
artifact. Consequently, Grant and Curran (1952) replicated the design of that 
study, except that they used the unsystematic response cards and the scoring 
4On cards with one figure, the design is centered on the card; for two figures, the designs are 
placed diagonally; for three figures, the designs form an equilateral triangle; and for four figures, 
the designs form a square shape . 
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conventions introduced by Grant (1951). Whereas in the initial study the number 
concept was the most easily acquired and subsequently the most likely 
"perseverate to" principle, in this study the number concept was the most 
difficult to acquire as the initial sorting principle, and form was acquired most 
readily. However, once acquired, number remained the most likely 
"perseverate-to" principle, and showed no appreciable decrease following the 
third category, as did perseveration to color and form. These results correspond 
more closely to Heidbreder's (1948) and Heidbreder and Overstreet's (1948) 
hypotheses than did the earlier results . The authors suggested that abstraction as 
measured by this test is a multidimensional construct which cannot be accounted 
for by simple unidimensional quantitative scores. 
Unlike the clinical tradition of the CT, the research tradition out of which the 
WCST developed was concerned with delineating the response determinants 
which related to the acquisition of concepts. Thus, WCST researchers addressed 
the question of determining the process by which subjects decided, ''This is [X]; 
this is not [X]." Of primary concern in this regard were those determinants 
which influenced perseveration of responses which were no longer reinforced. 
This behavior has long been defined as cognitive rigidity (Pishkin & Williams, 
1977) as it is assumed that subjects will shift hypotheses following 
disconfirmation through absence of reinforcement (Levine, 1966; Restle, 1962; 
Trabasso & Bower, 1966). However, Matthews and Patton (1975) demonstrated 
with a group of normal college students that the degree of success experienced 
with a given hypothesis prior to disconfirmation is related to failing to shift 
subsequent to disconfirmation. Matthews and Patton suggested that an 
hypothesis may not be immediately abandoned simply because it leads to an 
error, but instead must rely on what is most probable. 
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Perseveration might be considered a function of the degree to which 
irrelevant dimensions are reinforced. Since the 64 response cards represent all 
possible combinations of color, form, and number, correct responses might match 
the stimulus card on only one dimension, an unambiguous match, or on two or . 
three dimensions, an ambiguous match. The standard set of cards includes 24 
cards which can match on only one dimension, 36 cards which, depending on 
placement, may match on one or two dimensions, and 4 cards which can only 
match on all three dimensions simultaneously. Thus, up to 40 responses for each 
set of cards may receive reinforcement of ambiguous dimensions, and the subject 
may perseverate due to difficulty in ruling out the irrelevant features. 
Gormezano and Grant (1958) investigated the influence of intermittent 
reinforcement of irrelevant features on concept acquisition, by rearranging 
unsystematically configured response cards into sets of 48 in which a given 
dimension might be ambiguous 0%, 25%, 50%, or 75% of the time. Criterion 
performance was successful completion of the first two categories, color and 
number, within the 48-card set. Subjects were divided into four groups (N=40). 
The first group received a set of cards in which, when sorted correctly to color, 
none of the cards matched for number; the second group received a set of cards 
in which 25% when sorted to color also matched on number. In the third group, 
50% of the cards were ambiguous as to number. In the fourth group, 75% were 
ambiguous as to number. Each of these groups was then divided into four 
groups (N=lO), and the process was repeated with sets of cards which varied in 
ambiguity as to form, when cards were correctly sorted to number. Transformed 
frequency scores were used for comparison of groups. Results revealed that 
increased reinforcement of irrelevant dimensions made acquisition of the 
relevant concept more difficult, but increased reinforcement of the number 
dimension when it was irrelevant had no effect on acquisition of the number 
concept when it became relevant. These findings were interpreted in terms of 
concept formation theory (Bourne, 1965; Bourne, 1974; Brown, 1974; Buss, 1953; 
Buss, 1956; Dominowski, 1973; Dominowski, 1974; Kendler, Glucksberg, & 
Keston, 1961; Peterson & Colavita, 1964; Wetherick & Dominowski, 1976). 
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Up to this point, WCST research was related to investigating response 
determinants which influenced concept acquisition and cognitive rigidity. 
Methods of administration and scoring protocols which had developed were 
directed toward those research goals, but normative data had not been provided 
nor was any information available relative to discriminant validity with clinical 
groups. These concerns now became paramount in the further development of 
the WCST. 
Localization of Brain Damage 
Sorting tasks from which the WCST was developed have long been associated 
with cerebral dysfunction. As noted previously, McFie and Piercy (1952a; 1952b) 
found that left brain-damaged patients were more impaired on Weigl's (1941) 
Test than right brain-damaged patients, but no differences for aphasics vs. 
nonaphasics within the left hemisphere group. In contrast, De Renzi et al. (1966), 
employing a modified version of Weigl's Test, also found more impaired 
performance by left-brain damaged patients, but only those with aphasic 
symptoms. They postulated that these discrepant findings might be attributable 
to different proportions of patients with prefrontal lesions in their left brain-
damaged group in comparison with those studied by McFie and Piercy, as 
Goldstein and co-workers had long contended. 
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Whi]e the Weigl Test was similar to the WCST in many respects, it could only 
be scored dichotomously as "pass" or "fail" and was often considered too easy 
to discriminate subjects effectively. Milner (1963) was the first to study the utility 
of the WCST in localization of brain lesions. She compared the performance of 33 
patients with frontal lobe surgical excisions for control of focal epilepsy with the 
performance of 61 patients with surgical excisions at a variety of other sites. 
Most patients were tested both preoperatively and postoperatively (N=71), but 
the remainder (N=23) were tested on]y postoperatively, in some cases several 
years after the surgery. Surgeon's records were obtained in each case to obtain 
precise localizing information. The frontal lobe group was further subdivided 
into lesions of the dorsolateral aspect (superior) and the medial orbital aspect 
(inferior). All of the surgical excisions for the dorsolateral group were unilateral 
(14 nondominant right hemisphere and 11 dominant left hemisphere, although 
Broca's speech area was spared in all cases). The nonfrontal group consisted of 
34 patients with excisions of the dominant left hemisphere, 30 patients with 
excisions of the nondominant right hemisphere, 3 patients with excisions of the 
nondominant left hemisphere, and 2 patients with bilateral surgical excisions. 
Groups were equivalent with respect to age and IQ, both preoperatively and 
postoperatively. 
Milner employed the unsystematic response cards (Milner, 1963) developed 
by Grant (1951) and considered a more difficult task than the standard systematic 
response cards. Scoring categories included the usual scores, and she employed 
the Grant and Cost (1954) frequency score transformation for data analysis, but 
Milner redefined the scoring of perseveration. Grant and Berg (1948) defined 
perseveration as those responses which would have been correct in the previous 
category, preventing the scoring of perseveration in the first category, resulting 
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in misleading scores for subjects who failed to complete the first category or who 
displayed significant difficu]ty in the first category. Consequently, Milner 
included those responses in the first category which represent repetition of the 
patient's initia] concept, which was easily discerned since the first eight cards in 
her response deck could only be matched unambiguously, but she implied that 
she counted only perseverative errors, which would exclude those correct 
responses defined as perseverative by Grant and Berg. Additionally, she 
established the practice of terminating administration after completion of 128 
cards, or completion of six categories, whichever came first. 
Results revealed that preoperatively, WCST performance significantly 
discriminated the dorso]ateral frontal group from all other localization groups, 
except the smal1 parieto-temporo-occipital group (N=5), with respect to total 
errors (p< .05) and perseverative responses (p<.01). Postoperatively, the 
differentiation was even more marked. The dorsolatera] frontal group made 
significantly more errors than all other groups (p<.001), achieved fewer 
categories (r<.001), and made more perseverative errors (p<.001), although there 
were no group differences with respect to nonperseverative errors. Significantly, 
while surgical excision further deteriorated the performance of the dorsolateral 
frontal group, the nonfrontal group displayed an opposite trend. The 
performance of patients who were tested only postoperatively displayed the 
same pattern. None of the dorsolateral frontal patients completed more than two 
categories, while 51 of the 69 control subjects did so. 
Milner observed that while age and intelligence were controlled in this study, 
size and extent of lesions were not and may have accounted for these effects. 
Consequently, the performances of the five dorsolateral frontal patients with the 
smallest surgical excisions were compared with 12 nonfrontal patients with the 
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largest lesions, including some with complete lobectomies. Preoperatively, these 
groups showed no significant differences, although the dorsolateraJ frontal group 
tended to perform more poorly. Postoperatively, the performance of the 
nonfrontal group was unchanged, despite the extent of tissue removed, but the 
performance of the dorsolateral frontal group further deteriorated, with 
significantly more total errors (p <.05), more perseverative responses (p <.001), 
and fewer categories sorted (p <.05) than the control subjects. Milner concluded, 
therefore, that locus of lesion was the relevant factor bearing upon impaired 
performance of the dorsolateral frontal group in comparison with other brain-
damaged groups . 
Laterality comparisons were nonsignificant, in contrast to the findings by 
McFie and Piercy (1952a) and De Renzi et al. (1966), but Milner noted that left 
hemisphere excisions were consistently smalJer than those on the right, and 
suggested that those findings may indicate greater sensitivity of.the left 
hemisphere. Subsequently, Milner (1971) reported findings that confirmed that 
suggestion. 
An earlier study by Teuber, Battersby, and Bender (1951) found results 
discrepant from those reported by Milner on a modified sorting test, but the 
extent of modifications appears to have changed task demands significantly. 
Teuber et al. employed only 60 stimulus cards in which the figures were laid out 
linearly, and "shifts from one principle of sorting to another [were] enforced after 
every tenth trial" (p. 421). Subjects were also forewarned that a change may 
occur (Milner, 1963). The authors did not specify criteria of performance, nor 
indicate the order of presentation. Test subjects included 131 World War II 
combat veterans with penetrating missile wounds, four to seven years post-
injury, who were divided into three groups on the basis of site of wounds of 
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entrance. These groups were identified as Anterior, Intermediate, and Posterior. 
Forty control subjects with peripheral nerve injuries due to gunshot wounds 
were also tested. Results revealed that the posterior subjects performed more 
poorly than any other group, although only mean error scores were reported. In 
view of the modifications to the sorting task used in this study, and questions 
concerning extent of injuries not reflected in wounds of entrance, these results 
cannot be considered comparable to other studies, even though Teuber et al. is 
often cited in the literature as contradictory to more frequent findings regarding 
I ocaliza ti on. 
Milner (1963) suggested that her results implicating the dorsolateral surface of 
the frontal lobes in impaired set shifting behavior were consistent with findings 
with lower primates that dorsolateral frontal excisions but not ventromedial 
(orbital) excisions impair delayed alteration and delayed response behavior 
(Mishkin, 1957; Pribram, Mishkin, Rosvold, & Kaplan, 1952). However, Drewe 
(1974) contended that Milner's findings were surprising in view of increased 
perseveration by primates on nonspatial reversal tasks followed orbital but not 
dorsolateral excisions. Consequently, she sought to replicate Milner's findings 
with a more heterogenous group. 
Drewe tested 91 patients with unilateral localized lesions of varying etiology. 
Patients were divided into four mutually exclusive localization groups, right 
frontal (RF), left frontal (LF), right nonfrontal (RC), and left nonfrontal (LC). 
Groups were equivalent with respect to age, sex, chronicity, and nature of lesion. 
She did not specify which card set was utilized, systematic or unsystematic, but 
since the Grant and Berg manual (undated) was followed with respect to scoring 
and administration, it is likely the systematic response cards were utilized. 
Drewe added the scoring category, Number in Maximum Classification, 
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primarily to reflect perseverative responses in the initial category since these 
were not reflected in Grant and Berg's definition of perseverative responses. This 
scoring category was defined as the number of cards sorted into each category 
(color, form, number, unique), excluding criteria runs of 10. 
Results reflected very complex relationships between type and number of 
errors made, which varies from group to group, but on the whole these findings 
are consistent with those of Milner, despite substantial differences in procedure 
and scoring. Patients with frontal lesions achieved fewer categories and showed 
greater perseveration than nonfrontals, and there was no significant difference 
with respect to nonperseverative errors. However, in contrast to Milner, they did 
not make more total errors, and a greater range of variability in categories 
achieved was evident. These patients performed more like Milner's preoperative 
patients than her postoperative patients; in fact, patients after frontal lobectomies 
performed better than patients with other frontal lesions. 
In general, left frontal patients performed more poorly than right frontal 
patients, consistent with Milner's findings, and those of previous researchers, 
although they did not differ on perseverative errors. However, differences in 
definition may account for this finding. Drewe found that Number in Maximum 
Classification was a more sensitive measure of overall performance than 
perseverative responses, and on this measure left frontals were more impaired. 
Some discrepancy with respect to anatomical locus within the frontal lobe was 
evident, but Drewe concluded that her findings may be consistent with Milner's 
actual data, although the area of maximum sensitivity is the medial surface of the 
frontal lobes that are critical rather than the dorsolateral convexity. 
The most significant findings which emerged from this study, however, relate 
to the complexity of relationships between scores on the WCST and the site of 
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damage. Drewe concluded: "All scores on the WCST do not necessarily measure 
the same ability or disability, nor does the same 'impaired' score in different 
patients indicate a necessarily similar deficit" (1974, p . 168). 
Robinson, Heaton, Lehman, and Stilson (1980) noted that few other 
neuropsychological measures effectively localize focal frontal impairment, and so 
sought to replicate findings reported by Milner (1963) and Drewe (1974) that 
perseverative responses on the WCST are useful in localizing brain damage. 
They contrasted performance of a normal control group of paid volunteers 
(N=123) on the WCST, with the performance of seven brain-damaged groups: (a) 
right frontal (N=13); (b) left frontal (N=lO); (c) right frontal plus focal right 
nonfrontal (N=ll); (d) left frontal plus focal left nonfrontal (N=12); (e) right 
nonfrontal (N=9); (f) left nonfrontal (N=J4); and (g) diffuse (N=38), controlling 
for severity of impairment as reflected in the Average Impairment Rating 
(Russell et al., 1970) on the HRNB, as well as age and education. Like Drewe, 
Robinson et al. apparently used systematically configured response cards but 
followed Milner's definition of perseveration rather than Grant and Berg's, thus 
apparently counted only errors as perseverations, including those in the first 
category. 
Results revealed significant differences among groups with respect to WCST 
perseverative responses, in which covariance due to age, education, and severity 
of impairment was controlled (p <.02). The performance of all brain-damaged 
groups was significantly impaired in comparison with normals, except that of the 
left nonfrontal group. Comparison of the four frontal groups with nonfrontal 
groups confirmed previous findings with respect to the sensitivity of the WCST 
to frontal lobe impairment, but no difference was found for frontal groups in 
comparison with diffusely impaired patients. This should not be surprising, 
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Robinson et al. noted, since the frontal lobes comprise approximately 40% of the 
brain. These findings suggest that the perseveration score on the WCST is quite 
sensitive to general cerebral dysfunction, except possibly when focal impairment 
does not extend to the frontal areas. 
These findings were further confirmed by linear discriminant analyses using 
perseverative responses, age, education, and Average Impairment Rating on the 
HRNB to classify subjects on the basis of lesion site. Perseverative responses 
entered the analyses first and AIR failed to enter at all, yielding a correct 
classification rate of 68%, suggesting that perseverative responses, with age and 
education, account for variability in the AIR due to severity of impairment. 
Consequently, a second discriminant analysis was computed to determine if 
perseverative responses on the WCST would enhance the discriminant validity of 
the AIR. The 12 individual variables that comprise the AIR were entered into the 
analysis, with age, education, and perseverative responses. Again, the 
perseverative response score entered the analysis first, and this combination 
yielded a correct classification rate of 85%, when the population base rate of 
frontal lobe impairment was set to .67. Discriminant efficiency deteriorates with 
more extreme population base rates, however. 
With respect to lateralization, however, these findings are discrepant with 
those of Milner and Drewe. The combined right frontal groups were 
significantly more impaired than the left frontal groups, which could not be 
accounted for by differences in severity, as assessed by the AIR. However, 
Milner's (1963) caution concerning the multidimensionality of determinants on 
WCST performance should be noted in this regard, particularly since 
performance on this measure was assessed only on the basis of a single score. 
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Variability in task complexity and other procedural differences in 
administration and scoring, in addition to the usual differences in subject 
selection, has confounded interpretation of differing results across these studies, 
but surprisingly the differentiation of frontal vs. nonfrontal patients has proven 
to be very robust, although substantial variability has been evident with respect 
to individual scores. Nelson (1976) addressed the issue of the effects of task 
complexity directly by significantly simplifying the task, even in comparison 
with the systematic response cards, in creating what she referred to as the 
Modified Card Sorting Test. Nelson removed all ambiguous cards from the 
response set (apparently using systematic cards), thereby eliminating examiner 
uncertainty concerning what concepts patients were using to sort, and removing 
patient uncertainty concerning which concept was being reinforced by the 
examiner. This left 24 cards in each 64 card set, and Nelson combined two sets of 
cards for a complete response set of 48 cards. Administration instructions were 
also revised as follows: 
Here we have four key cards l examiner points to stimulus cards]. I want you 
to sort these cards [indicating the response cards] under the key cards 
according to certain rules: but the whole point of the test is that I shall not tell 
you what the rule is. I want you to find that out by trying out different rules 
and each time I shall tell you whether it's right or wrong. Now, go ahead and 
try to find out the rule. (p. 316) 
Following these instructions, whichever category the patient chose was 
scored "correct," and subsequent responses were scored accordingly. In contrast, 
in standard administration procedures color is the initial category, followed by 
form and number in that order when the criterion run of 10 consecutive correct 
responses was achieved, with the cycle being repeated a second time for a total of 
six categories. Nelson also completed six categories, but after six consecutive 
correct responses, stated: ''The rules have now changed; I want you to find 
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another rule" (p. 316). This instruction was repeated each time the patient 
completed six consecutive sorts to whichever new category was selected. Testing 
was discontinued when six categories had been completed in this fashion, or all 
48 cards had been placed. Nelson reported that she utilized Milner's definition of 
perseverative responses (PM), although her testing procedure would have 
excluded perseverative responses in the initial category. Additionally, Nelson 
devised a new scoring of perseveration (PN) which consisted of repetition of an 
incorrect response despite feedback that it was incorrect. 
Despite these substantive differences in administration and scoring, 
comparison of the performance of 64 brain-damaged inpatients, divided into four 
groups on the basis of cerebral quadrant of lesion site, with the performance on 
46 control subjects, including 32 inpatients with extra-cerebral lesions and 14 
normal subjects, Nelson found that frontal patients made significantly more 
perseverative errors (both PM and PN) than nonfrontal groups, after the records 
of 13 patients (lesion group not specified) who successfully completed the 
Modified Card Sorting Test were excluded from analysis. However, the lesions 
groups barely missed showing significant differences with respect to total errors 
and categories completed (p =.056), and no difference was evident between right 
and left lesion groups, either frontal or nonfrontal. Milner (1963) observed that 
patients often were able to verbalize which responses were correct and which 
incorrect, although they seemed unable to conform their behavior with their 
observations, suggesting that task difficulty may be less salient in influencing 
outcome on the WCST than other cognitive process factors. Nelson's findings 
lend credence to that interpretation. 
Nonetheless, Heaton (1981) noted that comparison of results across studies 
was handicapped by the variety of procedural variations employed in these 
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studies. Consequently, he sought to standardize materials and procedures in 
order to better focus attention upon the neurological and cognitive variables 
bearing upon test performance, rather than upon methodological variables. He 
included the subjects used by Robinson et al. (1980) in a normative study which 
provided the basis for standardization of administration and scoring procedures 
and materials. He employed two sets of the systematic configuration response 
cards (64 cards in each set) devised by Grant and Berg (1948), but the specified 
order of cards within each set was that first used by Robinson et al. in which five 
of the initial eight cards are ambiguous, including the first card, unlike the Grant 
and Berg set in which the first eight cards are alJ unambiguous. Instructions 
were specified as follows: 
This test is a little unusual, because I am not allowed to tell you very much 
about how to do it. You will be asked to match each of the cards in these 
decks to one of the four key cards. You must always take the top card from 
the deck, and place it below the key card you think it matches. I can't tell you 
how to match the cards, but I will teJl you each time whether you are right or 
wrong. If you are wrong, leave the card where you've placed it, and try to get 
the next card correct. Use this deck first, and then continue with the second 
deck. There is no time limit on this test. (p. 19) 
A standard scoring sheet was also devised, and the following order of correct 
concept matching was specified: CF NC F N. Designated scoring categories 
included: 
1) Total Errors 
2) Total Correct (including criteria runs and initial correct responses 
following shifts) 
3) Categories Completed (all criteria runs of 10 correct responses) 
4) Perseverative Responses 
a) those which would have been correct in the previous category; 
b) those responses prior to completion of the first category which match 
the first incorrect unambiguous response; 
c) ambiguous responses are also scored as perseverative responses if they 
are both preceded and followed by unambiguous perseverative 
responses; 
d) within any category, three consecutive incorrect unambiguous 
responses will establish a new "perseverate-to" principle for that 
category, although ambiguous perseverative responses may be 
interspersed among those three consecutive perseverative responses, 
which may be scored beginning with the second of the three 
consecutive perseverative responses. 
5) Perseverative Errors (those perseverative responses which are also 
incorrect) 
6) Nonperseverative Errors (errors which are not perseverative responses). 
Several optional scoring categories were also defined: 
1) Percent Perseverative Errors (Perseverative Errors 7 Total Responses) 
2) Trials to Complete First Category 
3) Percent Conceptual Level Responses (runs of three or more consecutive 
correct responses 7 Total Responses) 
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4) Failure to Maintain Set (number of runs of five to nine consecutive correct 
responses) 
5) Learning to Learn (for patients who complete at least three categories, 
mean sum of the differences of percent error score for consecutive 
categories with at least 10 trials). 
Heaton's normative study employing these procedures included comparisons 
of WCST performance of 208 subjects with structural cerebral lesions, confirmed 
by neuroradiological techniques, and 150 normal controls, including subjects 
studied by Robinson et al. (1980). Brain-damaged subjects were divided into 
Diffuse (N=94), Nonfrontal (N=35), Focal Frontal (N=43), and Frontal Plus 
(N=36). Normal subjects were paid volunteers without histories of neurological 
illness, head injury, or substance abuse. All subjects were administered the 
WAIS-R, HRNB, and WCST. WAIS-R Full Scale IQ and HRNB Average 
Impairment Rating (AIR) were used as measured of general netiropsychological 
impairment. 
Results revealed that the total brain-damaged group were more impaired on 
all measures (including W AIS-R FSIQ and AIR), except Failure to Maintain Set, 
which was relatively rare in all groups. Since Focal Frontal and Frontal Plus 
groups were not significantly different on demographic or neuropsychological 
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variables, these groups were combined for data analysis. This combined frontal 
group performed significantly more poorly than the nonfrontal group on WCST 
Total Errors, Perseverative Errors, Percent Perseverative Errors, Perseverative 
Responses, and Percent Conceptual Level Responses. Groups did not differ on 
Categories Completed, Nonperseverative Errors, Trials to First Category, 
Learning to Learn, or Failure to Maintain Set. Thus, the primary differentiation 
between groups was in terms of perseveration. The Diffuse group performed 
much like the Frontal group. 
The most efficient cutoff score for predicting brain damage in this population 
is a perseverative response score of 19 or above, which correctly classified 74% of 
the brain-damaged group and 72% of the nonbrain-damaged group. In 
compa rison, inferring a base rate for this population based on group composition 
reported, calling all subjects brain-damaged, would have resulted in 58% correct 
classification. A slightly higher cutoff score (20 or above perseverative 
responses) achieved 71.1% accuracy in discriminating focal frontal from focal 
nonfrontal brain-damaged subjects, but with better accuracy in classifying focal 
frontal patients (79.8% vs. 51.4%). The cutoff score for perseverative errors was 
13 and 16 for discriminating brain damage and focal frontal lesions, respectively, 
yielding approximately equivalent efficiency to a cutoff based on perseverative 
responses. A cutoff score based on total errors above 24 was also approximately 
equivalent in classifying focal frontal impairment but was not useful in 
identifying general cerebral dysfunction. Other measures were not useful in 
predicting brain damage or focal frontal involvement in individual cases, 
although in most cases the correlation between AIR and these variables was 
substantial for the brain-damaged group (.47 to .61), except for Learning to Learn 
(-.18) and Failure to Maintain Set (-.05). Nonperseverative errors were most 
strongly associated with overall neuropsychological functioning for the normal 
group, but the strongest association for the brain-damaged group was with 
measures of perseveration. 
Construct Validity 
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Strang (1983) devised eight new hypothesis testing scoring categories to 
investigate the normative expectation that intact persons will change concept 
strategies when they receive "incorrect" feedback, and persist with hypothesized 
concepts when the feedback is "correct." Four responses to examiner feedback 
regarding accuracy are possible: (a) Wrong-Shift, defined as shifting to a new 
concept when the examiner responds "incorrect" ; (b) Wrong-Stay , defined as 
persisting with the same concept when the examiner responds "incorrect"; (c) 
Right-Shift, shifting concepts when the examiner responds "correct"; and (d) 
Right-Stay, persisting with the same concept when the examiner responds 
"correct." However, since up to 62.5% of all responses may be ambiguous, it is 
often not possible to ascertain whether a subject has shifted to a new concept. 
Consequently, each score was computed twice: once, assuming that the patient 
persisted with the previous concept when responses were ambiguous, and again 
assuming that the patient had shifted. In discriminant function analyses, with 
significance level set very conservatively, of the 32 most promising WCST 
variables, only the transformed hypothesis testing score, Stay-Behavior 
(assuming stay), entered the prediction equation, with population base rates set 
at values ranging from .10 to .90, yielding a correct classification rate of .81. 
Additional post hoc analyses also supported the usefulness of these hypothesis 
testing scores. 
In order to better investigate the relationship among these scores, factor 
analysis was performed, employing 30 WCST variables. A three-factor solution 
was obtained, with the first factor representing cognitive perseveration, the 
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second factor representing what appeared to be slow or partial learning, and the 
third factor representing successful strategies. Strang hypothesized that 
underlying this proliferation of scores reflecting problem-solving approaches to 
the WCST may ]ie a single simple dimension. 
More recent results (Anderson et al., 1991 ), however, have suggested that 
WCST performance is multidimensional, consistent with findings by Robinson et 
al. (1980) that perseverative responses reflect general cerebral dysfunction. 
Anderson et al. tested 91 patients with single, focal brain lesions, as established 
by CT and MR images, in contrast to previous studies. All subjects were tested at 
least three months post CV A (N=71) or neurosurgical resection for tumor or 
seizures (N=20). Patients with a history of psychiatric disorders, head injuries, 
substance abuse, or neurological disease were excluded from the study . Patients 
were divided into frontal groups (including dorsolateral, mesial, and orbital 
frontal lesions), frontal plus (lesions extending posterior to rolandic areas), and 
nonfrontaJ. All patients were administered the WCST and WAIS-R. The WCST 
was administered and scored according to standard procedures (Heaton, 1981), 
y ielding the usual scores: number correct, number of errors, perseverative 
r esponses, perseverative errors, nonperseverative errors, and categories 
completed. None of these measures revealed significant differences, or even a 
t rend toward significant differences, between frontal and nonfrontal groups. The 
cutoff scores which best discriminated the groups were the same as those found 
by Heaton, but these correctly classified only 62% of the subjects (42% of 
n onfrontals). Anderson et al. considered the possibility that systematic 
differences in lesion size may have contributed to these findings, but found 
differences in lesion size did not result in systematic differences within the 
ffrontal groups. Differences between left and right hemisphere groups were also 
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not found, nor were differences evident between frontal groups divided on the 
basis of anatomical divisions within the frontal lobes. Finally, no consistent 
anatomical correlates of specific patterns of WCST performance were found. 
Anderson et al. concluded that while both human and animal studies clearly 
demonstrate frontal lobe mediation of cognitive abstraction and set shifting tasks, 
"performance on a multifaceted cognitive task such as the WCST will necessarily 
involve the coordinated interaction of multiple and separate brain regions" (pp. 
15-16). Regional blood flow studies (rCBF) confirm that while prefrontal lobe 
regions are activated by performance on the WCST, so are several other brain 
areas (Weinberger, Berman, & Zee, 1986). 
Anderson et al. (1991) observed, with Heaton and others, that the WCST may 
be most useful in assessment of multiple cognitive constructs, including ability to 
abstract information from relevant stimuli, ability to shift cognitive set, and 
perseverative tendencies, regardless of anatomical correlates. 
Moderator Variables 
While individual studies have demonstrated significant effects in 
differentiating the WCST performance of various clinical groups, replication of 
these effects has often been impeded by a variety of methodological variables 
which makes comparisons across groups and settings difficult. Moderator 
variables, including age, education, and IQ differences, are among those 
variables which may influence test research outcome, but this issue has received 
less attention relative to the WCST than for the CT. 
Age and Education Correlates 
Developers of the WCST employed groups of college students in their 
research, who were uniformly young and well-educated, with only one 
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exception. Berg (1948) administered what became known as the WCST to a 
group of 22 older students, ranging in age from 58 to 73 years, reporting that 
none of these students progressed beyond the first category shift. Loranger and 
Misiak (1960) also found that older normal subjects were very impaired on the 
WCST. Only two of her 50 aged female subjects between the ages of 74 and 80 
were able to complete all six categories and the mean number of categories 
completed was only 1.86 (S.D. = 1.54). Correlation with age was not significant 
(r=-.16), however, due to the restricted age range of her sample. Years of 
education was also not significantly correlated with WCST performance (r=.21). 
Misiak and Loranger (1961) found somewhat higher correlation between age and 
WCST perseverative errors (.34) in a group of elderly subjects, combining the 
aged females tested by Loranger and Misiak with 36 males, age 68 to 80. 
In studies comparing the performance of clinical subjects with other groups, 
most studies have used restricted age and education ranges, which may have 
modulated relationships that might have been discerned in more heterogenous 
groups. Exceptions to this general rule often have not provided data sufficient to 
analyze the relationship. For example, Drewe (1974) concluded that age was 
significantly associated with WCST performance only when other disabilities 
were not present, but she provided no data to support that conclusion. Nelson 
(1976) anecdotally observed that the standard WCST procedure was often too 
difficult for older subjects, but also provided no data concerning the effect of her 
modification on performance by older subjects. Similarly, Tarter and Parsons 
(1971) asserted that the significant differences observed in their study between 
college students and hospitalized controls was the result of age and education 
differences, but provided no support for that conclusion. 
Robinson et al. (1980) provided more adequate data analysis of age and 
education variables. They reported significant correlations of age with 
perseverative responses (r=.23, r<.05) but nonsignificant correlations with 
education (r=-.19, r<.10) for brain-damaged subjects. For normal subjects, the 
relationships were reversed: education correlated significantly with 
perseverative responses (r=-.17, r<.10) but age did not (r=-.25, r<.01). In 
attempting to classify focal brain-damaged subjects into frontal vs . nonfrontal 
groups, both age and education entered all discriminant function analyses, as 
variables contributing to discrimination equations. The proportion of the 
variance accounted for by these variables was not reported, however. 
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Heaton 's follow-up normative study, based in part on these same data, 
provides much more complete analyses of the influence of age and education 
correlates. With the exception of Learning to Learn and Failure to Maintain Set 
scores , which proved to have little predictive value in any of the analyses, age 
showed mild to moderate correlations with all other variables, ranging from .12 
with nonperseverative errors to -.33 with categories achieved for the total brain-
damaged group. Correlations for the normal group were comparable, except for 
Trials to First Category, which was essentially unrelated. The relationship with 
education was much more modest for the brain-damaged group, but roughly 
equivalent for the normal group . 
The opposite pattern was obtained by King and Snow (1981). In their analysis 
of patients referred for neuropsychological evaluation, patients who were 
ultimately found to be brain-damaged by independent diagnoses showed 
roughly equivalent correlations for education and age (.23 and -.29, respectively), 
but these moderator variables were essentially unrelated for patients found not 
to be brain-damaged. 
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Analysis of these demographic variables for the normal group using four age 
groups (under 40 years of age, 40-59 years of age, 50-59 years of age, and over 59 
years of age) and three levels of education (less than 12 years, 12-15 years, and 
over 15 years) revealed that age and education variables do not interact. 
Significant main age effects were obtained for six of ten WCST scores, but in each 
case this was due to the poor performance of the oldest group (over 59 years), 
who achieved mean scores on all variables within the impaired range. 
Significant main education effects were also obtained for six of the ten scores, but 
in this case these results were primarily due to the excellent performance of the 
best educated group. However, in several instances the performance of the least 
educated group fell just into the impaired range. These results suggest that 
interpretation of WCST performance should be amended somewhat for older 
persons, and performance of poorly educated subjects should perhaps be 
interpreted conservatively, despite the attenuation of education effects 
accompanying brain damage. 
Somewhat different findings were obtained by Heinrichs (1990), who 
compared the performance of psychiatric patients and brain-damaged patients. 
Results reveal that his sample was relatively impaired on all measures, with 
education showing stronger relationships with WCST variables (.44 to .54) than 
age (.34 to .37). Heinrichs concluded that these relationships appear to vary with 
respect to populations under consideration. 
IO Correlates 
A majority of studies have also attempted to equate IQ levels of research 
subjects and controls, but have seldom evaluated the relationship of IQ correlates 
to WCST for clinical vs. control groups. Fey (1951) was the first to report IQ as a 
covariate. She found no significant relationship between Full Scale IQ on the 
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Wechsler-Bellevue (Form I) and categories completed on the WCST for either the 
schizophrenic group or the normal control group. The correlations between 
categories completed and W-B subtests also were not significant. She concluded 
that intelligence is not a major factor influencing performance on the WCST, and 
noted parenthetically that the success of some "feebleminded" children on the 
WCST is supportive of that conclusion. 
Milner (1963) reported group IQ scores for her brain-damaged subjects, but 
failed to specify what test was administered and did not report any IQ/ WCST 
analyses, other than comparing IQ Joss for frontal vs. nonfronta] groups 
preoperatively and postoperatively. Drewe (1974) specified that her subjects 
were administered a short WAIS and reported that groups did not differ on 
Verbal IQ, but patients with left hemisphere lesions obtained significantly higher 
Performance IQ scores than patients with right hemisphere lesions (r<.01) and 
patients with nonfrontal lesions also scored significantly higher on the WAIS 
Performance Scale than patients with frontal lesions (r<.05). Drewe suggested 
that this may have accounted for some of the results, but did not analyze this 
relationship further. 
Loranger and Misiak (1960) examined the interrelationship among several 
tests of nonverbal intellectual function, including the WCST, for elderly females. 
Using concepts completed as a measure of success on the WCST, they found 
moderate correlations with all measures administered, including Porteus Mazes 
(r=.59), Primary Mental Abilities Reasoning (timed: r=.46; untimed: r=.36), and 
Ravens Progressive Mazes (r=.65). A follow-up of this study (Misiak & 
Loranger, 1961) employing an enlarged sample found these relationships to be 
somewhat weaker, however. Centroid factor analysis of these measures yielded 
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only one factor, which they termed a general intellectual factor, on which WCST 
perseverative errors loaded .35. 
Robinson et al. (1980) incorporated WAIS Full Scale IQ into the Average 
Impairment Rating on the HRNB, which was covaried as a measure of severity in 
their analyses. They did not analyze the relationship of IQ with WCST 
performance independently. However, in discriminant analyses intended to 
facilitate differentiation of focal frontal brain damage, the AJR score representing 
Full Scale IQ was the only variable which did not enter the prediction equation, 
suggesting that the variability represented by that measure was accounted for by 
other measures. The normative follow-up of this study by Heaton (1981), 
however, revealed moderate relationships for most WCST variables with Full 
Scale IQ except for Failure to Maintain Set, Learning to Learn, and 
Nonperseverative Errors, for the brain-damaged group (.32 to .45). Interestingly, 
the correlations are more modest for the normal group. In contrast, Heinrichs 
(1990) found a much more substantial relationship between WCST performance 
and WAIS-R Full Scale IQ in his more impaired group of subjects (.69 to .77). 
Pendleton and Heaton (1982) found similar moderate correlations in both brain-
damaged and normal control groups between Full Scale IQ and WCST 
perseverative responses. 
Only one study has investigated the relationship of WAIS subtest variables 
and scale scores with WCST performance. Strang (1983) compared the 
performance of her brain-damaged group with her normal group on all WCST 
variables which have been reported in the literature and WAIS subtests and scale 
scores. Results reveal that for the pooled data from both samples, most of the 
major WCST scores commonly used yielded Pearson correlation coefficients 
ranging from r=.40 to r=.60. No difference was observed between the strength of 
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reJationships between Verbal IQ and Performance IQ scores, but a trend toward 
more frequent significant correlations was observed for Performance Scale 
subtests than for Verbal Scale subtests. 
However, a very different pattern of relationships is observed when brain-
damaged and nonbrain-damaged groups are considered separately. For the 
brain-damaged group, none of the WCST scores are correlated with WAIS 
summary scores, except for Categories Completed (r=.41 with FSIQ). The 
strongest subtest score relationships are with Comprehension, which was 
correlated with every major score above r=.40. Only slightly less frequent 
correlations were found for Digit Symbol and Block Design. For Digit Symbol, 
only Total Correct (excluding criterion runs and signal trials) and Total Trials 
were not significantly correlated; for Block Design, only Categories Completed 
and Total Correct were not significantly correlated. Similarities and Picture 
Arrangement demonstrated secondary relationships with major WCST variables. 
This pattern of relationships was not expected, particularly the very consistent 
correlations with Comprehension. 
A somewhat different pattern of relationships was evident for the normal 
group. For this group, WAIS summary scores were consistently related to 
performance on major WCST variables, and less association was observed with 
Comprehension. However, the relationship with Block Design and Digit Symbol 
was even more evident. These results were interpreted as suggesting that among 
brain-damaged patients the use of practical problem-solving skills, most 
especially involving common sense, may be prerequisites for these measures of 
success on the task presented by the WCST, but with intact cerebral functioning, 
nonverbal reasoning skills take on greater importance. 
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Taken together, these results show marked variability in the association 
,etween moderator variables, particularly intelligence, and WCST performance. 
,..,hese results might be expected on the basis of variable constructs assessed by 
·he WCST in various populations and emphasize the need for further 
darification relating to the cognitive processes involved in WCST performance. 
,..,his might best be accomplished by directly relating performance on the WCST 
o CT performance characteristics. 
Comparison of the CT and WCST 
Despite their obvious differences, the CT and WCST share many similarities. 
30th are complex measures which require concept formation based on 
dentification of common elements in a visual array, sufficient flexibility to form 
md then reject hypotheses based on an ambiguous pattern of reinforcement, the 
1bility to profit from feedback concerning the accuracy of responses, the ability to 
shift response sets, as well as the ability to maintain response sets when 
1ppropriate (Pendleton & Heaton, 1982; Strang, 1983). Only a few studies, 
i10wever, have directly compared these measures. 
King and Snow (1981) compared the performances of 150 subjects referred for 
neuropsychological evaluation on the WCST and CT. Patients were divided into 
;wo groups on the basis of discharge diagnoses not derived from 
i\europsychological test data . The WCST was administered according to Milner's 
11963) procedures, except that all patients completed all 128 cards, rather than 
;erminating testing after completion of six categories. Dependent measures 
compared were categories completed on the WCST and total errors on the CT. 
?artial correlation coefficients were computed, controlling for the effects of age 
and education on both variables. The correlation obtained for the brain-damaged 
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~roup was r=-.44 (p <.001) and for the nonbrain-damaged group r=-.42 (p <.001). 
~he correlation for the pooled data from both groups, again controlling for age 
md education effects, was r=-.55 (p <.001). At most, this degree of 
<orrespondence accounted for approximately 30% of the variance in both 
neasures. King and Snow concluded that these are not measures of identical 
constructs. 
Similar results were reported by Pendleton and Heaton (1982), who also 
;ound 30% shared variance in a correlational study comparing the CT and WCST. 
Subjects were 207 brain-damaged patients who had been referred for 
1europsychological evaluation at the University of Colorado Health Sciences 
Center. Lesion site was confirmed and type was independently confirmed by 
1euroradiological and neurosurgical data. Brain-damaged patients were divided 
n to three subgroups: (a) Frontal, including those with lesions extending into 
10nfrontal areas; (b) Nonfrontal; and (c) Diffuse. A fourth group included 150 
10rmal paid volunteers. Performance of each group was compared with respect 
o CT total errors and WCST perseverative responses. Correlations for all groups 
vere roughly similar, ranging from r=.48 to r=.58, and all were significant at p 
..::.001, reflecting approximately 30% shared variance. Moreover, Full Scale IQ 
mrrelated more highly with the CT (p <.01) than for WCST perseverative 
esponses (p <.05). Diagnostic accuracy of these measures was also compared. 
:{esults reveal that the WCST is slightly more sensitive to frontal than to other 
cerebral lesions, but the WCST was more accurate in classifying nonfrontal and 
iliffuse groups. However, these differences did not reach statistical significance. 
':'his same pattern of results was obtained when these measures disagreed with 
:espect to classification: The WCST was more accurate in classifying frontal lobe 
Jatients whereas the CT was more accurate in classifying nonfrontal patients, 
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and these results did reach significance (p <05). Together these results suggested 
that these measures assess somewhat different cognitive abilities, despite their 
similarity. Consequently, Pendleton and Heaton recommend continued use of 
both tests. 
Despite these differences, Brandon and Chavez (1985) found that when both 
tests are administered in the same battery, presenting the CT first facilitates 
performance on the WCST, as measured by the relationship between CT total 
errors and WCST perseverative response and total error scores. The authors 
postulated those results were due to the more diversified range of abstract 
concepts represented in the CT, but this effect suggests considerable similarity in 
the cognitive processes assessed by each task, at least for this population of 
normal functioning college students. 
Rothke (1986) investigated the extent to which differences in set shifting cues 
given in the instructions on each test may have suppressed correlations between 
them. A heterogenous group of 52 inpatients in a VA medical center were 
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. In the first condition, 
subjects were administered the WCST first and both tests were given with set 
shifting instructions. In the second condition, subjects were also given the WCST 
first, but neither test was given with set shifting instructions. In the third 
condition, subjects were given the CT first, and both tests were given with set 
shifting instructions. In the fourth condition, subjects were given the CT first, 
and neither test was given with set shifting instructions. Thus, in each condition, 
one test was given with standard instructions and the other with modified 
instructions. When set shifting cues were given, patients administered the WCST 
were informed that the sorting principle might change from time to time, while 
the CT was given in the standard manner, being informed at the beginning at 
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each new subtest, ''The principle might be the same as it was in the last one or it 
might be different." When no set shifting cues were given, the WCST was given 
in the standard manner, where the only information given was feedback 
concerning the accuracy of responses. Similarly, the CT was given without any 
mention of subtests or a change of principles. Unlike the results reported by 
Brandon and Chavez (1985), Rothke did not find a significant effect for order of 
presentation of these tasks. However, a significant effect for cueing conditions 
was demonstrated (p <.001). Eliminating set shifting cues for the CT did not 
substantially affect performance, but WCST perseverative responses were much 
reduced by providing set shifting cues . The author concluded that for this 
relatively impaired population, these tasks measure substantially different 
cognitive skills . Rothke postulated that mental set shifting ability is of 
paramount importance on the WCST, while the CT measures more complex 
skills. 
Strang (1983) compared performance on all WCST variables reported in the 
literature, in addition to her new hypothesis-testing scores, and CT performance, 
including total errors and subtest scores. Since WCST variables are typically 
frequency scores which reflect the greater number of trials required with poorer 
performance, they may be expected to vary with CT error scores, which are also 
frequency scores. Partialing out this source of methodological variance resulted 
in much attenuated relationships between WCST variables and CT error scores. 
This resulted in significant relationships in the brain-damaged group only for 
WCST perseveration related scores, although total errors was also significantly 
correlated with performance on CT Subtest VIL The most consistent 
relationships were with CT Subtests V and VII and total errors, with less 
consistent correlations with Subtest IV, and no significant relationship with 
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Subtest I-III and VI. For the normal group, the only significant correlations using 
transformed WCST scores were with proportion of Matching to Form and 
Reinforcements to Form with CT total errors and Subtest IV. It should be 
remembered that form is the easiest concept for most subjects and the most 
frequent perseverate-to principle. These relationshlps for normals appear to 
reflect ability to shift flexibly from thls intuitive matching principle. 
The relationship between WCST variables and the CT is further attenuated 
when the effect of moderator variables was partialed out. For the normal group, 
partialing age or FSIQ or any combination of age, FSIQ, and education reduced 
the significant correlations to none. For the brain-damaged group , significant 
correlations remained when any one moderator variable was partialed out, but 
partialing age and FSIQ simultaneously reduced all correlations to less than r=.27 
(7.29% common variance) . 
When the hypothesis shlfting scores were considered in relation to CT 
performance for the total group, it was evident, as might be expected, that 
Wrong-Shlft behavior is associated with better CT performance, and Wrong-Stay 
is an unsuccessful strategy. However, controlling for demographlc variables also 
reduces these relationshlps to nonsignificance in the brain-damaged group. In 
contrast, for the normal group, when controlling for all three demographlc 
variables simultaneously, Shift-Behavior remains significantly correlated with 
performance on Subtest VI (p <.01). 
Overall, thls very complex study suggested that WCST performance may be 
viewed from a variety of perspectives, which may reflect multiple cognitive 
processes, but relationshlps between these measures and CT performance, when 
controlling for variance due to age and intellect, are nonsignificant. This may be 
due to the complexity of cognitive processes reflected by CT error scores, which 
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may not vary consistently in predicted directions, or these measures may simply 
reflect different cognitive processes. 
Conclusions 
Although the CT and WCST derived from common sources, in some senses 
their development may be described as mirror images of each other. Reitan 
(1966b) referred to the CT as a continuing long-term experiment, and added: 
We are still administering the same tests in the same way we did more than a 
decade ago. Of course, standardization of testing procedure has been 
necessary in order to be in a position gradually to accumulate enough subjects 
for study of specific neurological variables. As a result, we have not been able 
to modify or manipulate the test battery in order to learn experimentally what 
the tests measure or the particular requirements of the tests which might be 
most sensitive to cerebral dysfunction. The approach has been oriented 
toward subdivision and analysis of the independent neurological variables 
while the dependent variables (psychological measurements) have been held 
constant. (p. 163) 
In contrast, the WCST has been developed out of seemingly endless 
methodological variations. Heaton (1981) described 32 different scoring methods 
which have been utilized, and almost as many variations of materials and 
procedures. Only a few of these variations have been studied systematically; 
consequently, comparability across studies has been lacking. Unlike the CT, 
where a single score conceals complexity of constructs, with the WCST a 
proliferation of scores has impeded investigation of the constructs they each 
reflect and the interrelationships among them. Heaton's (1981) standardization 
appears to have brought some measure of consistency to research and clinical 
practice involving the WCST. What is now needed is a means of relating the 
performance profile obtained on WCST variables to the broader pattern of 
patients' neuropsychological functioning, particularly that represented by CT 
... 




METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Modified Administration Procedures 
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While pre viou s research has firmly established both the CT and WCST as 
sensitive measures of complex problem-solving skills, concept formation, and 
cognitive flexibility, the specific cognitive skills assessed by each task have not 
been addressed, except by correlating error scores on one test with error scores 
on the other test. Bond and Buchtel (1984) argued that while the issue of 
identifying the cognitive skills assessed by neuropsychological measures is an 
important one, correlational studies which compare error scores on one test with 
those of another may be uninformative. In particular , they observed that 
correlations such as those which have been reported for the CT and WCST may 
reflect the unreliability of the tests rather than differences in abilities measured 
by these tests. This, however, is difficult to ascertain for several reasons . A 
considerable practice effect has been found to be characteristic of both measures, 
and those effects appear to vary from population to population (Matarazzo, 
Matarazzo, Wiens, Gallo, & Klonoff, 1976; Matarazzo, Wiens, Matarazzo, & 
Goldstein, 1974; Matarazzo, Matarazzo, Gallo, & Wiens, 1979), which renders 
test-retest reliability estimates essentially meaningless. Split-half reliability 
estimation for these measures is also not useful, because subsequent items are 
not equivalent in terms of difficulty or independent (Simmel & Counts, 1957), nor 
is the last half comparable to the first half. Since no alternate form exists for 
either measure and would be very difficult to construct, reliability estimates are 
not presently available. 
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Bond and Buchtel (1984) also described other problems attendant upon 
correlational analyses of error scores in describing common constructs measured 
by each of these tests. Among these are uncertainty concerning what processes 
given scores by specific individuals reflect. This is an especially important 
consideration when cognitive strategies may vary considerably. Bond and 
Buchtel recommended a process tracing approach, or a "think aloud" approach, 
as one means of minimizing these obstacles. This technique involves asking 
subjects to verbalize the rules or the reasoning underlying their responses. 
Such an approach has the advantage of providing supplementary data that 
are useful to help clarify the hypothesis-testing process employed by subjects as 
they seek to identify relevant features of the stimuli comprising these tasks. 
Thereby , it is possible to differentiate types of errors subjects make in 
responding . It is not likely that subjects "te11 al1 they know" in explaining the 
reasoning underlying their responses; rather verbal explanations are often 
incomplete and ambiguous. Yet, this technique permits more accurate 
description of cognitive processes characteristic of particular patients' problem-
solving strategies. For example, some patients fail on these tasks due to an 
overly concrete perceptual focus, while others respond incorrectly due to failure 
to maintain cognitive set, while still others are deficient in idea fluency, or 
display perseverative responding. From the perspective of designing and 
implementing cognitive rehabilitation strategies, it is important to differentiate 
among these different types of errors, to the extent that these approaches to 
problem-solving tasks are characteristic of individual patients, or groups of 
patients. 
This verbalization approach to assessment represents a modification of 
standard testing procedures, and is not without methodological problems of its 
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own, but it has been used with some success in other contexts. Reitan has 
recommended this approach on an informal basis as a means of gathering 
additional information concerning patients' problem-solving strategies on the CT 
(Reitan & Wolfson, 1985), and it has been used also with concept formation tasks 
(Bourne, 1965). 
However, this technique has not been previously reported in the literature. It 
is not known whether asking subjects to verbalize their reasoning may have 
changed the nature of cognitive processing involved in task performance. This 
question was addressed in the current study by comparing results of testing 
collected under standard administration conditions with test results of subjects 
who were asked to verbalize reasoning. Noncomparability of mean error scores 
would suggest that adding a verbalization component to these tasks has 
substantially modified the nature of the cognitive processes called upon in 
performing these problem-solving tasks. Moreover, if the strength of association 
between types of error scores between groups is significantly different 
statistically, it could conduded that the tasks presented under modified 
administration conditions ( verbalization of reasoning) were not the same tasks 
presented under standard administration conditions (reasoning not verbalized). 
If asking patients to verbalize their reasoning on these tasks is found to 
substantially alter the nature of the task, obviously conclusions that were based 
on data collected under modified instructions could not be generalized to data 
collected under standard instructions. 
Cognitive Process Variables 
A primary concern of neuropsychological evaluation, particularly since the 
advent of more sophisticated neurodiagnostic procedures, is the prescription of 
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treatment goals and the design of remediation strategies. This requires more 
specific definition of deficits than statements of "impaired problem solving 
skills," or "impaired cognitive flexibility," or other such general statements. 
However, evaluating performance of higher cognitive functions by counting 
errors on the CT and WCST fails to provide such specific information . What 
referral sources seek to know is, "What does this patient do that impairs 
performance on this problem-solving task and how can that behavior be 
changed?" Since the CT and WCST have been found to be among the most 
sensitive measures of brain damage, it is reasonable to believe that patients' 
performance characteristics contain the information necessary to respond to those 
questions. If that is so, patients' verba]jzation of the reasoning underlying their 
responses may well access that data. For that information to be useful, however, 
it must be translated into reliable scores, and those scores must reflect relatively 
consistent performance characteristics, independently of age and IQ covariates. 
Asking patients to verbalize the reasoning underlying quantifiable responses 
introduces the problem of how one patient's qualitative responses may be 
compared to other patients ' qualitative responses. Some anecdotal reports are 
available for the CT in whlch patients have been asked to verbalize their 
reasoning (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985), but these responses have been interpreted 
subjectively, whlch does not allow systematic comparisons across patients or 
groups of patients. 
Two studies have more systematically addressed the issue of identifying item-
by-item response determinants on the CT, however, and these may serve to 
provide some guidance in defining relevant response parameters. Simmel and 
Counts (1957) concluded that some form of counting was the most persistent 
response determinant for theif subjects. They described counting responses 
92 
based upon the number of stimuli or elements in the configuration, counting 
responses based upon perceptually similar stimuli, counting responses based 
upon perceptual dissimilarity, counting responses based upon spatial continuity 
of both similar and dissimilar stimuli, and counting responses based upon 
dominant perceptual features. Simmel and Counts also noted that subjects who 
are confused as to the correct principle may have perseverated to an obviously 
incorrect principle, or reverted to a preferred (incorrect) principle when the 
stimulus configuration changed or a dominant perceptual feature appeared, even 
though they may have been more recently reinforced for employing the correct 
principle . 
Perrine (1984) referred to the concept formation literature (Bourne, 
Dominowski, & Loftus, 1979) for a cognitive process model which might help 
clarify the response tendencies described by Simmel and Counts. Following 
Bourne (Bourne et al., 1979), he differentiated between attribute identification, 
defined as characteristics of a stimulus configuration which convey information 
about membership or nonmembership in a class, and rule-learning, which 
describes the process whereby attributes are related logically. Perrine described 
the relationship between these components as hierarchical, having both concr:ete 
(attribute identification) and abstract (rule learning) stages. Concept formation 
tasks may involve only the concrete stage, or both the concrete and abstract 
stages. Using tasks devised to assess performance on these stages separately as 
independent variables, Perrine concluded that the WCST is primarily an attribute 
identification task (concrete) whereas the CT is more a rule learning task (both 
concrete and abstract). However, even though the relationship between these 
concept formation scores and CT subtest and WCST scores was significantly 
greater than the relationship between CT subtest and WCST scores from a 
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statistical perspective, the improvement in predictive power was generally 
marginal from a clinical viewpoint. Further, even these findings may have been 
influenced by the greater similarity of the attribute identification tasks to the 
WCST than the CT, and vice versa for the rule learning tasks. 
An assumption underlying such approaches is that the cognitive processes 
employed in problem-solving or concept formation tasks is "task-driven," 
wherein the strategies employed are dependent upon the nature of the task. 
However, as Bond and Buchtel (1984) have noted, individuals may select a 
common response by utilizing a variety of processes. Measuring only the end 
product of those processes may conceal as much as it illuminates. 
What is needed is an approach which can measure the processes employed by 
subjects as they arrive at a solution to the task presented to them. Asking patients 
to verbalize their reasoning as they problem-solve may be the most direct means 
of accomplishing this goal. For the WCST those responses consist only of the 
perceptual attribute (utilizing Perrine's terminology) identified by the subject in 
determining his or her response. Thus, verbalized WCST responses serve to 
provide a less ambiguous means of scoring the responses than is true for 
conventional administration. However, for the CT, devising a coding system 
which permits comparison of verbalized responses across items and across 
subjects is a formidable task. 
Perrine's Model of Concept Formation 
Perrine's (1984) concept formation model for describing the process whereby 
patients select a response from the choices available to them on the problem-
solving tasks represented by the CT provides a means for differentiating subjects' 
reasoning. In terms of this model, the attribute identification stage of response 
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selection may be viewed as the perceptual component of that process, while the 
rule-learning stage appears more conceptual. Thus, when patients verbalized 
their reasoning on these tasks, attribute identification occurred when subjects 
discriminated features in the stimulus upon which their response was based, 
while the rule-learning component consisted of the significance subjects 
attributed to those features. For example, on Subtest Ill of the CT, many subjects 
chose "3" as the correct response because "three are not solid." In that instance, 
"openness" (nonsolidity) constituted the attribute identification portion of the 
response, while counting ( elements that are not solid) comprised the rule-
learning component. 
However, the task of applying this model to subjects' verbal responses is 
somewhat equivalent to devising a valid and reliable coding system for the 
Rorschach Inkblot Technique. Different individuals describe the same reasoning 
differently, and on occasion similar language may describe very different 
reasoning processes. Similarly, one person may utilize different language to 
describe similar responses or may fail to use language which differentiates 
among different kinds of responses. For example, in Subtest IV, one person may 
respond, "Three because that part is missing," while another person, referring to 
the same perceptual features, may respond, "Three because that's where the line 
is." Even more problematic is when such language shifts occur within the same 
protoco1. The question arises as to whether these differences in language relate to 
different cognitive processes. If so, coding subjects' reasoning on the CT may not 
be feasible since utilizing the language in subjects' descriptions of how stimuli 
relate to the number responses given has proven to be inherently unreliable, and 
therefore invalid. 
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The Attribute Identification Score 
The alternative which was utilized in this study was the convention of 
identifying the perceptual attributes of stimuli to which the language used by 
subjects referred. For example, on Subtest III, subjects may have chosen "1" as 
the correct response because "One is different." In this instance, "different" 
referred to the solidity of one portion of the stimulus; consequently, the 
perceptual attribute would be "Solid" rather than "Different." Similarly, subjects 
may have chosen "2" as the correct response because "Two are alike" (referring to 
the fact that two stimuli have four sides). ln that case, the perceptual attribute 
would be "Form." In this fashion it is possible to avoid the ambiguities inherent 
in attempting to code multiple ways of describing "diiference" in a consistent 
fashion. In contrast, if the patient had stated in the first instance, "solidness," but 
the number response was "3," the perceptual attribute would be "Open," because 
the language of the verbal response clearly referred to the nonsolidity of three 
elements in the stimulus. Table 2 lists the Attribute Identification codes identified 
for the purposes of this study and brief definitions for each. These codes may be 
viewed as describing where the subject was looking in formulating the response, 
or what part of the stimulus was included in the response. This approach brings 
a greater degree of standardization to the task and permits increased reliability in 
coding responses. 
An additional problem encountered is that due to the complexity of CT 
stimuli, a response may refer to two or more perceptual attributes, or a verbal 
response may be ambiguous as to which attribute takes precedence. Often it is 
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Table 2 
Definitions of Attribute Identification (Concrete) Codes 
1. Gestalt (G) 
2. Color (C) 
3. Form (F) 
4. Element (E) 
5. Size (Z) 
6. Solidity (5) 
7. Open (0) 





Tho se respon ses in which the perceptual focus is on the stimulu s 
configuration as a wh ole 
a. does not differentiat e between solid and dott ed or inferred (missing) 
lines 
b. dissimilar elements are treated as equival ent. 
Respon ses in which clements in the stimulu s configuration are 
differentiated on the basis of color. 
a. Where achromatic colors are used to describe configural elements 
("the long whit e one"), score for so lidity not color. 
b. An exception to the above rule will be when respon ses are based 
up on the achromatic color of elements which are unlik e with respect 
to solidity . 
Responses based upon the form or shap e of concr ete non geom etric 
figures. If shap e or form is used descript ively rath er than to differentiate 
elements in the configuration ("3 small squar es" to refer to dott ed lines), 
form would not be scored . 
Respon ses in which elem ents in the stimulu s configurati on which are not 
perceptually uniqu e or distinct are arbitrarily differentiat ed from other 
perceptually similar elements. 
Respon ses in which elements in the stimulu s configuration are 
differentiat ed on the basis of size. 
Respon ses in which element s in the stimulu s configuration are 
differentiat ed on the basis of solidity, or where the perceptual focus of 
att ention is on elements outlined by a solid line . 
Respon ses in whid1 the openne ss of th e stimulu s or stimuli is identified 
as the perceptual focus of attention, in contrast to stimuli which are 
identified as "solid ." Includes responses focusing attention on brok en or 
dotted lines. 
Respon ses using inferred lines or components which are considered 
missing as the object of rul e formulation. Include s dotted line s which are 
described as missing. 
Response s which include the background area beyond the border s of the 
stimulu s. 
Respon ses which consist of elements representing a remote point or 
location pointed to or identified by another element in the stimulu s. 
not possible to differentiate which of these alternatives is true. Consequently, in 
the interest of increased reliability in coding responses, a decision tree approach 
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was adopted for coding perceptual attributes. This approach establishes a 
hierarchy of coding rules, ordered in such a way that the most reJevant or highest 
order perceptual attributes are listed first. (See Appendix E for the full model.) 
Use of this approach permitted achievement of a satisfactory level of test-retest 
reliability in recoding perceptual attributes. (See Procedures section for reliability 
coefficients.) 
The Conceptual Abstraction Score 
Perrine's model described a two-part process of concept formation in which 
Attribute Identification referred to the identification of relevant perceptual 
attributes of stimuli and Rule Learning referred to logical relationships between 
attributes, leading to hypothesis formation. With reference to the CT, Attribute 
Identification refers to identification of the relevant features of stimuli upon 
which the rule is based, whereas Rule Learning refers to the logical relationship 
between the attribute identified and the number response chosen. For example, 
on Subtest III, the Attribute Identification task is to discern that the stimulus 
which is different is the relevant dimension, while the Rule Learning task is to 
discover that the position of the different stimulus corresponds to the correct 
number. 
Howe':er, during the course of this study, it was discovered that a three-stage 
coding system was required to reliably differentiate verbal responses: 
(a) Concrete: subjects selected a perceptual feature which they believed relevant; 
(b) Abstract: the perceptual feature or features were organized conceptually to 
create a pattern; (c) Rule: this pattern was related to the number response given. 
For example, in Subtest IV, the quadrants are numbered in a clockwise direction, 
and the principle requires identifying the quadrant of the stimulus which is 
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missing or different. The Concrete (Attribute Identification) task is identification 
of the portion which is not there or which is different from the rest of the 
stimulus; the Abstract conceptual task is to perceive this attribute as one quadrant 
of the whole stimulus; the Rule Leaming task is to select a number corresponding 
to the position of the missing or different quadrant when ordered in a clockwise 
direction. 
Table 3 lists the Abstract scores identified for the purposes of this study and 
brief definitions for each. As was the case with the Concrete (Attribute 
Identification) score, reliability in coding was enhanced by utilizing a hierarchical 
decision-tree approach in coding the Abstract score. (See Appendix F for the full 
model.) 
The Rule-Learning Score 
Rule Learning is the third element in this model of concept formation. This is 
identical to Perrine's Rule-Learning model and refers to the logical relationship 
between the Abstract Pattern and the number response given for the item. For 
example, in the following response, "1 because there's 1 object" (referring to a 
solidly outlined square figure in Subtest V), the Attribute Identification score 
would be "S" because the stimulus included in the response is outlined in a solid 
line; the Abstract Pattern score would be "I" because the attribute identified 
occupies space corresponding to multiple quadrants of the stimulus and has been 
combined into a single percept; and the Rule Learning score would be "C" 
because the number response results from counting the Abstract Patterns 
identified. In contrast, if the response had been, "4 because there's 4 lines" (using 
the same stimulus), the Attribute Identification score would remain the same; the 
Abstract Pattern score would be "Q" because the attribute identified occupies 
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Table 3 





3. Location (L) 
4. Unlike (U) 
5. Alike (A) 
6. Number (N) 
7. Form (F) 
8. Missing (M) 
9. Quadrant (Q) 
10. Integrated (I) 
11. Division (D) 
Responses which combine elements with like attributes into a unitary set, 
then differentiate elements within the set. 
Responses which combine elements with like attributes into a unitary set, 
and apply the rule to the set without further subdivision. 
Responses based upon the position of concrete attribute s, other than 
those responses which reflect the correct position of a specified quadrant. 
Responses which consist of one unique element which is described or 
treated as different than other elements in the stimulus array. 
Responses which consist of elements described as "alike" or the "same" 
or differentiated from elements not included in the response on the basis 
of unique attributes. 
Responses which consist of attributes described as a shape repr ese nting a 
number value. 
Responses which consist of attributes described as a concrete, 
nongeometric shape other than a number. 
Responses which consist of attributes which are physically present but 
are described as "missing." 
Responses which consist of attributes which occupy space corresponding 
to quadrants or fourths of the stimulus, or multiples thereof. 
Responses which consist of attributes occupying space corresponding to 
two or more quadrants which have been combined into a single percept. 
Responses which consist of attributes occupying space which does not 
correspond to quadrants of the stimulus, or multiples thereof. 
space corresponding to quadrants of the stimulus, or multiples thereof, and the 
Rule Learning score would also be unchanged because the number response still 
results from counting the Abstract Patterns identified. (See Table 4 for additional 
scoring examples.) 
In this fashion, it is possible to assess the hypothesis testing behavior of 
individual subjects, in response to confirmation or disconfirmation of hypotheses. 
Bourne (1965) reported that efficient hypothesis testing behavior was 
characterized by formulation of all-encompassing hypothesis initially, and 
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Table 4 
Examples of Scoring Cognitive Process Variables 
STIMULUS NO. VERBAL RESPONSE C A R 0 .. .,, .. 
"One straight line" F D x~· l C 
~ .. 0 
,[r 3 'There's the page, then this, B D C and this" 
0600 2 'There are 2 kinds" G K C 
··---- 1 "The big box is pointing to D Q L I I I I No. l" : .. a 
Ooal!!a 4 "4th one is a different shape" F u L 
modifying elements of the hypothesis one at a time, until the correct principle is 
discovered. The coding system described here permits that type of analysis with 
respect to the CT. Table 5 lists the Rule Learning scores identified for the 
purposes of this study and brief definitions for each. As was the case with the 
Concrete and Abstract scores, reliability in coding was enhanced by utilizing a 
hierarchical decision-tree approach in coding the Rule-Leaming score. (See 
Appendix G for the full model.) 
Summary and Ratio Scores 
The primary scores described above were transformed to a variety of ratio and 
summary scores which comprise the Cognitive Process variables. These scores 
reflect a smaller number of cognitive processes which are believed to be crucial 
for performance of problem-solving tasks. These include, but are not limited to, 
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Table 5 
Definitions of Rule-Learning Codes 
1. Random (R) 
2. Memory (M) 
3. Counting (C) 









9. Form (F) 
10. Sequence (S) 
Responses based on Guesses. 
Responses based on a previous response without clarifying the 
reasoning. 
Responses based upon counting Abstract Patterns identified. 
Responses corresponding to correct placement of a single quadrant or 
fourth of the stimulus. 
Responses corresponding to incorrect placement of a single quadrant or 
fourth of the stimulus. 
Responses based upon the proportion of the stimulus which was 
identified as the Abstract Pattern, when the number response given 
corresponds to the numerator of the fraction when the denominator= 4. 
Responses based upon the proportion of the stimulus which was 
identified as the Abstract Pattern, when the number response given does 
not correspond to the numerator of the fraction or when the denominator 
;c4. 
Responses based upon a mathematical procedure other than simple 
counting of Abstract Patterns. 
Responses based upon the shape or form of the Abstract Pattern. 
Responses which are based upon a sequence other than described above. 
the following: (a) ability to shift strategies when solutions are ineffective; (b) 
ability to maintain strategies when solutions are effective; (c) ability to generate 
alternative solutions; (d) ability to identify relevant perceptual attributes; (e) 
ability to apply abstract rules to variable perceptual stimuli. (See Appendix H for 
definitions of these variables.) 
Hypotheses 
If these or other similar cognitive processes predict performance on these 
tasks, the scores which have been derived from coding of patients' verbalized 
reasoning on the CT and WCST should form interpretable cognitive process 
factors, when entered into a factor analysis, which are at least moderately 
independent of age and lQ covariates . This may be stated in the form of the 
following research hypotheses: 
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1. Mean Total Error and Subtest Error scores on the CT and mean Error 
scores, Categories Completed, and Perseverative Responses on the WCST will not 
differ significantly (statistically) between a group of patients who verbalized the 
reasoning for their responses on the CT and WCST and a group of patients who 
did not verbalize their reasoning on the CT and WCST, and are comparable to the 
first group with respect to diagnosis, age and Full Scale WAIS-R IQ. 
2. Correlations among CT Total Error scores, CT Subtest Error scores, WCST 
Error scores, WCST Categories Completed, WCST Perseverative Responses, 
WCST Nonperseverative Errors, and WCST Failure to Maintain Set will not differ 
significantly (statistically) between a group of patients who verbalized the 
reasoning for their responses on the CT and a group of patients who did not 
verbalize their reasoning on the CT, when both groups are comparable with 
respect to diagnosis, age and Full Scale WAIS-R IQ. 
3. The relationships between coded variables derived from verbalized 
responses on the CT will produce three or more interpretable (cognitive process) 
factors, which are more independent of age, education, and IQ subtest and 
summary scores than CT error scores. 
4. The relationships between coded variables derived from verbalized 
responses on the WCST (defined in Appendix I) will produce three or more 
interpretable (cognitive process) factors, which are more independent of age, 
education, and IQ subtest and summary scores than summary WCST scores 
(Categories Completed, Perseverative Responses, Nonperseverative Errors, Total 
Errors, Failure to Maintain Set). 
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5. The relationship between Total Error Scores and Subtest Error Scores on 
the CT and Perseverative Errors, Nonperseverative Errors, Categories 
Completed, Perseverative Responses, and Failure-to-Maintain Set scores on the 
WCST will not be statistically significant, when controlling for FSIQ, age, and 
education. 
6. The relationship between interpretable factor scores from the WCST factor 
analyses (hypothesis 4) and each factor score derived from the CT factor analysis 
(hypothesis 3) will be statistically significant, when controlling for FSIQ, age, and 
education. 
Purpose 
In view of the need for more accurate description of the cognitive deficits 
that characterize the problem-solving behavior of patients with brain injuries or 
dysfunction, the purpose of this study was to devise a coding system to classify 
CT and WCST responses using a "think aloud" methodology, in order to achieve 
the following goals: (a) describe the cognitive strategies employed by individual 
patients in performing these tasks, and (b) differentiate the cognitive strategies 
assessed by the CT versus the WCST. 
Objectives 
The goals described above were addressed in terms of the following 
objectives: 
1. To determine whether asking patients to verbalize their reasoning on 
WCST and CT responses substantially alters the nature of these tasks. 
2. To devise a coding system derived from these verbal responses and 
determine if verbal responses obtained using this methodology can be reliably 
coded by trained examiners. 
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3. To determine the relationship between the cognitive processes reflected by 
~cores on the WCST versus the cognitive processes reflected by scores on the CT. 
Procedures 
Subjects 
Subjects receiving modified test instructions and those receiving nonmodified 
instructions (comparison group) were obtained from archival records in the 
Clinical Psychology Department at Iowa Methodist Medical Center (IMMC), a 
;10 bed privately-funded, nonprofit general medical center located in Des 
Moines, Iowa, affiliated with the only post-acute care rehabilitation center in 
central Iowa, Younkers Rehabilitation Center (YRC), which provides a full range 
cf rehabilitation services for victims of stroke, traumatic injury, heart disease, 
reurological disorders, tumors, and a variety of other disabling conditions. In 
,ddition, IMMC offers inpatient and outpatient substance abuse treatment and 
ilpatient psychiatric care. The Clinical Psychology Department has on staff two 
lcensed neuropsychologists and receives a large number of referrals for 
1europsychological evaluation from neurologists, physiatrists, psychiatrists, and 
ether medical specialists associated with these treatment programs and others. 
Cognitive rehabilitation is also provided as an adjunct service by the Clinical 
Jsychology Department, and in that connection since July, 1990, technicians 
rroviding neuropsychological testing have routinely asked patients to verbalize 
heir reasoning on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the Category Test, when 
hese measures were administered and time permitted. These responses were 
recorded verbatim to supplement the clinical data available to the 
neuropsychologist to provide baseline data for treatment planning purposes. 
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Records of neuropsychological testing since July, 1990 were reviewed in order 
to identify patients whose charts contained verbalized records of both complete 
WCST and Category Test administration, and completed WAIS-R protocols. 
Charts of 132 such patients were identified. Additionally, patients were 
identified whose charts contained completed CT and WCST protocols, 
administered according to standard instructions (nonverbalized), and who also 
completed the WAIS-R. Charts of 88 patients who met these criteria were 
identified. However, patients in this comparison group were tested over a much 
wider time period for several reasons. First, most patients referred since July, 
1990 received verbalized test administration on the CT and WCST for clinical 
reasons; second, staff changes occurred just prior to that time, and previous staff 
members apparently administered both of these test instruments in their entirety 
much less frequently than was true after July, 1990. As a result, testing records 
were searched to mid-1986 in order to identify a sufficient number of patients for 
the comparison group. 
Confidentiality of these patients was protected by duplicating only those 
portions of the protocols which contained no personally identifying information, 
with the exception of date of testing, date of birth, and age. Duplicated protocols 
were coded with a sequential identifying number. At the same time, the Report 
of Neuropsychological Evaluation was consulted to obtain other data relevant to 
assessing comparability of the two groups, which was entered on a coding sheet 
identified by the assigned identification number. These data included sex, 
handedness, diagnosis, and medical information relevant to neuropsychological 
functioning (history of hospitalization for head injury, substance abuse history, 
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treatment for neurological or psychiatric disorder, and learning disabilities). 
After these data were entered onto the coding sheet and protocols were 
photoduplicated as described above, original protocols were returned to the files. 
Coded protocols were then divided into the comparison group (nonmodified 
instructions) and experimental group (modified instructions). 
Although patients whose protocols were selected for the purposes of this 
study did not sign informed consent forms, the designated custodian of the 
records, the Director of the Psychology Department at IMMC, on the 
recommendation of a five-member research committee appointed by the 
president of IMMC, and chaired by the research director, approved the use of 
these records for the purposes described, with the limitation that patient 
confidentiality would be protected, according to the procedures described above. 
No attempt was made to ensure that patients whose protocols were selected 
for inclusion in this study were representative with respect to demographic 
characteristics of the general population or the population of patients referred to 
the Psychology Department at IMMC for neuropsychological evaluation. In fact, 
it is unlikely that these groups of patients are comparable with the general 
population in terms of these characteristics, since young males are at increased 
risk of head injuries, and closed head injury is the primary diagnostic 
classification for both groups of patients. 
These groups of patients are also unlikely to be representative of all patients 
referred for neuropsychological assessment since the selection criteria 
(completion of the WAIS-R, CT, and WCST) excluded most severely impaired 
patients, patients with very poor frustration tolerance who could not persist in 
completing these difficult tasks, and aphasic patients who were unable to 
adequately verbalize responses on the Verbal Scale of the WAIS-R or verbalize 
their reasoning on the CT and WCST. As a result, it is likely that patients 
selected for inclusion in the study induded a disproportionate number of 
patients with right cerebral hemisphere damage, since patients with left 
hemisphere damage are much more likely to be aphasic. 
Further analysis of the influence of these variables on outcome was not 
attempted. Table 6 lists primary, secondary, and tertiary diagnoses (when 
available) for patients in each group. 
107 
It will be noted that a history of head injury was present in 73% of all patients, 
at least by patient self-report, although the reason for referral may have been 
another diagnosis. As a result, reliably differentiating among this group of 
patients on the basis of diagnosis is not practical. Consequently, diagnosis is not 
induded as a variable or covariate in this study. 
Since previous researchers have identified age and IQ, and to a lesser degree 
education, as covariates of CT and WCST performance, mean values of these 
demographic variables were computed for each group, and comparability of 
Table 6 
Diagnostic Classification Within Each Patient Group 
DIAGNOSIS EXPERIMENT AL GRP COMPARISON GRP 
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 
Traumatic Brain Injury 88 6 3 59 4 
CVA 7 1 2 1 
Toxic Exposure 3 1 3 
Brain Tumour 3 1 
Dementia 1 
Psychiatric 8 6 1 3 4 
Chemical Dependency 5 23 5 4 5 3 
Seizure Disorder 5 2 1 4 1 
Other Neurological 6 1 10 
Unspecified 7 4 3 
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group means were assessed using t tests. Table 7 lists mean age, education, and 
JQ scores of patients by sex and handedness for each patient group and for both 
groups together. It will be noted that though the groups were comparable with 
respect to IQ and education, the age comparison revealed that the experimental 
group was significantly older (p < .03) than the comparison group. 
Inspection of decade age ranges in the two groups revealed that the 
proportions of subjects in both extremes of the continuum were quite dissimilar 
for the two groups. (See Table 8.) Consequently, covarying age was necessary 
on all group comparisons. 
Test Admini stration 
For both of these groups of patients, testing was administered in a standard 
manner by qualified technicians under the appropriate supervision of licensed 
psychologists who are credentialed as clinical neuropsychologists. Each 
examiner has completed at least an M.A. or M.S. degree in psychology, but each 
group was tested by different examiners, with the exception of the small number 
of patients in the Comparison Group who were tested subsequent to July, 1990 
and were not asked to verbalize reasoning on the CT and WCST. Among the 
Table 7 
Demographic Characteristics of Patient Groups 
GROUP N AGE ED PIQ VIQ FSIQ 
Mean (S.D.) 
Exp. Grp Total 132 *37.1 (14.3) 13.2 (2.7) 95.9 (14.1) 97.3 (13.6) 96.2 (13.5) 
Comp . Grp Tot. 88 *33.1 (12.4) 12.8 (2.5) 97.6 (13.5) 98.4 (14.0) 98.1 (13.7) 
Combined Tot. 220 35.5 (13.7) 13.1 (3.0) %.5 (13.9) 97.7 (13.7) 96.9 (13.6) 
*P < .05 
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reasons for employing standard administration for these subjects were time 
limitations, impaired expressive language skills, or assignment to an examiner 
who was reluctant to employ modified test instructions. 
The Booklet Category Test (BCT) was substituted for the Halstead Category 
Test for both groups, even for those tested prior to 1990. The BCT (Defilippis & 
McCampbell, 1979) consists of either one or two large loose-leaf binders 
containing reproductions of the CT stimuli on a black background to correspond 
to the smoked screen on which the CT slides are projected. Patients are 
presented a strip of paper on which numbers one through four have been 
printed, and rather than responding by pulling a lever on the projection 
apparatus, they point to the number they have chosen as their response. 
Feedback consists of the examiner's verbal response, "correct" or "incorrect" 
rather than the bell or buzzer which provides feedback on the CT apparatus. The 
BCT has the advantage that it is much less cumbersome than the CT and may be 
readily transported to patients' rooms and other testing sites. It is also less 
intimidating for many patients and facilitates examiner interaction to help 
maintain patient collaboration. 
Validation of the BCT has been hampered by practice effects when both the 
Halstead CT and the BCT are administered within a short time period. To some 
extent, however, this has been compensated for by counter-balancing 
Table 8 
Distribution of Decade Age Ranges Within Patient Grou12s 
GROUP <20 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 >69 
Experimental 7.58% 24.24% 29.55% 21.21% 9.85% 3.03% 4.55% 
Comearison 15.91% 30.68% 22.73% 19.32% 10.23% 2.27% 0% 
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administration order in a variety of populations. These studies have consistently 
demonstrated a high degree of consistency between scores on the two forms 
(r=.913 and r=.893, for example) and equivalent patterns of correlation and group 
discrimination (Defilippis & McCampbell, 1979). Although validation research 
continues, the BCT is generally viewed as an equivalent form of the CT. 
Coding of Responses 
Verbalized CT responses for the experimental group were coded by the 
experimenter, employing the decision tree procedures in Appendices E through 
G. These procedures were developed, also by the experimenter, using patient 
protocols which were not included in this study for the purpose of statistical 
analysis. These protocols were among those which were discarded due to 
missing data, generally because the WCST was not available or was not 
administered according to modified instructions. 
Criteria employed in the development of the coding system were based upon 
the theoretical approach described by Perrine (1984), as outlined in the 
description of Coding Process Variables in the section above. Definitions and 
coding procedures were constructed in such a way that discrimination among 
verbal responses which varied in terms of Concrete Attribute Identification, 
Abstract Pattern Identification, or Rule Learning was enhanced. Such 
discrimination was measured on the basis of test-retest (recoding) reliability for 
recoding by the examiner of four protocols which had been initially coded, also 
by the examiner, four months previously 5 . Since verbal responses of subjects 
who made few errors on the CT provided little variety of scoring q.eterminants or 
5 Although interscorer reliability would have provided a more accurate measure of reliability in 
coding responses, the complexity of the coding system precluded use of trained volunteers for 
the purpose of this study. 
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coding challenges, protocols which contained fewer than 50 errors were 
eliminated from the selection pool, and protocols used for assessing reliability 
were randomly selected from among those which remained. Although it is not 
typically used in this manner, an adaptation of the point-by-point agreement 
ratio was computed, based upon a total sample of 2,160 scores (Kazdin, 1982). 
Reliability for recoding responses utilizing this procedure was .943. 
Consequently, it was concluded that use of coding rules provided adequate 
reliability. 
Data Entry 
After all CT protocols were coded following the procedures described above, 
the experimenter entered all data into appropriate cells on a spreadsheet 
software program (Excel 4.0) running on an Apple Macintosh Ilci computer. This 
spreadsheet contained formulas for computation of frequency and ratio scores 
for all variables defined in Appendix I. WCST responses, both those scored 
conventionally and those based upon patients' verbal responses, were entered 
into a second spreadsheet program, which contained formulas for computation 
of WCST variables listed in Appendix H. After all data were entered and all 
summary and ratio scores for both the CT and WCST were computed, these data 
were combined with WAIS-R IQ scores and demographic variables, with each 
subject identified by sequentially assigned ID numbers. 
Data for the Comparison Group were summarized and collated in the same 
manner, except that CT cognitive process variables and WCST verbalized scores 
were not available for this group. Consequently, only CT error scores and 
conventionally scored WCST variables were combined. At this point, the 
combined scores for each group were exported to files for statistical analysis 





Data analysis for this study proceeded in three distinct phases, reflecting the 
separate purposes of the three sets of hypotheses described in the previous 
chapter. First, error scores on the CT and conventional scores on the WCST, and 
relationships among those scores, for the Experimental Group were compared to 
the same scores for the Comparison Group in order to determine if there were 
differential performance characteristics between these groups, which might have 
suggested that asking patients to verbalize their reasoning altered the nature of 
the task. Since it had been established previously that these groups were not 
comparable with respect to some variables which have been found to influence 
performance on these tasks (age and some subtests on the Performance IQ scale), 
it was necessary to statistically control for the influence of these variables in 
performing these comparisons. This was accomplished by use of analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA), in which scores reflecting performance comprised the 
dependent variables with group membership comprising the independent 
variable, while covarying age and WAIS-R performance. Since IQ scores were 
age-corrected, and age was already entered as a covariate, nonage-corrected IQ 
scores (summed scale scores) were utilized to avoid confounding correction 
terms. Comparing correlations between pairs of scores was accomplished in the 
same manner, partialing out the influence of age and IQ variables, then 
covarying one score on another score, with group membership as the 
independent variable. 
The second set of analyses related to hypotheses three and four, which 
concerned the identification of separate cognitive process factors comprised of 
subsets of cognitive process variables from the CT and WCST. It was 
114 
hypothesized that at least three interpretable factors for each test would emerge 
from factor analyses of the ratio and summary variables defined in Appendices 
Hand I. It was further hypothesized that these factors would be at least 
moderately independent of age and IQ variables . Therefore, this set of analyses 
was accomplished using principal components factor analysis with oblique 
rotation since it was not expected that these factors would be independent of 
each other. The relationship of these factors to age and IQ variables was assessed 
through the use of multiple regression techniques, with age and WAIS-R subtest 
scores regressed on each interpretable factor which emerged from factor analysis 
of variables from each test. 
The third set of analyses was intended to test hypotheses 5 and 6. It was 
hypothesized that when age and IQ covariates were partialed out, the correlation 
between CT error scores and WCST conventional scores would not be 
statistically significant, but that CT factor scores would be significantly correlated 
with WCST factor scores, when age and IQ covariates are partialed . This set of 
analyses was performed using multiple regression techniques, regressing the 
combined sets of covariates and independent variables onto each dependent 
variable, forcing covariates into the equation first, in order to partial out their 
influence. 
Results of Group Comparisons 
Hypothesis 1 
It was anticipated that mean CT error scores and Categories Completed, 
Perseverative Errors, and Total Errors on the WCST for the Experimental Group 
would not be significantly different statistically from the same scores for the 
Comparison Group, when controlling for variance due to age, education, and 
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FSIQ (nonage corrected) covariates. This expectation was tested using 
ANCOV A, with summary scores on both the CT and WCST serving as 
dependent variables, and group membership as the independent variable, 
covarying blocked age, education, and summed W AIS-R scale scores (FSSUM). 
The results of these comparisons are listed in Table 9. Of the 11 comparisons, 
onJy mean scores for CT Subtest IV Errors (C4Err) were significantly different (p 
= .017). 
The relevance of this single significant comparison for conclusions concerning 
the comparability of the scores for the two groups was explored further, 
covarying all possible combinations of age, education, and FSSUM variables. 
The two groups were found to be comparable only when age by itself was 
covaried (p = .075), but treating age and group membership both as independent 
variables, without covariates, produced the least differentiation between groups 
with respect to C4Err. Adding education and FSSUM as covariates decreased 
comparability of the groups. 
All other comparisons listed in Table 9 were also recomputed using this 
procedure, and group differences were found only for CT Subtest VI (C6Err) and 
WCST Total Errors (WTE). Covarying education and FSSUM was found to 
Table 9 
Comparison of Mean CT and WCST Summary Scores 
GROUP CT WCST 
III IV V VI VII TOT CAT PSV NPS TE FfM 
Experimental 16.0 *13.4 13.7 10.7 4.8 58.6 4.7 19.7 14.1 31.1 .98 
Comearison 16.4 *10.7 11.9 8.3 4.3 51.9 4.6 20.3 19.2 36.9 .86 
*p < .02 
produce comparability between groups on C6Err (p = .16) and covarying 
education by itself produced comparability between groups on WTE (p = .24). 
No interaction terms were found for any of these analyses; consequently, 
although groups were found to be not comparable with respect to age and 
covariates for individual variables was sometimes dissimilar, as might be 




Not only were CT and WCST mean scores expected to be comparable 
between the experimental group and the comparison group, when controlling for 
age, education, and IQ covariates, but the relationships among those scores were 
also expected to be comparable. This hypothesis was tested utilizing analysis of 
covariance to evaluate the covariance between pairs of variables, after partialing 
out age, education, and FSSUM, with group membership comprising the 
independent variable. The main effect in each comparison for group 
membership is listed in Table 10. 
Only 3 of 55 comparisons revealed statistically significant differences in 
covariance between variables as a function of group membership. Two of those 
involved WCST Total Errors, while the third difference was the correlation 
between CT Subtest III Errors (C4Err) and CT Total Errors (CTE). 
Multiple regression analysis in each instance revealed that patterns of 
covariation for age, education, and IQ scores for these variables were dissimilar 
between groups. Consequently, it would not be expected that relationships 
among these scores would be similar across groups. As a result of these findings, 
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Table 10 
Probabilities of Group Differences Between Variables 
VARIABLES III IV V VI VII TOT CAT PSV NPV FrM TE 
CT WCST 
Subte st III NIA .14 .25 .28 .22 *.03 .32 .35 .31 .32 .58 
Subt est IV NIA .18 .16 .06 .15 .09 .08 .11 .11 *.03 
Subtest V NIA .31 .09 .18 .11 .11 .08 .12 .07 
Subte st VI NIA .18 .35 .20 .21 .13 .24 .11 
Subtest VII NIA .38 .83 .77 .91 .86 .45 
Total Errors NIA .35 .33 .34 .41 .12 
Cat. Completed NIA .80 .74 .65 **.003 
PSV Respon ses NIA .06 SI .11 
NonPSV Resp . NIA .13 .40 
Fail to Maintain NIA .28 
Total Errors NIA 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
covariate relationships for all variables were computed for both groups . These 
results are shown in Table 11. 
It can be seen that age, education, and IQ covariates for all scores are quite 
dissimilar between the groups. Consequently, although most correlations 
between pairs of CT and WCST variables were comparable between groups, 
when age, education, and Full Scale IQ were partialed out, the three correlations 
which were not comparable were sufficient to raise questions concerning the 
comparability of groups. However, given the group differences which were 
previously identified, it was unclear whether dissimilar relationships among 
variables across groups reflected differences due to administration procedures or 
due to other variables. 
This question was explored further by analyzing relationships among other 
sets of scores on which administration procedures did not vary between groups. 
It was reasoned that if groups were comparable with respect to diagnosis, 
. severity of impairment, and other relevant variables, relationships among 
WAIS-R subtest and summary scores would be similar across groups, since these 
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Table 11 
E_2 for Age, Education, and IO Regressed on CT/ WCST Variab]es 
Covar. Age Ed OS A V C s PC PA BO OA osr vs PS FS Tot. 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP 
C3Err .06 .11 .03 .18 
C4Err .03 .04 .17 .05 .27 
CSErr .04 .21 .24 
C6Err .18 .18 
CTE .02 .08 .27 .37 
WCAT .07 .03 .20 .28 
WPSV .02 .05 .26 .31 
WNPV .03 .06 .10 .16 
WFTM 0 
\"7TE .07 .02 .32 .40 
COMPARISON GROUP 
Covar. Age Ed OS A V C s PC PA BO OA OS}'. vs PS FS Tot. 
C3Err .05 .40 .44 
C4Err .05 .08 .32 .41 
C5Err .23 .22 
C6Err .30 .29 
CTE .08 .50 .03 .59 
WCAT .17 .15 
WPSV .07 .09 .13 
WNPV 0 
WFTM .07 .05 
WTE .14 .13 
tasks were administered in the same way for all subjects. The results of these 
multiple regression analyses are shown in Table 12. 
These analyses revealed that relationships among WAIS-R subtest and 
summary scores were quite dissimilar, with the exception of Wechsler's (1944) 
"Hold" scores on the verbal scale, Information, Vocabu]ary, and Comprehension 
subtests, plus Similarities. However, the so-called Hold scores from the 
performance scale, Picture Completion and Object Assembly, were among those 
which were most dissimilar across groups. 
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Table 12 
R2 Change for Age, Education, and IO Interrelationships 
Covar. Age Ed OS A V C s PC PA BD OA DS~ vs PS FS Tot. 
EXPERIMENT AL GROUP 
Info. .03 .52 .02 .02 .02 .59 
DS .25 .04 .03 .02 .08 .08 .02 .50 
Arith . .02 .36 .09 .08 .03 .02 .58 
Voe .02 .52 .04 .01 .12 .02 .04 .02 .05 .82 
Comp. .02 .42 .05 .03 .03 .53 
Sim. .09 .39 .04 .02 .10 .62 
PC .09 .24 .07 .02 .09 .50 
PA .04 .02 .07 .28 .13 .53 
BO .07 .02 .48 .01 .57 
OA .02 .06 .48 .02 .12 .06 .02 .77 
OSY .12 .02 .23 .05 .40 
CO1\1P ARISON GROUP 
Covar. Age Ed OS A V C s PC PA BD OA OSt vs PS FS Tot. 
Info . .55 .04 .06 .63 
OS .25 .24 
Arith. .11 .44 .13 .66 
Voe .03 .55 .03 .08 .08 .76 
Comp. .43 .13 .04 .08 .67 
Sim . .09 .50 .18 .75 
PC .33 .09 .12 .52 
PA .06 .39 .25 .68 
BO .04 .39 .08 .22 .71 
OA .20 .05 .22 .45 
OSY .22 .09 .18 .46 
These findings strongly suggested that the comparison group was not 
comparable to the experimental group with respect to variables influencing CT 
and WCST performance. The pattern of dissimilarity among WAIS-R scores 
raised the possibility that groups differed with respect to severity, but sufficient 
data to evaluate this possibility were not available. More importantly, these 
differences precluded determination of the effect of administration procedure 
modifications on CT and WCST performance. 
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Factor Analyses of Cognitive Process Variables 
Hypothesis 3 
A primary goal of this study was to determine if scores derived from a 
theoretically based approach to concept formation could differentiate among the 
problem-solving approaches displayed by individual patients on the CT. It was 
expected that accomplishment of this goal would be reflected in the emergence of 
at least three distinct and interpretable factors in factor analysis of the cognitive 
process variables defined in Appendix H. It was further anticipated that these 
factors would be relatively independent of age, education, and IQ variables, 
unlike summary error scores. 
Mean cognitive process scores were computed for each subtest individually, 
as well as across all subtests used in the analysis. However, Leonberger, Nicks, 
Larrabee, and Goldfader (1992) noted that multicolinearity results when 
summary measures are entered in the same analysis with subtests used to 
compute them; consequently, mean total variable scores were factor analyzed 
separately from subtest variable scores. An additional problem cited by 
Leonberger et al. is the use of multiple variables assessed by the same or similar 
methods, which tends to inflate correlations among them. An attempt was made 
to minimize this problem by converting variable scores to proportions, to reduce 
the dependence of variables within subtests upon error scores on that subtest. 
Since 19 process variables were computed for each subtest and factor analysis 
of all variables simultaneously would require considerably more subjects than 
were presently available for this study (Gorsuch, 1974), each subtest was 
analyzed separately, and separate analysis was conducted for mean scores across 
all subtests. Additionally, since normative data were not available for these 
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scores, and cannot be derived from the results of this neuropsychologically 
impaired group (see mean scores in Table 9), in order to facilitate the 
interpretability of factor loadings on each factor analysis, the group was divided 
into impaired and unimpaired subgroups, using Reitan's criteria for impaired 
performance on CT total errors (>50), and the factor analysis for each subtest was 
replicated for each subgroup. Table 13 lists the mean scores and standard 
deviations of each subgroup on each CT subtest and for total errors . 
It should be noted that these secondary analyses violated the recommended 
minimum ratio for subjects to variables for factor analysis (5:1). Consequently, 
these results were utilized only for the purpose of clarifying how factor loadings 
differed for impaired versus unimpaired subjects, thereby clarifying 
relationships among variables which comprised the factors. 
Each retained factor from the primary individual analyses was transformed to 
factor scores for each subject, and factor scores were then subjected to second 
order factor analysis in order to assess the relationships among cognitive 
processes across su btests. Subsequently, the relationship of each primary and 
higher order factor to age, education, and IQ covariates was assessed utilizing 
multiple regression analysis. 
Table 13 







III IV V VI TOTAL 
Mean (S.D.) 
7.6 (8.5) 4.9 (5.3) 10.0 (4.9) 6.8 (5.0) 31.5 (12.7) 
22.6 (11.1) 20.1 (10.5) 16.6 (6.4) 13.7 (7.0) 79. 9 (21.0) 
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SuHest llf 
Factor pattern. The factor pattern for the results of factor analysis of Subtest 
III 1ariables is shown in Table 14. Six factors with eigenvalues above 1.0 were 
ext'acted, accounting for 79.9% of the variance, but the scree test and inspection 
of tie factor loadings indicated that only the first four factors, accounting for 
60.~% of the variance, should be retained . 
Factor 1 in this analysis relates to maintaining set when the previous response 
wa ; correct. Four of the seven variables which loaded highly on this factor were 
ba~d on maintaining the determinants in the previous response, although, 
Talle 14 
Factor Pattern Matrix for Fu 11 Group on Subtest lII 
Variable Number: 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ii rcent of Variance: 28.1% 15.4% 9.8% 6.9% 6.2% 5.7% 
6. RKA .78 
4. SLR .74 
8. PCK .72 -.39 
Hi. C3 -.69 .35 
3. LR -.65 .40 
7. KR .53 .34 
12. WSl -.88 
10. WSA .83 
14. WS3 -.79 
15. WPCS .53 -.71 
13. WS2 .57 .66 
11. WSR .42 -.64 
9. wsc -.62 
5. KC -.95 
1. \.1SIS -.93 
19. SV5-6 .71 
18. RAC4 .69 
2. \.1S85 .73 
17. \JC4 .70 
Noe. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 
defnitions listed in Appendix H. 
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interestingly, maintaining the concrete determinant (C) from the previous 
response loaded on a separate factor and did not load on Factor 1. Not 
surprisingly, Learning Rate (represented by the item number of the third 
consecutive conceptually correct response) also loaded on this factor, as did Near 
Correct, which is comprised of responses in which the correct principle is applied 
incorrectly. Thus, this factor appeared to represent efficient learning to the 
correct principle and maintaining that principle on subsequent items. 
Factor 2, accounting for 15.4% of the variance, reflected an inefficient 
approach to problem-solving characterized by shifting more than one 
determinant simultaneously when the previous response was incorrect , which 
usually included the abstract pattern (A) as one of the determinants shifted, with 
no clear pattern emerging for selecting the other determinant to be shifted. This 
factor appeared to represent variance attributed to subjects who repeatedly tried 
different combinations of determinants without any systematic plan or 
incorporation of feedback. 
Factor 3, which accounted for 9.8% of the variance, was also represented by 
variables which reflected somewhat inefficient and unsystematic learning. 
However, this factor was differentiated from the previous factor by a moderate 
positive loading for Leaming Rate, indicating that the correct principle was 
learned but following numerous learning trials. 
Factor 4, which accounted for 6.9% of the variance, reflected variance 
attributable to subjects who perseverated on concrete features of the stimuli, but 
who failed to apprehend that identifying the pattern which was most different 
determined which concrete feature was relevant. Thus, RKC loaded highly on 
this factor (in a negative direction), as did, by definition, MSIS. 
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Factor 5 consisted primarily of two variables derived from other subtests, 
PRAC4 and PSVS-6, which both related to some degree of cognitive rigidity or 
shifting set from one subtest to another, although scores on these variables imply 
learning of the Subtest IV principle. This variable accounted for 6.2% of the 
variance. 
Factor 6 was ambiguous, but accounted for 5.7% of the variance. MSBS 
(maintaining set between sets when the stimuli change within the subtest) loaded 
highly on this factor, but it showed no relationship with MSIS (maintaining set 
within sets). NC4, which related to a rigid adherence to an almost correct 
principle that resulted in many errors, also loaded highly on this factor. Since 
variance attributable to adaptive set maintenance behavior was accounted for by 
Factor 1, it appeared that this factor represented an automatic form of repetition 
which is nonadaptive. 
Comparison with unimpaired subgroup. Table 15 shows the factor pattern 
for the unimpaired subgroup. Results for these groups were quite similar, but 
also differ in significant ways. Most importantly, whereas for the full group, 
responses involving the Abstract Pattern were highly salient and loaded highly 
on the first two factors, responses involving Concrete Attributes were much less 
discriminating. 
In contrast, within the group of subjects whose performance on the CT was 
unimpaired, the variable which loaded first, and thus accounted for the greatest 
proportion of variance, was RKC, and, as previously, loaded with MSIS. MSBS 
also became a much more discriminative variable than was previously true. The 
only other notable change in the factor patterns between these groups was the 
dropping out of RKA and RKR as discriminative variables. Thus, the primary 
difference between the full group and the unimpaired subgroup was the 
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factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest III 
Variable Number: 
























































Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 
cefinitions listed in Appendix H. 
6ange of position of RKC and MSIS with RKA and RKR, with increased 







Comparison with impaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the impaired 
s1bgroup is shown in Table 16. This pattern was dissimilar from the other 
groups in many ways. Whereas in the other groups Maintaining Set accounted 
f>r the largest proportion of the variance, in this subgroup it accounted for only 
68% of the variance. Interestingly, NC3 did not load on this factor, as for the 
cther groups, but PSV5-6 replaced it, although it loaded in the opposite direction. 
JJthough the correlation between these variables was null (-.01), probably 
Table 16 
Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest Ill 
Variable Number: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Percent of Variance: 23.5 % 19.4% 11.6% 7.3% 6.8% 5.9% 5.5% 
13. WS2 -.84 -.39 
12. WS1 .82 
10. WSA -.78 
14. WS3 .94 
11. WSR .88 
15. WPCS -.45 .77 
9. wsc .49 -.47 
3. LR -.48 -.42 
5. RKC .94 
1. MSIS .90 
17. NC4 .91 
6. RKA .80 
8. RPCK .40 .77 
19. PSV5-6 .59 .40 
7. RKR -.37 .59 
4. SLR .35 .36 .49 
16. NC3 .83 
2. MSBS .42 -.51 
18. PRAC4 
Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 





because they were each unique to unrelated subtests, both appeared to relate to 
persisting with unsuccessful hypotheses. Thus, for the other groups, NC3 loaded 
negatively on a factor associated with maintaining set when the previous 
response was correct, but for this impaired subgroup, PSVS-6 loaded positively 
on that same factor. This loading may well reflect the reason this factor 
accounted for little variance within this subgroup. Whereas for the other groups 
maintaining set appeared to reflect a purposeful and adaptive problem-solving 
strategy, for this subgroup it may represent cognitive rigidity and failure to 
adopt a purposeful strategy. 
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Factor 1, which accounted for 23.5% of the variance, was a mirror image of 
Factor 2 in the full group, with the addition of WS2 loading negatively with 
WSA. Thus, not surprisingly, for this impaired subgroup, the largest proportion 
of the variance was accounted for by systematic problem-solving strategies when 
the previous response was incorrect. 
Factor 2 for the impaired subgroup, accounting for 19.4% of the variance, was 
similar to factor composition of Factor 3 in the other groups which related to less 
efficient problem-solving strategies when the previous response was incorrect, 
but for this subgroup many of the variables, including LR, loaded in the opposite 
direction. Furthermore, for this subgroup SLR loaded somewhat moderately on 
this factor. Thus, this factor represented usually inefficient problem -solving 
strategies which in this instance were associated with some degree of success. 
Therefore, the variance accounted for by this factor appeared to be due to flashes 
of insight in which the correct rule was suddenly apprehended. 
Factor 3 for this subgroup, accounting for 11.6% of the variance, was identical 
in variable composition to Factor 4 for the full group, consisting primarily of 
RKC and MSIS, but variables loaded in the opposite direction for this subgroup. 
These are the variables which were highly discriminating in the unimpaired 
subgroup, but for this subgroup, as for the full group, accounted for a much 
smaller proportion of the variance. For the full group, this factor represented 
subjects who perseverated on identifying a common physical feature on 
succeeding items rather than identifying the element within each item which was 
most different. For this subgroup, however, this factor represented subjects who 
were able to successfully identify the relevant physical feature, but apparently 
this was not translated to the correct rule. 
128 
Factor 4 for this subgroup, accounting for 7.3% of the variance, has no 
correlate in the other groups. It is comprised predominantly of NC4, WSC 
loaded moderately in a negative direction, and it was somewhat predictive of 
maintaining set when the principle was learned. Thus, it appeared that this 
factor represented variance attributed to subjects whose concrete responses were 
often relevant, but the rule was probably based on counting. Similarly, these 
subjects achieved only incomplete rule learning in Subtest IV. 
Factor 5 was similar to Factor 1 in the other groups, and represented variance 
attributed to maintaining set. However, for this subgroup, this factor showed a 
reduced loading for LR and SLR, reflecting the increased learning trials necessary 
to establish set. As a result, it accounted for only 6.8% of the variance, and was 
associated with increased perseveration on Subtests V and VI, suggesting that 
these impaired subjects established set more slowly and were less flexible in 
shifting to alternative principles when the previously learned principle became 
ineffective. 
Factor 6 reflected partial learning in Subtest III, probably due to perseveration 
of the counting principle from Subtest II, and was also associated with 
perseveration of the Subtest IV principle on Subtests V and VI. This factor also 
had no correlate in the other groups. 
The final factor for this subgroup was comprised predominantly of PRAC4 
variance, which was attributed to slow learning of the demonstration items on 
Subtest IV, but with success achieved within six trials. Consistent with that 
pattern, this factor was associated with some degree of perseveration on concrete 
physical features of stimuli in Subtest III. 
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Subtest IV 
Factor pattern. The factor pattern for Subtest IV, shown in Table 17, was 
somewhat different from that of Subtest III. Factors were much more 
dichotomized between those comprised of variables related to maintaining set 
and those related to shifting determinants. Factor 1 again was related to 
maintaining set, although for this subtest, all set maintenance variables, 
including RKC, MSIS, and MSBS, as well as PRAC4, loaded on this factor. In that 
sense, this factor represented a more pure measure of set maintenance. 
Table 17 
Factor Pattern Matrix for Full Group on Subtest JV 
Variabl e Number : 1 2 3 4 5 
Percent of Variance : 38.1% 19.0% 8.5% 6.4% 5.4% 
8. RPCK .93 
6. RKA .90 
5. RKC .89 
l. MSIS .89 
3. LR -.78 
4. SLR .75 
2. MSBS .71 
7. RKR .68 -.58 
18. PRAC4 .63 
15. WPCS .95 
10. WSA .88 
9. wsc .82 
12. WSl -.75 -.34 
14. WS3 .73 -.31 
17. NC4 .88 
11. WSR .41 .36 .42 -.39 
13. WS2 .80 
19. PSVS-6 -.54 
16. NC3 .87 
Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 
definitions listed in Appendix H. 
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Factor 2 was comprised of variables related to ineffective problem-solving 
when the previous response was incorrect. Shifting A and C determjnants (WSA, 
WSC) were prominent on this factor, as was the total percentage of determinants 
shifted (WPCS). Not surprisingly, shifting all three determinants simultaneously 
(WS3) also loaded highly. In contrast, shifting just one determinant following an 
incorrect response (WSl) loaded negatively on this factor, reinforcing the 
interpretation of this variable from Subtest III. Rule shifting showed low loading 
on this factor, as was expected on this subtest, where the primary task was to 
discover the clockwise rotational pattern which comprises the rule. Interestingly, 
variance on this score (WSR) was distributed to an approximately equal degree 
across the first four factors, presumably reflecting the variety of hypotheses 
utilized by subgroups of patients in seeking to discover the correct rule. 
Factor 3 was comprised almost exclusively of variance associated with 
incomplete rule learning. NC4, which reflected utilization of a left/ right location 
scheme for this subtest, or an alternative nonclockwise rotation, loaded hjghly on 
this factor. Subjects with hlgh NC4 scores usually were expected to respond 
correctly, at least initially when the missing quadrant was located in the first two 
positions (the first line in the stimulus moving from left to right), but incorrectly 
when the missing quadrant was located on the second line (where clockwise 
rotation reverses the expected order of quadrants three and four). Consequently, 
rule learning necessarily involves shifting following correct feedback to 
quadrants one and two, if a left/ right location scheme was utilized. Consistent 
with this expectation, RKR (repeating the previously used rule when the 
previous response was correct) loaded to a moderate level in a negative direction 
on this factor. Consistent with that finding, WSR also loaded moderately. 
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Factor 4 is predominantly comprised of WS2 (shifting two determinants 
simultaneously following an incorrect response), with a low negative loading for 
WSl and WSR, and a more moderate negative loading for PSVS-6. This pattern 
suggested that subjects who simultaneously shifted two determinants were 
somewhat unlikely to utilize a more systematic approach of shifting only one 
determinant (although this negative correlation is not as pronounced as one 
might expect) and were also somewhat unlikely to shift the rule utilized. Thus, 
the variance associated with this factor appeared to be generated by subjects who 
failed to learn the location principle for this subtest and probably continued to 
utilize the counting principle articulated by Sirnmel and Counts (1957): "If in 
doubt, count." Consistent with this hypothesis, PSVS-6 loaded negatively on this 
factor at a moderate level, since these subjects were unlikely to have learned the 
location principle to perseverate to on subsequent subtests. 
Factor 5 consisted predominantly of NC3 with a low negative loading for 
WS3. Thus, most of the variance associated with this factor arose from the 
previous subtest. 
Comparison with impaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the impaired 
subgroup is shown in Table 18. Results for this subgroup were almost identical 
to that for the full group. The only notable changes were in the direction 
predicted in the analysis above. 
For this subgroup, RKR loaded to a slightly less degree on Factor 1, 
Maintaining Set, and to a somewhat greater degree on Factor 3, Nonclockwise 
Rotation. The relationships among variables for Factor 4 were also slightly 
stronger, with the addition of low negative loading for MSBS, LR, and SLR, as 
might be expected given the learning failure associated with this factor. Factor 5 
Table 18 
Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest IV 
Variable Number: 

































WS1 -.61 -.35 
WSR .55 .48 -.51 
NC4 .90 




Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 
definitions listed in Appendix H. 
.36 
-.89 
was also virtually identical, although SLR now loaded to a slightly greater 
degree. 
Comparison with unimpaired subgroup. When the factor pattern for these 
groups was compared with that for the unimpaired subgroup (see Table 19), 
somewhat more differences were apparent but the changes were relatively 
minor, and in the anticipated direction. 
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PRAC4 for this subgroup (learning the principle on t-he first six practice items) 
was not associated with maintaining set, probably because of reduced variability 
on this variable among these subjects. Instead PRAC4 now comprised the fifth 
Table 19 
Factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest IV 
Variable Number : 















































Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 





factor, on which the only other variable loading above .3 was PSVS.6. Thus, 
among subjects who performed relatively well on the CT overall, but showed 
inefficient learning of the Subtest IV principle ·on the demonstration items, 
inefficient learning of the principle on subsequent subtests was also likely. 
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Additionally, Factor 3 for this subgroup was similar to Factor 4 for the other 
groups, with the addition of NC3 and a weaker negative association with 
adaptive problem-solving strategies (WSR and WSl). For this subgroup, unlike 
the other groups, WSR was not associated with nonclockwise rotation but 
showed a weak relationship with nonadaptive problem-solving (WPCS). 
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Subtest V 
Factor pattern. The factor pattern for Subtest Vis shown in Table 20. Again, 
this pattern was similar in many respects to that of Subtests III and IV, but also 
uniquely reflected the task differences presented by this subtest. Factor 1 was 
again comprised of set maintenance scores, but RKR (maintaining rule) loaded 
only weakly on this factor, probably reflecting the reduced variability of this 
score among subjects who consistently maintained set on other scores when the 
previous response was correct. That hypothesis was supported by the weak 
loading for WSR, reflecting the low probability of rule shifting when the previous 
response was incorrect, among subjects who consistently maintained set. 
Factor 2 was comprised predominantly of ineffective problem-solving 
strategies, with WS3 and WPCS loading highly, and WSR loading more 
moderately, supporting the interpretation above for this variable. WS1 loaded 
negatively on this factor, as expected, with low negative loading also for RKR, 
probably reflecting the randomness of problem-solving strategies suggested by 
high scores on this factor. 
Factor 3 represented more systematic problem solving when the previous 
response was incorrect, with WSA loading highly, and a low negative loading for 
RKA and WSR. This factor appeared to reflect variance attributable to subjects 
who correctly discerned that the task on this subtest was accurate pattern 
identification, but failed to perceive the relationship between the number choices 
presented them and subdivision of the stimulus. The adaptive role of this factor 
was further supported by the moderate loading for RKR and the high negative 
loading for PSVS-6, reflecting the low probability of rule perseveration from the 
previous subtest of subjects who effectively problem solved. 
Table 20 
Factor Pattern Matrix for Full Group on Subtest V 
Variable Number: 



























































Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 








Factor 4 was difficult to interpret. High scores on this factor were associated 
with a very low probability of shifting two scores simultaneously when the 
previous response was incorrect. High scorers on this factor were also somewhat 
unlikely to shift C, but did often shift three scores simultaneously. These subjects 
tended to have a moderately low proportion of total scores shifted or may have 
shifted only one score. This pattern appeared to be characteristic of patients who 
were not responding randomly, but were not systematic or well organized in 
seeking to discover the correct principle. This factor might be described as 
"confused problem-solving." 
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Factor 5 was predominantly comprised of NC3 and NC4, with a low loading 
by WSC. Thus, high scores on this factor appeared to relate to incomplete 
learning, which may result from rigid thinking, since NC3 and NC4 describe the 
correct principle used incorrectly. Subjects with high scores on NC3 had 
difficulty giving up the counting principle from practice Subtest II and thus 
counted the number of elements located in specific positions, and subjects with 
high scores on NC4 were usually unable to give up a conventional left/ right 
orientation in positioning elements in the stimulus, even when the six practice 
items demonstrated an alternate placement. Not surprisingly, this factor had a 
low loading on WSC, which probably represented some perseveration from the 
missing element in Subtest IV to the dotted lines in Subtest V. The failure to 
PSV5-6 to load on this factor was probably due to poor learning of the Subtest IV 
principle, which was a prerequisite for perseveration to this subtest. 
Factor 6 also appeared related to rigid thinking, but whereas Factor 5 was 
associated with failure to learn, this factor was associated with slow learning. 
PRAC4 (slow learning of the correct principle on the practice items) loaded 
highly on this factor, but NC4 showed a weak loading, as does PSV5-6. For each 
of those variables, the factor loading reflected a relatively high number of trials 
required to learn the principle, but the principle was learned in each case, unlike 
the variance associated with Factor 5. The weak negative loading of WSC, which 
was almost a reverse, mirror image of the loading on Factor 5, supported that 
interpretation. 
Comparison with impaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the impaired 
subgroup is shown in Table 21. These results replicated those for the full group 
with respect to the first two factors, except that the low loading for WSA on 
Factor 2 in the full group was replaced by low loadings for WSC and PSV5-6 in 
Table 21 
Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest V 
Variable Number: 

















































Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 









this subgroup. Additionally, the proportion of the variance accounted for by this 
factor was slightly greater. These changes all reflected the somewhat greater 
likelihood of ineffective problem-solving in this subgroup. 
The remaining three factors for this subgroup were somewhat different from 
the pattern in the full group, but still recognizable. Factor 3 was comprised 
predominantly of high scores on WSA and a moderate likelihood of a low score 
on WSC, with a weak negative loading for PSVS-6. Thus, this appeared to 
represent variance attributed to subjects who recognized the correct concrete 
attribute but had difficulty learning the quadrant principle for the abstract 
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pattern. The negative loadings on NC3 and PSVS-6 suggested that cognitive 
r gidity did not characterize the performance of these subjects, however. This 
factor was somewhat similar to Factor 3 for the full group, but the negative 
c)rrelation between WSA and PSVS-6 was much weaker for this subgroup and 
the moderate loading for RKR was much weaker, and moderate negative 
loadings for WSC and NC3 were present. Thus, this factor appeared to represent 
less efficient problem solving for this subgroup than was true for the full group, 
but rigid thinking was negatively associated with this factor for this subgroup. 
Factor 4 for this subgroup was very different from that of the full group. 
Where as in the latter case this factor charact erized subject s with intentional but 
nonsystematic and confused problem-solving strategies who were unlikely to 
s:1ift two scores simultaneously when the previou s response was incorrect , for 
th.is subgroup, high scorers on this factor were likely to shift two scores 
simultaneously. NC4 also loaded highly on this factor , which may characterize 
subjects who became frustrated by this point and were responding randomly. 
Factor 5 for the full group had no correlate in the impaired subgroup, but 
Factor 5 in this subgroup corresponded to Factor 6 in the full group, with the 
addition of a moderate loading in the negative direction for RKR. Thus, in this 
subgroup, this factor continued to suggest slow learning, but with less success 
than was true for the full group . 
Comparison with unimpaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the 
unimpaired subgroup (see Table 22) was similar to that for the other groups, but 
composition of factors was slightly different. Factor 1 replicated the first factor in 
the other groups in most respects, but with the addition of low to moderate 
negative loadings for PSVS-6 and WSC, reflecting the decreased incidence of 
rigid problem solving in this subgroup . Additionally, WSR was not associated 
Table 22 
Factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest V 
Variable Number: 1 2 3 4 








WS2 .91 -.48 
WSl -.86 
WPCS .83 .40 
wsc -.34 .61 
WSR .79 .35 
PSVS-6 -.42 .74 
RKR .54 -.64 
WSA -.50 




Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 







with this factor, probably also as a function of decreased perseveration of the rule 
from Subtest IV for this subgroup . 
Factor 2 continued to reflect ineffective problem solving, but it contributed a 
slightly smaller proportion of the variance. Whereas shifting three determinants 
simultaneously (WS3) loaded highly for the other groups on this factor, for this 
subgroup shifting two determinants simultaneously (WS2) loaded highly, and 
there was no association for WS3, probably due to limited variability on this 
score. Both WSA and WSC showed a stronger association with this factor for this 
subgroup, but WSR, which loaded moderately for the other groups, showed no 
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association, and WSl wa s more negatively associated. Thus, for the unimpaired 
subgroup, ineffective problem -solving, though still accounting for substantial 
variance, was less maladaptive than for the other group. 
For this subgroup, Factor 3 appeared to be almost a mirror image of this 
factor in the other groups, particularly the full group. Whereas previously this 
factor represented effective problem-solving when the previous response was 
incorrect, for this subgroup it reflected very ineffective problem-solving. 
Variable loadings for all groups were very similar, but the direction of the 
loadings for this subgroup was opposite. Consistent with that change, the 
moderate loading for RKR wa s replaced in this subgroup with a low negati ve 
loading for NC4, reflecting rigid thinking . 
Factor 4 for this subgroup was also in the opposite direction than for the full 
group , but like the impaired subgroup, this factor appeared to represent random 
or nonsysternatic responding, with a high loading for WS3. 
Factor 5 for this subgroup had no precise correlate in the other groups in 
terms of variable loadings, but like the other groups this appeared to represent 
slow learning due to rigid thinking, with high loadings for PRAC4 and NC3, and 
a low loading for WSA. 
Subtest VI 
Factor pattern. The factor pattern for Subtest VI, shown in Table 23, was very 
similar to that for Subtest V, as might be expected for the only two subtests 
sharing the same principle. The only notable difference for Factor 1, reflecting set 
maintenance, was that WSR showed a weak association on Subtest V but not 
Subtest VI, and RKR showed a somewhat higher loading on Subtest VI. 
Presumably, that difference was related to the rule shift between Subtests IV and 
V which was not present between Subtests V and VI. 
Table 23 
Factor Pattern Matrix Subtest VI 
Variable Number: 1 
Percent of Variance: 36.2% 
4. SLR .97 
8. RPCK .97 
5. RKC .95 
6. RKA .93 
l. MSIS .92 
2. MSBS .91 































Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 






Factor 2 also replicated Factor 2 from Subtest V, but represented even more 
pronounced ineffective problem solving, with WSC, WSA, and WSR all loading 
to an approximately equal degree, suggesting a random approach to discovering 
the correct principle. Unlike Subtest V, RKR did not load on this factor in a 
negative direction, probably due to reduced variability on this score. 
The variable loading pattern on Factor 3 was also very similar to the variable 
loading pattern on the third factor in Subtest V, with the exception that in the 
latter case, WSA was the predominant feature associated with adaptive problem-
solving when the previous response was incorrect, but on this subtest WSA did 
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not load on this factor. Rather, maintaining the previous rule is the predominant 
feature here, and was associated with negative loadings on PSVS-6 and PRAC4. 
Thus, adaptive problem-solving associated with these scores apparently acted to 
restrict variability on abstract pattern identification after learning the principle in 
Subtest V and maintaining set with respect to formulating the rule based on the 
quadrant principle was the differentiating variable. 
Factor 4 reflected ineffective problem-solving, as in Subtest V, although the 
loading pattern was somewhat different. For this subtest, this factor was 
associated with shifting two determinants simultaneously, although WSR loaded 
weakly in the negative direction indicating that this shifting was not entirely 
random. PRAC4 loaded moderately on this factor, reflecting slow learning or a 
moderate degree of cognitive rigidity. 
Factor 5 replicated Factor 5 in the previous subtest and was represented 
almost entirely by high loadings on NC3 and NC4. Thus, this factor reflected 
cognitive inflexibility associated with tasks on previous subtests but was not 
associated with any variables on this subtest to any substantial degree. 
Comparison with impaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the impaired 
subgroup is shown in Table 24. Factor 1 essentially replicated factor composition 
of Factor 1 for the full group, with the addition of weak loadings for shifting just 
one determinant at a time (WSl) but not two (WS2). Thus, for this impaired 
subgroup, maintaining set was associated with utilization of a systematic 
approach, as might be anticipated. 
Factor 2 also was very similar to Factor 2 in the full group, reflecting 
nonsystematic responses when the previous response was incorrect. Factor 
composition was almost identical in the two groups, but small differences 
emerged with respect to factor loadings. WSR loaded to a substantially greater 
Table 24 
Factor Pattern Matrix for Impaired Subgroup on Subtest VI 
Variable Number: 1 2 3 4 
Percent of Variance: 37.0 % 17.1% 10.9% 6.9% 
SLR .97 







WSR .85 -.35 
WS3 .68 
WSl .32 -.66 -.39 
PSY5--o -.86 
RKR .44 .69 
WSA .53 .55 
WS2 -.33 .76 




Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 






degree in the impaired subgroup than was true for the full group, and WSC 
loaded to a lesser degree. Further, NC3, reflecting a rigid approach to task 
performance in Subtest III, loaded we_akly on this factor for the impaired 
subgroup. However, these differences between groups with respect to this 
factor, which reflected random and nonsystematic problem solving, were 
generally minor. 
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Factor 3 for this subgroup is also very similar to the third factor for the full 
group, except that WSA now loaded to a moderate degree on this factor, as it did 
for Factor 3 in Subtest V. Thus, for this subgroup, when the previous response 
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was incorrect, this factor reflected subjects who tended to appropriately shift the 
abstract pattern, rather than the rule. 
Factor 4 in this subgroup was somewhat different than Factor 4 in the full 
group, although still reflecting cognitive rigidity with moderate loadings on 
PRAC4 and NC4 and a moderate loading in the negative direction on WSl. 
Factor 5 was very different than the fifth factor in the full group, which 
reflected only variance attributable to cognitive rigidity on previous subtests. 
For this subgroup, thjs factor loaded principally on WSC, with negative loading 
on NC3 and WSA. Despite these differences, this pattern still reflected rigid 
thinking in attempting to shift the concrete features rather than the abstract 
pattern. 
Comparison with unimpaired subgroup. The factor pattern for the 
unimpaired subgroup is shown in Table 25. This pattern was almost identical to 
the other groups with respect to Factors 1 and 2, reflecting, respectively, 
maintaining set and responding nonsystematically. Factor 3 for this subgroup 
was very similar to Factor 4 for the full group, reflecting a nonsystematic 
approach when the previous response was wrong, and was also associated with 
slow or somewhat rigid thinking. 
Factor 4 loaded on most of the same variables as Factor 3 in the full group, 
but loadings were in the opposite direction. Consequently, whereas foi; the full 
group this factor reflected a more systematic approach when the previous 
response was incorrect, and was negatively associated with rigid thinking, for 
this subgroup the opposite was true. This factor related to a rigid, perseverative 
approach. 
Factor 5 for this subgroup was also similar to Factor 5 for the full group with 
respect to factor composition, but whereas for the full group a rigid approach on 
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Subtests III and IV varied together, for this subgroup those variables (NC3 and 
NC4) were negatively related. Consequently, this factor appeared to represent 
subjects who identified the location principle in Subtest III but experienced 
difficulty giving up the counting rule from Subtest II, so used the location and 
counting principles together, failing to benefit from feedback in shifting to a 
more effective approach. This confused thinking, however, did not extend to 
Subtest IV for this group. 
Table 25 
Factor Pattern Matrix for Unimpaired Subgroup on Subtest VI 
Variable Number : 1 2 3 4 5 









WPCS .85 .33 
wsc .81 
WSA .67 -.35 
WS3 .54 -.44 .35 
WS2 .81 
PRAC4 .72 .31 
WSR .31 .82 
PSVS-6 -.40 .68 
RKR .56 -.57 
NC3 .78 
NC4 -.46 
Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 
definitions listed in Appendix H. 
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Tota] Score 
Factor analysis of cognitive process variables from each CT subtest 
individually resulted in factor solutions of five or six factors in each instance 
which were quite similar in many respects, although rather discrepant results 
were obtained for Subtest Ill. Many of the similarities within subtests remained 
even when separate factor analyses were conducted for impaired versus 
unimpaired subjects, again except for Subtest III, where several unique factors 
relating to ineffective problem-solving emerged for the impaired subgroup. 
However, this was not surprising since this was the most difficult subtest (see 
Table 9), and it might be anticipated that subjects would encounter difficulty on 
this task for a variety of reasons. 
What was more surprising was that the remaining subtests showed as much 
similarity as was evident, both across subtests and across levels of impairment. 
Consequently, mean scores across subtests were also factor analyzed to 
determine if these patterns would emerge with respect to total scores for the CT 
as a whole. 
The factor pattern for mean scores across all subtests is shown in Table 26. 
Factor 1 for this group was comprised of substantial loadings on all maintaining 
set variables, with a more moderate loading for RKR. PRAC4 also showed a 
weak loading on this factor, perhaps since a high score on that variable, though 
suggesting slow learning, was also associated with successful learning within six 
trials. Further, WSR loaded moderately on this factor, perhaps reflecting the rule 
shifting across subtests which was related to effective performance in terms of 
total errors. 
Factor 2 represented nonsysternatic shifting of determinants when the 
previous response was incorrect, as was true of the second factor in all other 
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subtests as well (except Subtest III). Factor 3 appeared to represent a mixture of 
responses types, with WS2 loading moderately, reflecting a nonsystematic 
approach, but also PSVS-6 loaded prominently in a negative direction, 
suggesting that this factor did not reflect random responding. All of the rigid 
thinking variables loaded to a substantial degree on Factor 4; thus, this appeared 
to reflect some perseverative responding. 
Since factors which emerged from mean cognitive process scores were not 
appropriate to enter in subsequent factor analyses with subtest specific factors 
Table 26 
Factor Pattern Matrix for Full Group on Total Score 
Variabl e Number: 1 2 3 4 








PRAC4 .35 .32 
WPCS .92 
WSA .82 .34 
wsc .73 
WSl -.68 
WS3 .66 -.41 
PSV5-6 -.83 
RKR .58 .70 
WSR .50 .36 -.65 
NC4 .73 
NC3 .52 
WS2 .47 .50 
Note. Variable numbers and labels in left hand column refer to variable 
definitions listed in Appendix H. 
(since they share common variance), this group was not subdivided into high 
and low scorers for further analysis. 
Second Order Factor Analysis Across Subtests 
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Although intuitively many similarities were evident among factors which 
emerged in the analyses, it did not follow that factors composed of similar 
variables across subtests were necessarily related. To assess the relationship 
among cognitive process factors from one subtest to another, second order factor 
analyses of subtest factors was performed. However, it was necessary to 
recompute factor scores, deleting the marker variables which were entered in 
each analysis described above in order to prevent the repetitive scores on these 
variables form masking the relationships among the remaining variables. Such 
recomputation did not substantially alter factor composition or loadings, except 
where those variables which were deleted comprised the principal determinant 
of the factor. Thus, Factor 5 was eliminated from the Subtest III analysis, Factor 5 
was eliminated from Subtest IV, Factors 5 and 6 were eliminated from Subtest V, 
Factor 5 was eliminated from Subtest VI, Factor 3 was merged with Factor 2, and 
Factor 4 became the third factor. Additionally, the direction of factor loadings 
changed in two instances: Factor 4 in Subtest ill, which previously reflected 
variance attributed to subjects who perseverated on the concrete features of the 
stimuli, changed to reflect variance attributed to subjects who did not 
perseverate on concrete features, and a similar change occurred on Factor 4 in 
Subtest V, which now became characterized by those who shifted two scores 
simultaneously, often tending to shift C. None of these changes represents 
substantial interpretive significance. 
The results of second order factor analysis of the remaining factors are listed 
in Table 27. Variable numbers comprising the subtest specific factors (from 
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Table 27 
Second Order Factor Anal)'.sis of All Subtest Factors 
Var. 
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Grd. Fl -.9 -.8 -.4 .4 .3 
(V: F3) 
-.3 .7 .7 -.6 -.9 
(VI: F3) .5 -.7 .8 -.6 -.4 
(IV: F4) -.4 .8 .4 
rv: F1 .9 .8 -.9 .8 .9 .9 .8 1.0 .5 .5 
IJI:Fl .3 -.7 .8 .9 .6 .8 -.3 .5 -.3 -.5 
Grd. F2 .9 .9 .5 -.3 
V: Fl 1.0 .7 -.9 .9 1.0 .9 .3 1.0 -.4 .4 
VI: Fl .9 .9 -.9 1.0 1.0 .9 .6 1.0 
IV: Fl .9 .8 -.9 .8 .9 .9 .8 1.0 .5 .5 
(III: F3) .3 .3 -.7 -.3 -.6 .6 -.8 -.7 
Grd. F3 -.8 -.3 -.3 -.3 .5 .5 .3 
(V: F2) .3 .4 .6 -.6 1.0 .9 
(IV: F2) .8 .9 .4 -.8 .7 1.0 
(V: F 3) 
-.3 .7 .7 -.6 -.9 
(IV: F3) -.5 .6 .8 
V: F4 .4 -.4 1.0 -.4 
IV: F4 -.4 .8 .4 
VI: F3 .5 -.7 .8 -.6 -.4 
Grd. F4 .7 .6 .6 .3 
III: F3 .3 .3 -.7 -.3 -.6 .6 -.8 -.7 
III: F2 .8 .6 -.9 .5 
HI: Fl .3 -.7 .8 .9 .6 .8 -.3 .5 -.3 -.5 
V:F4 .4 -.4 1.0 -.4 
Grd. F'S 
-.6 -.5 -.4 .6 
(IV: F2) .8 .9 .4 -.8 .7 1.0 
(IV: F4) -.4 .8 .4 
(IV: Fl) .9 .8 -.9 .8 .9 .9 .8 1.0 .5 .5 
VI: F2 .6 .7 .4 -.9 .4 .5 .9 
Grd. F6 -.7 -.7 
(III: F5) .9 .3 -.3 
(IV: F3) -.5 .6 .8 
Grd.F7 .9 .4 .3 
III:F4 .9 .9 .4 
III:F3 .3 .3 -.7 -.3 -.6 .6 -.8 -.7 
IV: F3 -.5 .6 .8 
Note. All subtest factor loadings above .3 are listed. Negative loadings are in 
parentheses. 2nd order factor loadings are in bold print in the order listed. 
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Appendix H) entered in the analysis are listed across the top row of the table. 
Similar variables in Appendix Hare numbered consecutively. Thus, if similar 
variables loaded on common factors across subtests, several subtests should be 
represented, with factor loadings forming a cluster, under each second order 
factor. 
Jt can be seen that some clustering was evident but the dispersion of loadings 
was more prominent than the clustering. Further, many of the clustering 
patterns which were evident tended to be specific to sets of similar subtests, 
rather than common to all subtests . 
Thus, this analysis suggested that many of the cognitive process variables 
were task specific rather than generalizable across subtests. For example, on 
second order Factor 1, Variable 11 (WSR) loaded positively on Factor 3 for 
Subtests V and VI but negatively on Factor 1 for Subtests III and IV. Statistical 
analysis of the correlates of these second order factors, therefore, appeared 
appropriate. 
Relationship of Cognitive Process Factors 
to Error Scores 
The relationship between second order factor scores and performance on each 
CT subt .est and for CT Total Errors was assessed using stepwise multiple 
regression analyses. Those results revealed that second order factors 
significantly predicted error scores in each case (p < .00009), but the proportion 
of the variance which was accounted for varied substantially, although Factor 2, 
consisting predominantly of Maintaining Set scores, accounted for most of the 
variance across all scores except for Subtest III. (See Table 28.) 
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Table 28 
Adjusted R2 for 2nd Order Factors on CT Error Scores 
Predictors m IV V VI TOTAL 
Factor 1 (1) .17 (1) .26 (2) .25 
Factor 2 (2) .12 (2) .30 (1) .47 (1) .64 (1) .48 
Factor 3 
Factor 4 (3) .09 (3) .02 
Factor 5 (3) .04 
Factor 6 (2) .01 
Factor 7 
Total Var. .36 .58 .46 .65 .75 
Note. Step at which predictor entered equation is given in parentheses. 
These results represented some improvement in prediction of subtest error 
scores from error scores on corresponding subtests, but the improvement was not 
dramatic, as shown by Table 29. 
Second order factor scores did show a very significant relationship with CT 
performance, but, as Table 28 demonstrates, this relationship was comprised 
almost entirely of variance due to Maintaining Set scores. The previously 
documented relationship of age, education, and IQ variables with CT 
performance might have accounted for these findings if Maintaining Set factor 
scores were influenced to a substantially greater degree by covariates, as is likely. 
Consequently, the foregoing analyses were recomputed, with age, education, 
WAIS-R scale scores, and Full Scale sum, Verbal Scale sum, and Performance 
Scale sum entered into the equation first, to account for variance from these 
sources on CT error scores. Results are listed in Table 30. 
Although partialing variance due to age, education, and IQ scores resulted in 
marginally improved predictability of error scores, the proportion of variance 
accounted for by each factor remained essentially unchanged. Thus, Maintaining 
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Table 29 
Adjusted RZ for Subtest Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out 
Predictors III IV V VI 
Total Covar. .18 .27 .24 .18 
I II (1) .32 
IV (1) .24 
V (1) .52 
VI (2) .37 (1) .56 
Total Var. .24 .37 .56 .52 
Set factor scores continued to account for nearJy all of the variance in error 
scores. 
This pattern was also evident among cognitive process factors specific to 
individual subtests, as shown by the results of multiple regression analysis listed 
in Table 31. [n each case, age, education, and IQ covariates, plus Maintaining Set 
scores, accounted for almost all of the predicted variance in error scores. 
It is not surprising that discovering the correct principle for each subtest and 
consistently applying that principle across sets of dissimilar stimuli accounted for 
most of the variance in CT performance (although to a lesser degree in 
Table 30 
RZ Change for CT Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out 
Predictors III IV V VI TOTAL 
Total Covar. .18 .27 .24 .18 .36 
Factor 1 (1) .10 (1) .15 (2) .16 
Factor 2 (3) .07 (2) .19 (1) .28 (1) .48 (1) .23 
Factor 3 (4) .01 
Factor4 (2) .07 (4) .01 (2) .01 (3) .01 
Factor 5 (3) .02 
Factor 6 
Factor 7 
Total Adj . R2 .41 .63 .52 .66 .77 
Note. Number in parentheses reflects step at which factor entered equation. 
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TabJe 31 
R2 Change for Subtest Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out 
Predictor s rrr IV V VI TOTAL 
Total Covar. .18 .27 .24 .18 .35 
Factor 1 Cl) .48 (1) .47 (I) .33 (1) .63 (1) .33 
Factor 2 (4) .01 (3) .04 (4) .01 
Factor 3 (2) .10 (2) .03 (2) .01 (2) .07 
Factor 4 (3) .03 (2) .05 (4) .03 (3) .04 
Factor 5 
Total Adj . R2 .81 .80 .66 .82 .82 
Note . Number in parentheses reflects step at which factor entered equation. 
Subtest V). However, a much more relevant issue from a treatment perspective 
is how patients fail to discover the correct principle and maintain set. 
Although the analyses described above revealed some patterns characteristic 
of such failures, it was unclear how those patterns related to CT performance. 
For that reason, variables related only to failures were factor analyzed separately 
from Maintaining Set variables. Those results were very similar in factor 
composition and factor loadings to the full model described above, but the 
relationship of these factors and CT performance were rather different, as shown 
by the results of multiple regression analyses listed in Table 32. 
Since previous analyses had shown that Maintaining Set scores were strongly 
related to the dependent variable, in order to assess the relationship between 
error scores and factors related to incorrect responding independently of 
Maintaining Set factor scores, the former factors were entered into the analyses 
first, following covariates, with Maintaining Set factors entered last. 
This procedure revealed a substantially greater relationship between error 
scores and factors related to incorrect responding than was true when the same 
procedure was applied to the full model. In the latter instance, for each subtest 
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Table 32 
E2 Change for Subtest Error Scores with Covariates Partialed Out 
P~edictor s III IV V VI TOTAL 
T )ta! Covar. .18 .27 .24 .18 .36 
Factor 1 Wron g (1) .09 (3) .02 (2) .04 (3) .03 
Factor 2 Wrong (1) .28 (I) .08 (I) .12 
Factor 3 Wron g (2) .11 (2) .06 (2) .05 (2) .04 
Factor 4 Wrong (3) .12 (4) .01 (3) .02 
Factor 5 Wron g (1) .11 
Factor 1 Right (4) .26 (5) .17 (4) .27 (3) .47 (4) .25 
Factor 2 Right (5) .03 
T Jtal Adj . R2 .79 .82 .65 .81 .81 
and for Total Errors , even when Maintaining Set scores were forced to enter the 
equation last, following the stepwise block for factor s related to incorr ect 
responding, all of the var iance in error score prediction was accounted for by 
Maintaining Set factors and none of the factors related to incorrect responding 
entered the equation, with probability to enter set at .05. Nonetheless, these 
factors were virtually equivalent, as shown by the correlations in Table 33 
between factors in the full model (across the top row) and corresponding factors 
from the separate models. 
This discrepancy appeared to be the result of differential relationships 
between these sets of factors and Maintaining Set factor scores due to the effects 
of oblique axes rotation in the full model. Even though in oblique rotation 
(oblimin) factors are not constrained to independence, the effect of maximizing 
factor loadings served to minimize correlations between these factors. Thus, due 
to the strong relationship between the dependent variable (error scores) and 
Maintaining Set factor scores, the correlation between error scores and Incorrect 
Responding factor scores was also minimized. 
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Table 33 
Correlation of Full Model With Separate Right/ Wrong Factors 
Subtest III IV V VI TOTAL 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 
Fl Wrong .89 .98 .94 .98 .97 
F2 Wrong .97 .87 .95 .86 
F3 Wrong .88 .93 .97 
F4 Wrong .96 
F1 Right .91 .97 .95 1.0 .96 
F2 Right .94 
F3 Ri ht .91 
In fact, when factor scores for the full model were recomputed without 
rotation, a much stronger pattern of relationships between error scores and 
Incorrect Responding factor scores emerged (except for Subtest VJ), as shown in 
Table 34. 
Thus, the failure of Incorrect Responding factor scores to significantly predict 
error scores appeared to be artifactual rather than reflecting the absence of 
relationships. Nonetheless, the cognitive processes reflected by these factor 
scores, and to an even greater extent the second order factor scores, remained 
ambiguous. In part, this was because specific variable scores did not necessarily 
reflect a uniform approach within subtests, even for an individual subject. 
Further, task demands varied from subtest to subtest; consequently, variable 
scores did not reflect similar processes across subtests. Despite this ambiguity, 
however, factor scores may be more accurate predictors of CT performance than 
were the error scores themselves since error due to "incidentally correct" 
responses was partialed out. Further, error scores were substantially influenced 
by age, education, and IQ covariates, while the previous analyses have shown 
that partialing covariates did not substantially moderate the predictive power of 
Table 34 
R2 Change for Unrotated Factor Scores with Covariates Partialed Out 
Predictor s III IV V VI TOTAL 
Total Covar. .18 .27 .24 .18 .36 
Factor 1 Wrong (3) .08 (4) .01 (1) .10 
Factor 2 Wrong (1) .20 (1) .24 (1) .19 
Factor 3 Wrong (2) .08 (3) .03 (2) .04 
Factor 4 Wrong (2) .09 
Factor 1 Right (4) .24 (5) .17 (3) .28 (1) .63 (2) .25 
Factor 2 Right (5) .02 
Total Adj. R2 .81 .82 .65 .81 .81 
factor scores. Thus, further investigation of covariate relationships appeared 
warranted. 
Covariates of Cognitive Process Factors 
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All covariates in the previous analyses (age, education, WAIS-R scale scores, 
Verbal Scale Sum, Performance Scale Sum, and Full Scale Sum) were regressed 
on each first and second order cognitive process factor. These results are listed in 
Table 35. Covariates accounted for a slightly greater proportion of the variance 
in error scores for each subtest than was true for the cognitive process factors. 
This discrepancy was not substantially greater for the Maintaining Set factor in 
each subtest, but was greater for all other process variables by a significant 
margin, except in the case of Factor 3 in Subtest VI. This pattern suggested the 
possibility that the relationship of covariates with cognitive processes related to 
maintaining set may be principally responsible for the relationship of covariates 
with error scores, since Maintaining Set factors (Factor 1) in each subtest 
accounted for the largest single portion of the variance in subtest error scores in 
the multiple regression analyses listed in Table 35. 
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Table 35 
R2 for Age, Education, and IO Regressed on Cognitive Factors 
Covar. Age Ed 
III .17 
Fact. 1 .12 
Fact. 2 
Fact.3 .10 
Fact . 4 
Fact. 5 
IV .20 








Fact . 4 
VI 




Fact. 1 .28 






































































Note. All subtest factor loadings above .3 are listed. Negative loadings are in 
parentheses. 2nd order factor loadings are in bold print in the order listed. 
The other principal finding to emerge with respect to these analyses related to 
the dispersion of correlates across subtests and across factors within subtests. 
Given the weak relationship of many of these variables, considerable 
inconsistency should be expected. However, even when the relationship was 
stronger, considerable variability was evident. 
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The influence of age was a notable exception to that general rule, since age 
significantly predicted Subtest III errors and Factor I scores (Maintaining Set), as 
well as Maintaining Set scores on Subtests IV and VI, Maintaining Set Scores 
Total, and second order Factor 2 scores (Maintaining Set on Subtests IV, V, and 
VI). However, all other covariates were quite inconsistent across factors and 
across subtests. This finding appeared to reflect the ambiguity inherent in 
interpreting the cognitive process factors. 
Hypothe sis 4 
It was also anticipated that factor analysis of verbalized responses on the 
WCST would produce three or more interpretable cognitive process factors 
which would differentiate among problem-solving approaches employed on this 
task as well. Coding verbalized responses on the WCST did not present the 
challenges which were present for the CT. Conventional scoring for the WCST is 
based upon a process analysis of subjects' problem-solving approaches on this 
task. The only ambiguities present on this task relate to uncertainty which 
determinant is instrumental in determining card placement when cards match on 
two or three determinants. Asking patients to verbalize their reasoning was an 
attempt to better clarify process analysis by reducing the proportion of 
ambiguous responses without simplifying the task. However, in practice it was 
found that many subjects verbalized two or more determinants for their 
responses; consequently, such verbalized responses conveyed no more 
information than did conventional responses. 
Comparison of Verbalized versus 
Nonverbalized Scoring 
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If verbalized administration was successful in clarifying reasoning on this 
task, verbal process scores should correlate only moderately or below with 
conventionally scored responses but summary scores (Categories Completed, 
Total Errors) would show very high correlation coefficients. Consequently, these 
sets of scores were correlated. Results are listed in Table 36. Due to space 
limitations, scores are designated by the order in which they were listed in 
Appendix I. These correlations were all reasonably high, with the notable 
exception of Right-Shift responses (#19), and to a lesser degree Missed Learning 
Opportunities (#5) and Percent Nonperseverative Errors (#6). 
Consequently these scores were examined to determine the source of these 
discrepancies. (See Table 37.) Inspection of the data revealed that the low 
correlation between verbalized and conventional Right-Shift scores resulted from 
restricted range on this score under both scoring conditions . Consequently, this 
score was dropped from further analysis. Reduced correlations for the other two 
variables, however, appeared to reflect legitimate differences in the values of 
these scores between scoring conditions. Little difference in mean scores for 
Nonperseverative Error Percent was evident, but considerably greater variability 
was present under verbalized scoring conditions. Thus, it appeared that for 
some subjects verbalizing their reasoning substantially reduced ambiguity in 
Table 36 
Correlations Between Verbalized and Conventional WCST Scores 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
.92 .95 .82 .90 .73 .79 .84 .87 .92 .86 .93 .97 .86 .94 .91 .92 .69 .90 .26 .89 
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Table 37 
Descriptive Data for Right-Shift, Missed Lrng Oppor., and NPSV% 
Variable s N Mean S.D. Min . Max. 
Right-Shift Conventional 132 .64 .76 0 3 
Right-Shift Verbali zed 132 .10 .30 0 1 
Missed Lrng Oppor., Conven. 132 7.69 8.08 1 33 
Misse d Lmg Oppor., Verbal. 132 13.58 11.11 2 42 
NonPSV Error %, Conv en. 132 12 8 1 41 
NonPSV Error %, Verbal 132 13 12 0 60 
scoring perseverative versus nonperseverative responses, but this was not true 
for all subjects. Conventiona] scoring resulted in fewer missed learning 
opportunities apparently because of a higher proportion of ambiguous 
responses, which reduced scoring opportunities. Therefore, these latter two 
scores were retained for further analysis . 
Factor Analysis of WCST Scores 
Verbalized administration. The factor pattern for factor analysis of all 
retained scores from verbalized WCST administration is described in Table 38. 
Only three factors emerged in this analysis, accounting for 82.5% of the variance. 
Factor 1, which accounted for the largest proportion of the variance by far 
was comprised of substantial loadings on all major variables, and appeared to 
reflect ineffective, perseverative responding. Summary scores reflecting 
nonperseverative responding (Conceptual Level Responses, Categories 
Completed, and Learning to Learn) loaded negatively on this factor. 
Interestingly, Unambiguous Form responses and Unambiguous S.D. both loaded 
very highly on this factor, and Unambiguous Color responses loaded more 
moderately, but Unambiguous Number showed only a weak loading, below .30. 
This pattern was also evident with respect to maximum classification (Maximum 
Color, Form, Number), but at a lower level. In contrast, Factor 2 was comprised 
Table 38 
Factor Pattern Matrix for WCST Verbalized Administration 
Factor Number: Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Percent of Variance: 57.4% 16.9% 8.2% 
Total Errors% .99 
Unambiguous Form .96 
Unambiguous S.D. .93 
Concept. Level Resp. -.92 
Perseverative Error% .91 
Perseverative Resp .% .91 
Wrong-Stay .90 .41 
Max. Determ. S.D. .86 -.29 
NonPSV Error% .79 
Categories Completed -.77 .32 
Unambiguous Color .70 -.56 
Maximum Form .69 -.26 
Learning to Learn -.67 .37 
Unambiguous No. .80 
Maximum Number .78 -.42 
Missed Lrng. Oppor. .31 .56 -.41 
Fail to Maintain Set -.88 
Total Correct% .30 -.87 
Maximum Color .52 -.61 
predominantly of Unambiguous Number and Maximum Number, but with a 
negative loading for Unambiguous Color (at a moderate level), and almost no 
relationship with Unambiguous Form. 
161 
This pattern strongly suggested that when the proportions of determinant 
responses were unequal, whether due to ambiguous or unambiguous responses, 
color and form responses were associated with perseveration, while unequal 
number responses tended not to be associated with clear performance patterns, 
other than a mild inclination to repeat unsuccessful responses, in a 
nonperseverative manner. 
Factor 3 accounted for a much smaller proportion of the variance and related 
very mildly to effective nonrigid problem-solving, with high negative loadings 
on variables relating to failure to maintain set. 
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Conventional administration. The factor pattern for conventional WCST 
scoring is shown in Table 39. Three factors also emerged in this analysis, which 
were almost identical to the verbal scoring factors, and accounted for similar 
proportions of the variance. 
Consistent with the correlation patterns described in Table 36, differences 
between Factor 1 for the two sets of scores (r = .85) emerged only with respect to 
Missed Learning Opportunities and Nonperseverative Error Percent. In the 
former case, the loading for Factor 1 increased substantially, from .31 to .71, and 
in the latter case the loading decreased from .79 to .59. Both of these changes 
were in the predicted direction, consistent with greater accuracy in scoring 
responses with verbalized administration, although hardly sufficient to justify 
Table 39 
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the change in administration procedure. Loading and factor composition for 
Factors 2 and 3 for the two administration conditions were also very similar 
(r = .77; r = .77), and in the predicted direction. In neither case did loading 
changes significantly modify interpretive conclusions. 
Covariates for WCST Cognitive Process Factors 
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Despite the similarities between factors which emerged from the two sets of 
scores, the relationships with age, education, and IQ covariates were 
considerably different for Factor 1 across scoring conditions, although the 
remaining factors in each condition did not show any substantial relationship 
with covariates. Results of multiple regression analysis for covariates on each 
factor are listed in Table 40. 
The proportion of the variance accounted for was somewhat greater for 
verbal scores, but more striking was the very different pattern of covariation 
between corresponding pairs of scores, suggesting that these factors may not be 
equivalent measures. In fact, analysis of covariance, partialing out all age, 
education, and IQ covariates, did not substantially change these correlation 
Table 40 
R2 for Age, Education, and IO Regressed on WCST Factors 
Covar. Age Ed I OS A V C s PC PA BO OA OSz: vs PS FS Tot. 
Verbal 
Fact. 1 .24 .30 .27 .21 .14 .30 
Fact. 2 0 
Fact. 3 .05 .05 
Conv. 
Fact. 1 .19 .15 .19 
Fact. 2 .04 .04 
Fact. 3 0 
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coefficients between similar factors from different scoring conditions (Factor 1, 
r = .84; Factor 2, r = .76; Factor 3, r = .80). The relative equivalence of these 
coefficients suggested that similar factor scores did not share common 
covanance. 
In an attempt to discern the source of differences in covariation between the 
two sets of scores, multiple regression analyses were performed. Age, education, 
and IQ covariates were regressed onto each of the original WCST variables which 
loaded on these factors. These results are listed in Table 41. Somewhat different 
patterns of covariation emerged from these analyses as well. Only 7 of 20 
comparisons showed very similar patterns of covariation, and an additional 3 
comparisons were somewhat similar. The remainder were quite dissimilar, 
although some similarities were evident. 
The proportion of dissimilar findings is far beyond chance and strongly 
suggested that these sets of scores may reflect different cognitive processes. This 
interpretation was strengthened by the fact that Verbal Scale Sum (VS) did not 
significantly predict variance on any variable from conventional scoring but did 
in four instances for verbalized scores (Categories Completed, Conceptual Level 
Response, Perseverative Responses, and Total Errors). It should be noted that 
these latter variables were all among the major C(?ntributors to Factor 1 under 
both sets of scores. The opposite pattern was obtained with respect to 
covariation with Performance Scale Sum, which covaried with three conventional 
scores, but not verbalized scores. 
Additionally, age and Digit Symbol Scale Score (DSySS) covaried to a 
substantially greater degree with conventional scores than verbal scores. These 
differences all led to the conclusion that asking patients to verbalize their 
reasoning on the WCST reflected very different skills than asking them to 
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Table 41 
R2 for Age, Education, and IO Regressed on WCST Factors 
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perform the same task without verbalization. It was not clear, however, whether 
performance varied as a function of verbalizing reasoning, or whether only the 
verbal scores varied. Consequently, it is not known at this point which 
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procedure may be best suited to measuring the cognitive processes involved in 
attribute identification and cognitive flexibility. Some light may be shed 
concerning those relationships by investigating the relationships between the 
WCST and CT factors, while controlling for covariates. 
Comparisons Between the Category Test and the WCST 
Previous studies have found that the CT and WCST share approximately 30% 
common variance, using conventional scoring. Other studies have found less 
significant relationships when partialing out age, education, and JQ covariates . 
In this study, the relationship between performance on these individual tasks 
was assessed using multiple regression analysis, entering covariates first to 
partial out their influence on the relationship between CT and WCST scores. 
Those resu Its are shown in Table 42. 
Although each dependent variable (with only two exceptions) on both the 
WCST and CT were significantly predicted statistically by at least one variable 
from the corresponding test, the increase in predictive power in each case was 
Table 42 
Prediction of CT L WCST Variables, Controlling for Covariates 
Dependent Var . Covar . Independent Var. R2 Change SigfChg 
Ad -.R2 
CT Total Errors .31 WCST Categories Completed .03 .0139 
CT Subtest III Errors .13 None Entered 
CT Subtest IV Errors .22 WCST Max. Class SD .05 .0040 
CT Subtest V Errors .25 WCST Total Correct .04 .0416 
CT Subtest VI Errors .20 WCST Categories Completed .09 .0002 
WCST Categories Comp. .16 CT Subtest VI Errors .09 .0003 
WCSTTotal Errors% .29 None Entered 
WCST Non PSV Errors % .24 CT Subtest VI Errors .03 .0440 
WCST PSV Responses % .23 CT Subtest IV Errors .02 .0484 
WCST PSV Errors % .24 CT Subtest IV Errors .02 .0485 
WCSTFrMSet .03 CT Subtest VI Errors .04 .0176 
WCST Learn to Learn .12 CT Subtest VI Errors .06 .0027 
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nonsubstantial. These findings are very consistent with other reports in the 
literature. 
It was anticipated that factor scores derived from cognitive process variables 
on each of these tasks would predict a significantly greater proportion of the 
variance than using conventional scores alone on the other task. This prediction 
Table 43 
Prediction of CT LWCST Factor Scores, Controlling for Covariates 
Deeendent Var . Covar. R2 Indeeendent Var. R2 Change SigF Chg 
CT Subtest III Factor 1 .08 WCSf Maximum Color .03 .0394 
CT Subtest III Factor 2 None Entered 
CT Subtest III Factor 3 .05 None Entered 
CT Subtest m Factor 4 .04 None Entered 
CT Subtest JJl Factor 5 .14 None Entered 
CT Subtest N Factor 1 .19 WCST Verbal Factor 1 .03 .0453 
WCSf Verbal Missed Lrng Oppor. .03 .0255 
CT Subtest IV Factor 2 .08 WCSf Conventional Factor 3 .03 .0464 
CT Subtest N Factor 3 None Entered 
CT Subtest N Factor 4 .12 None Entered 
CT Subtest V Factor 1 .19 WCST Verbal Factor 1 .03 .0238 
WCSf Verbal Unambiguous Form .04 .0101 
CT Subtest V Factor 2 None Entered 
CT Subtest V Factor 3 .04 None Entered 
CT Subtest V Factor 4 None Entered 
CT Subtest VI Factor 1 .14 WCST Verbal Leaming to Learn .06 .0025 
CT Subtest VI Factor 2 None Entered 
CT Subtest VI Factor 3 .14 None Entered 
CT Total Factor 1 .20 WCSf Verbal Factor 1 .05 .0052 
WCSf Verbal Factor 3 .04 .0122 
WCSf Verbal Total Errors Percent .03 .0178 
CT Total Factor 2 None Entered 
CT Total Factor 3 None Entered 
CT Total Factor 4 None Entered 
CT 2nd Order Factor 1 .06 None Entered 
CT 2nd Order Factor 2 .13 WCSf Verbal Factor 1 .04 .0141 
WCSf Verbal Factor 3 .03 .0389 
CT 2nd Order Factor 3 None Entered 
CT 2nd Order Factor 4 None Entered 
CT 2nd Order Factor 5 None Entered 
CT 2nd Order Factor 6 .11 None Entered 
CT 2nd Order Factor 7 .03 None Entered 
WCSf Factor 1 .26 CT 2nd Order Factor 2 .03 .0354 
WCST Factor 2. None Entered 
WCST Factor 3 .04 None Entered 
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was assessed utilizing multiple regression procedures, shown in Table 43, 
controlling for the influence of covariates, as described above. For CT factors as 
dependent variables, covariates were regressed first, followed by WCST factor 
scores from verbal administration, then WCST factor scores from conventional 
administration, followed by all individual WCST variables. 
Results of these analyses showed even less relationship between factor scores 
from one task and factor scores from the other task. Moreover, using variables as 
predictors for factor scores failed to improve prediction. These analyses 





The objectives of this study were threefold: (a) determine whether asking 
patients to verbalize their reasoning on WCST and CT responses substantially 
alters the nature of these tasks; (b) devise a coding system derived from these 
verbal responses and determine if verbal responses obtained using this 
methodology can be reliably coded by trained examiners; and (c) determine the 
relationship between the cognitive processes reflected by scores on the WCST 
versus the cognitive processes reflected by scores on the CT. The results 
described in the previous chapter will be described in terms of the research 
hypotheses which address each of these objectives. 
Comparison of Verbalized versus Conventional Administration 
Prior validation studies have shown that the CT and WCST are among the 
most sensitive indicators of brain damage (Kl0ve, 1974). Departures from 
standard administration procedures for these tasks, therefore, must be 
undertaken cautiously to avoid modifying the nature of the skills being assessed. 
For that reason, it was necessary to establish that the results obtained using 
standard administration procedures were comparable to results obtained when 
patients were asked to verbalize their reasoning on these tasks, when both 
groups were comparable in other relevant respects. The specific hypotheses 
tested were (a) Mean Tota] Error and subtest error scores on the CT and mean 
Categories Completed, Total Errors, Nonperseverative Errors, Perseverative 
Errors, Perseverative Responses, and Failure to Maintain Set scores on the WCST 
will not differ significantly (statistically) between a group of patients who 
verbalized the reasoning for their responses and a group of patients who did not 
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verbalize their reasoning, and are comparable to the first group with respect to 
diagnosis, age, education, and FulJ Scale W AIS-R IQ; and (b) Correlations 
between Mean Total Error and subtest error scores on the CT and mean 
Categories Completed, Total Errors, Nonperseverative Errors, Perseverative 
Errors, Perseverative Responses, and Failure to Maintain Set scores on the WCST 
will not differ significantly (statistically) between a group of patients who 
verbalized the reasoning for their responses and a group of patients who did not 
verbalize their reasoning, and are comparable to the first group with respect to 
diagnosis, age, education, and Full Scale W AIS-R IQ. 
Hypothesis 1 was tested using ANCOV A to compare scores between groups 
while controlling for age, education, and IQ covariates. Results revealed that 
only CT Subtest IV Errors (C4Err) significantly differed (p < .02) between the 
groups. Further analysis of covariates for C4Err revealed that covarying only age 
increased comparability on C4Err across groups. Treating both age and group 
membership as independent variables further increased comparability between 
groups, so that main effects were found only for age, as expected. The effects of 
group membership were nonsignificant (p = .16), and no interaction effects for 
age and group membership were apparent. Consequently, comparison of mean 
scores across groups did not reveal group differences, when controlling for age, 
education, and IQ covariates. 
Rather different results were found for Hypothesis 2, however. ANCOV A 
was also utilized for testing differences in correlation coefficients between all 
possible pairs of CT and WCST variables, while controlling for age, education, 
and IQ covariates. Significant differences were found for correlations between 
three pairs of variables. Fifty-five comparisons were computed; consequently, 
finding significant differences for three of these may have been due to chance. 
171 
However, further analysis of these differences revealed different patterns of age, 
education, and IQ covariation between pairs of identical scores across groups. 
These results suggested that groups may not be comparable, despite finding no 
significant differences between mean scores and between most correlations for 
sets of scores across groups. Comparing relationships among WAIS-R subtest 
and summary scores also revealed substantial differences between groups with 
respect to relationships among scores. 
Since administration conditions for the WAIS-R were identical for both 
groups, in view of differences among relationships for these scores between 
groups, it cannot be concluded that differences in relationships for CT and WCST 
variables is the result of administration conditions. Rather, the groups may not 
be comparable with respect to diagnosis, severity, or other relevant variables. 
These results are not surprising, since data were obtained from archival 
records, and subjects were not randomly assigned to adminjstration conditions. 
Systematic differences between groups may have occurred because different 
examiners tested subjects in each group, and decisions as to which test 
instruments to administer were made by individual examiners based on clinical 
judgment. It is likely that these judgments were not based on consistent criteria. 
Therefore, generalization of the results of this study to subjects who were 
adminjstered these test instruments under conventional administration 
conditions should be considered tentative. 
Reliability of Coding Verbalized Responses 
Asking patients to verbalize the reasoning underlying quantifiable responses 
introduced the problem of how one patient's qualitative responses may be 
compared to other patients' qualitative responses. Some anecdotal reports are 
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availabJe for the CT in which patients have been asked to verbalize their 
reasoning (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985), but these responses have been interpreted 
subjectively, which does not allow systematic comparisons across patients or 
across responses. 
Perrine (1984) referred to the concept formation Jiterature (Bourne et al., 1979) 
for a cognitive process modeJ which might help clarify the cognitive processes on 
the CT and WCST. For the purposes of this study, Perrine's model was utilized 
for the development of a system of coding verbal responses on the CT. This 
model described a two-part process of concept formation in which Attribute 
Identification referred to identification of the relevant features of stimuli upon 
which the rule is based, whereas Rule Learning refers to the logical relationship 
between the attribute identified and the number response chosen. For example, 
on Subtest Ill, the Attribute Identification task is to discern that the stimulus 
which is different is the relevant dimension, while the Rule Learning task is to 
discover that the position of the different stimulus corresponds to the correct 
number . 
However, during the course of this study, it was discovered that a three-stage 
roding system was required to reliably differentiate verbal responses: 
(a) Concrete: Subjects selected a perceptual feature which they believed relevant; 
(b) Abstract: The perceptual feature or features were organized conceptually to 
create a pattern; and (c) Rule: This pattern was related to the number response 
given. For example, in Subtest IV, the quadrants are numbered in a clockwise 
riirection, and the principle requires identifying the quadrant of the stimulus 
which is missing or different. The Concrete (Attribute Identification) task is 
identification of the portion which is not there or which is different from the rest 
cf the stimulus; the Abstract conceptual task is to perceive this attribute as one 
~uadrant of the whole stimulus; the Rule Learning task is to select a number 
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corresponding to the position of the missing or different quadrant when ordered 
in a clockwise direction. 
Often, however, responses referred to two or more perceptual attributes, or 
verbal responses were ambiguous as to which attribute took precedence. 
Consequently, in the interest of increased reliability in coding responses, a 
decision tree approach was adopted for coding verbal responses. This approach 
established a hierarchy of coding rules, ordered in such a way that the most 
relevant or highest order perceptual attributes and rules were listed first. (See 
Appendices E through G for the full model.) Use of this approach permitted 
achievement of a satisfactory level of test-retest (recoding) reliability (.94) for 
recoding verbal responses after an interval of four months (for one examiner). 
Achievement of this level of reliability permitted quantitative comparison of 
verbalized responses across subjects and across responses. 
Factor Analysis of Cognitive Process Variables 
Category Test 
The CT has been described as a test of complex, problem-solving skills (Reitan 
& Wolfson, 1985) on the basis of previous factor analytic studies in which CT 
error scores loaded with other variables known to predict abstract reasoning, 
cognitive flexibility, and problem-solving skills (Barnes & Lucas, 1974; Corrigan 
& Hinkeldey, 1988; Goldstein & Shelly, 1972; Halstead, 1947a; Haynes & Sells, 
1963; Royce et al., 1976; Russell, 1982). However, in only one of these studies 
(Royce et al., 1976) have CT subtest scores been entered into the analysis 
individually, and in none of these instances has it been possible to evaluate the 
nature of the errors committed by subjects in solving the task presented to them 
by the CT. The methodology developed for the purpose of the present study has 
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afforded that opportunity by devising a standardized coding system based upon 
concept formation literature (Bourne et al., 1979) for describing how subjects 
relate the perceptual stimuli presented to them to the numbers which constitute 
their responses. 
Since the focus of interest on this task is not how quickly the correct principle 
on each subtest was discovered, but rather on how effectively the feedback 
provided by the examiner (or the apparatus) was utilized, concept formation 
scores were transformed to change scores, or process scores, to identify how 
feedback was incorporated into subsequent responses. Thus, cognitive process 
variables were obtained which reflected the degree to which response 
determinants were repeated when correct feedback was received and response 
determinants were modified when incorrect feedback was received. These scores 
(see Appendix H) were tabulated for each CT subtest and for CT Total Errors. 
It was hypothesized that factor analysis of these process scores would 
produce three or more interpretable cognitive process factors which were 
relatively independent of age, education, and IQ subtest and summary scores. 
Since preliminary analysis revealed that, except for Subtests V and VI which 
share a common principle, individual subtest error scores were relatively 
independent of error scores on other subtests (although some relationships were 
statistically significant), and that the small N precluded analyzing all data 
simultaneously, process scores for each subtest were analyzed separately. In 
order to enhance interpretability of results, the data analysis for the full group 
was replicated for impaired and unimpaired subgroups, using Reitan' s definition 
for impairment on the CT (>50 errors). 
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Maintaining Set 
These analyses revealed fairly consistent results across all subtests and for 
Total Errors. The factor in all subtests accounting for the largest proportion of 
the variance (28.1% for Subtest III to 38.1% for Subtest IV) was a Maintaining Set 
fac or on which most variables that loaded highly related to learning the correct 
subtest principle and maintaining that principle on subsequent items. This was 
true also on all subgroup analyses, with the exception of the impaired subgroup 
on Subtest III. This factor accounted for the greatest portion of the variability in 
subtest error scores as well, ranging from 33% of the variance in error scores for 
To al Errors and Subtest V to 63% of the variance on Subtest VI (see Table 31 for 
de tails). 
This factor also showed the greatest relationship with age, education, and IQ 
cO\ariates across all subtests and for Total Errors. In most instances this 
relationship was nearly as great as the relationship between error scores and 
co\'ariates (see Table 35). It may therefore be postulated that this factor accounts 
for most of the discriminability of the CT in differentiating brain-damaged from 
nonbrain-damaged subjects. In fact, this may well be a more reliable indicator of 
effective problem-solving skills than error scores since this factor score is 
conprised almost exclusively of variance due to repeating determinants which 
are correct and is not inflated by "incidentally correct" responses (Simmel & 
Co11nts, 1957). 
Shirting Determinants 
However, from a clinical perspective, despite the importance of assessing 
efftctive problem-solving skills, treatment must proceed from evaluation of how 
patents fail problem-solving tasks. The remaining factors which emerged from 
facior analysis of process variables across all subtests and for Total Errors 
176 
predominantly related to how response determinants were changed when the 
previous response was incorrect. These factors were often ambiguous but were 
of three general types: (a) random or irrelevant shifting characterized by 
nonsystematic shifting of multiple determinants simultaneously; (b) systematic 
shifting of determinants in order to identify the relevant dimensions; and (c) 
cognitively rigid shifting characterized by persisting with a previous principle 
which was no longer effective or by difficulty abandoning assumptions. 
Factor 2 for all analyses was a nonsystematic factor characterized by 
simultaneously shifting multiple determinants, often all three, although the 
degree to which each determinant loaded on this factor varied somewhat from 
subtest to subtest. Shifting just one determinant consistently loaded negatively 
on this factor, reflecting the absence of a systematic approach. 
Factor 3 showed somewhat more variability across subtests. For Subtest III, 
this factor represented somewhat more effective and systematic problem-solving 
than the previous factor, with a moderate positive loading for Leaming Rate, 
relating to slow but successful learning. This factor was not represented in 
Subtest IV, but Subtests V and VI were consistent with Subtest III, although the 
determinants shifted varied somewhat. 
The remaining factors were less consistent across subtests, but related to some 
degree with cognitive rigidity and difficulty abandoning assumptions. 
The relationship of these factors to CT performance was unclear, however, 
since almost all of the variance in subtest error scores was predicted by 
Maintaining Set factors. (See Table 31.) It was hypothesized that the restricted 
relationship of Determinant Shifting factors with subtest error scores may have 
been due to artifacts associated with oblique rotation, which apparently served to 
minimize the relationship between factors . Given the strong relationship 
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between Maintaining Set factors and subtest error scores, this apparently served 
also to minimize the relationship between Determinant Shifting factors and 
subtest error scores. Consequently, Maintaining Set variables were factor 
analyzed separately from Determinant Shifting variables. 
This strategy produced almost identical factors in each case (see Table 33), but 
multiple regression analysis revealed that the relationship of the Determinant 
Shifting factors to error scores was rather different. For the full model, even 
when Maintaining Set scores were forced to enter the equation last, following the 
stepwise block for factors related to incorrect responding, all of the variance in 
error score prediction was accounted for by Maintaining Set factors and none of 
the factors related to Determinant Shifting entered the equation, with probability 
to enter set at .05. However, when each set of scores was factor analyzed 
separately, the relationship of Determinant Shifting factors to subtest error scores 
was much more substantial. 
Thus, the failure of Determinant Shifting factor scores to significantly predict 
error scores appeared to be artifactual rather than reflecting the absence of 
relationships. Nonetheless, the cognitive processes reflected by these factor 
scores remained ambiguous. 
Second Order Factor Analysis 
In view of the consistency of factor loadings across subtests and Total Errors, 
it appeared that these primary factors may be descriptive of a general approach 
to problem-solving tasks. Consequently, second order factor analysis was 
performed, entering all factors across subtests, to determine if primary factors of 
each type related to the same cognitive process. Results are shown in Table 27, 
with variables identified across the top of the table by number (from the 
definitions in Appendix H) and primary factors loading on each second order 
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factor listed in the left hand column. It was expected that if primary factors 
related to cognitive processes which were consistently applied across problem-
solving tasks, variable loadings on primary factors would cluster within each 
second order factor. 
Seven second order factors emerged in this analysis, but although some 
chs tering of variables is evident, only the first two second order factors have 
primary loadings from all subtests and variable clustering is not consistent. 
Second Order Factor 2 shows the greatest degree of variable clustering, with all 
maintaining set variables and primary factors from Subtests IV, V, and VJ 
loading substantiaJly. Subtest III showed a very different pattern, however. 
Although all subtests also loaded on Second Order Factor 1, the variable 
clustering pattern on this factor was very discrepant, with maintaining set 
variables from Subtests III and IV loading consistently (although comprising a 
relatively small proportion of the variance) but with unsystematic shifting 
variables from Subtests V and VI loading negatively. Thus, low scores on 
Umystematic Shifting variables on Subtests IV, V, and VI appeared to predict 
high Maintaining Set variable scores on Subtests III and IV. The remaining 
sect)nd order factors are specific to primary factors from subsets of two subtests. 
fhis analysis strongly suggested that despite the consistency with which 
similar factors emerged across subtests in the initial factor analysis of process 
vanables, second order factor analysis indicated that these factors were primarily 
des:riptive of variance unique to individual subtests or sets of similar subtests. 
Fac:or patterns were reminiscent of the relationships among subtests described in 
Table 29 where multiple regression analysis revealed that error scores on Subtest 
III were significantly predicted only by error scores on Subtest IV, and error 
scores on Subtest V were significantly predicted only by error scores on Subtest 
179 
VI, and vice versa. Only Subtest IV showed a significant relationship with more 
than one other subtest. As expected, error scores on Subtest IV were significantly 
predicted by Subtest III, but also by error scores on Subtest VI. However, even 
though these relationships were statistically significant (r < .05), they accounted 
for only a minor portion of the variance, except in the case of Subtests V and VI, 
which are based upon the same principle. It was expected that second order 
factor analysis of process variables would reveal stronger relationships among 
primary process factors across subtests, but this did not prove to be the case. 
The failure to find second order factors which generalized across subtests 
may reflect characteristics of the cognitive process variables which were devised 
to measure hypothesized cognitive processes. Each of these scores was based 
upon determinant shifting following feedback from the examiner. However, 
perceptual differences between subtests may modify the significance of given 
determinant shifts. For example, in Subtest III, the most salient determinant may 
be R, while in Subtest IV the determinant which is most salient may be A. 
Consequently, the relevance of R shifts is likely to be very different across 
subtests. For that reason, intersubtest comparisons with respect to determinant 
shifting are not likely to be fruitful. 
In contrast, the failure to find second order factors for cognitive processes 
which generalized across subtests may also reflect the uniqueness of task 
demands presented by each subtest (again except for Subtests V and VI). In fact, 
this explanation appears likely in view of the failure of Maintaining Set factors to 
show stronger relationships across subtests. These factors show less dependence 
upon perceptual dissimilarities between subtests in that they reflect a "win-stay" 
strategy, without regard to perceptual shifts. 
180 
Only two previous studies have addressed correlates of differential 
performance on individual CT subtests. Royce et al. (1976) also found that 
Subtests III and TV comprised a factor separate from Subtests V and VI. They 
referred to these as Halstead Abstraction I and Halstead Abstraction II, and 
found somewhat different patterns of correlations with sites of cerebral damage 
for each of these factors. Holland and Wadsworth (1976) also found evidence for 
a different pattern of correlates for individual CT subtests in a study which 
compared the performance of schizophrenic subjects with brain-damaged 
subjects on a battery of neuropsychological tests. They found that only CT 
Subtest IV minus Subtest V significantly differentiated the groups . However, the 
significance of these findings for cognitive correlates of CT subtest performance 
is not known. 
Covariates of Cognitive Process Factors 
One means of assessing correlates of subtest-specific cognitive process factors 
is to investigate the relationships of predicted age, education, and IQ covariates . 
These results are shown in Table 35. As might be expected in view of the 
restricted relationships among subtest errors scores and among cognitive process 
factors across subtests, relationships of age, education, and IQ covariates with 
both error scores and cognitive process factors were quite variable. These results 
suggested that scores across subtests are quite clearly measures of different 
cognitive processes. 
More importantly, however, these findings suggested that most of the 
relationship of CT error scores with age, education, and IQ covariates was 
reflected in Maintaining Set factors, but that most Determinant Shifting factors 
were relatively independent of covariates. Previous research has found the CT to 
be highly sensitive to brain dysfunction, but specificity has been less reliable in 
181 
discriminating nonbrain-damaged subjects due to the influence of covariates on 
CT performance. If relationships of covariates with Determinant Shifting factor 
scores are confirmed in cross-validation research, these scores may be more 
useful than error scores in discriminating nonbrain-damaged subjects. 
Summary of CT Factor Analyses 
It was anticipated that factor analysis of CT cognitive process variables would 
produce three or more cognitive process factors which were relatively 
independent of age, education, and IQ covariates. This expectation was fulfilled 
for all CT subtests in most respects. The requisite number of factors did emerge 
in all analyses and most were interpretable, although often ambiguous. 
However, the first factor to emerge for all subtests related to Maintaining Set 
variables, which predicted most of the variance in subtest error scores and 
showed almost as much covariation with age, education, and IQ variables as did 
the error scores themselves. Nonetheless, these scores may be more accurate 
reflectors of CT subtest performance than error scores because they are not 
influenced by "incidentaJly correct responses." 
The remaining factors which emerged reflected Determinant Shifting 
variables and were quite consistent across subtests, showing much less 
relationship with age, education, and IQ covariates, although subtest specific 
factors did not predict similar factors on other subtests. Similarly, Maintaining 
Set factors from one subtest showed only minimal relationship with Maintaining 
Set factors from other subtests. These relationships were reminiscent of 
relationships between subtest error scores. It therefore appeared that CT subtest 
scores, whether error scores, Maintaining Set factor scores, or Determinant 
Shifting scores, were not substantially related, suggesting that CT subtests are 
measures of different cognitive processes. Previous research offers little 
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guidance as to what the correlates of individual subtests may be, and the factors 
which emerged in this study do not shed much light on this question. 
Factors which emerged in each subtest analysis were comprised of similar 
variables, but contrary to expectations the relationship between similar factors 
across subtests was minimal. Thus, second order factor analysis of primary 
cognitive process factors from each subtest did not reveal consistent relationships 
across subtests, and the pattern of covariation with age, education, and IQ 
variables across subtest factor scores was also quite inconsistent. It was, 
therefore, apparent that the cognitive process variables which were devised for 
this study did not reflect the cognitive skills required to perform each subtest 
task. For the cognitive shifting variables, this might be due to perceptual 
differences between subtest stimuli which served to modify the significance of 
given determinant shifts from subtest to subtest. That is, if a given determinant 
was of unequal salience across subtests, shifting that determinant in response to 
feedback would convey different interpretations from subtest to subtest. 
The Maintaining Set factors are comprised of two components. First, scores 
on this factor reflect a "win-stay" strategy, in which determinant scores that were 
successful are repeated. Second, use of this strategy presupposes that the correct 
determinants have been surmised. The latter component is reflected in Set 
Leaming Rate (SLR) scores, which are measures of how consistently determinant 
scores were repeated after the correct principle was learned. It might be 
expected that this strategy would generalize across problem-solving tasks, 
including different CT subtests. Discovery of the correct principle within each 
subtest is reflected in Leaming Rate (LR) scores. If individual subtests reflect 
dissimilar cognitive skills, it would not be expected that LR scores would show 
substantial relationships across subtests. 
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However, multiple regression analysis revealed that both subtest specific SLR 
and LR scores did not generalize across subtests, except for Subtests V and Vl 
(which are based upon the same principle), contrary to expectations. Inspection 
of the data suggested that the failure of SLR scores to generalize may have been 
due to learning failures which were not expected to generalize across subtests. 
Consequently, the data were recomputed after eliminating these scores. 
However, this adjustment did not substantially affect the generalizability of this 
score. 
These results are very puzzling. Task differences across subtests are not 
relevant for this score, when learning failures are eliminated; consequently, SLR 
should reflect only failures of working memory, or attentional lapses, and this 
would not be expected to vary substantially as a result of task differences. 
Unreliability of scores might account for these findings, but in that case Subtests 
V and VI would not be expected to show discrepant patterns of relationship. 
However, this is an impaired subgroup of predominantly head-injured 
subjects whose performance on learning tasks would be characterized by 
frequent p·roactive intrusions from previously learned material (Butters, 1992). 
The probability of such intrusions would vary with respect to strength of prior 
learning and task novelty. Thus, previous material which was overlearned, 
counting stimuli for instance, may intrude more frequently on tasks which are 
novel, such as Subtests III or IV, than on tasks which are more familiar, as in 
Subtests V and VI. This principle would predict that mean SLR for Subtests III 
and IV would be much smaller than mean SLR for Subtests V and VI. In fact, this 
, pattern was partially confirmed. Mean SLR for Subtest III was .18 (S.D. = .04), 
while for Subtests V and VI mean SLR was .64 (S.D. = .22) and .64 (S.D. = .24), 
respectively. However, mean SLR for Subtest IV was greatest at .82 (S.D. = .31). 
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Task novelty for the latter subtest, however, may have been influenced by the six 
practice items on this subtest. 
Further research concerning these patterns would be necessary to confirm this 
explanation, but certainly these findings point to the need for more systematic 
task analysis to define variables which reflect discriminable cognitive processes 
utilized by subgroups of subjects in concept formation tasks, particularly CT 
subtests. Fortunately, the determinant coding system devised for the purpose of 
this study makes such analyses possible. 
Such an approach must be based on the premise that because the CT is a 
problem-solving test in which the central task is to surmise the correct principle 
for each subtest through use of feedback from the examiner (or the apparatus), 
not all responses are of equal salience. For example, incidentally correct 
responses are of particular value in helping to identify the correct principle. 
These are responses which are correct by chance rather than by design. These 
offer subjects the opportunity to contrast the perceptual attributes of the item 
which was incidentally correct with the perceptual attributes of previous items 
which were incorrect to identify differences, which must logically be descriptive 
of the correct principle. Consequently, determinant shifts following incidentally 
correct responses are particularly relevant in identifying cognitive approaches to 
this task. 
Similarly, responses following an incorrect response within a series of 
"almost correct" responses are particularly salient in helping subjects discover 
the correct principle. These are responses in which the current operating 
principle is very similar to the correct principle, but it is ineffective in some 
instances. For example, in Subtests V and VI, many subjects count quadrants 
which are outlined rather than basing their responses on the proportion of the 
1 Qi::; 
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stimulus which is outlined. This results in correct responses for most but not all 
items. Thus, determinant changes following these disconfirming responses are 
especially relevant in identifying problem-solving characteristics of subjects. 
Careful item analysis of determinant changes employing such a process 
approach to develop characteristic patterns of performance for various 
subgroups of subjects wi11 be of much value in identifying cognitive processes 
descriptive of impaired performance on the CT. 
\Visconsin Card Sorting Test 
The WCST did not present the coding challenges which were present for the 
CT, since this test has been traditionally scored utilizing a process approach to 
analyze subjects' performance. The ambiguities for WCST conventional scores 
stem from ambiguous responses in which cards match on more than one 
perceptual attribute. In such cases, it is not possible to identify which feature 
determined card placement. As a result of such ambiguity, Osman (1992) noted 
that perseverative responses reflect a variety of processes, including (a) 
intrusions of a prior mental set; (b) continuation of on-going behavior; (c) loss of 
mental set; and (d) loss of conceptual power. Asking subjects to verbalize their 
reasoning was an attempt to better clarify process analysis by reducing the 
proportion of ambiguous responses without task simplification. It was expected 
that factor analysis of verbalized scores would produce three or more cognitive 
process factors which were relatively independent of age, education, and IQ 
covariates. 
Comparison of Verbalized and 
Nonverbalized Scores 
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Comparison of results of different scoring conditions revealed that when 
subjects verbalized their responses they often responded by utilizing multiple 
determinants. In such cases, verbalized responses conveyed no more 
information than did conventional scoring. As a result, the correlations between 
verbalized scores and conventional scores were generally quite high. Exceptions 
were for Right-Shift responses, Missed Learning Opportunities, and Percent 
Nonperseverative Errors. Inspection of the data revealed that the low correlation 
for Right-Shift responses resulted from restricted range of scores. Consequently, 
this score was dropped from further analysis. Further analysis revealed that for 
the remaining two variables, lower correlations between scoring conditions 
resulted from reduced ambiguity on verbalized scores. Consequently, these 
variables were retained for further analysis. 
Separate factor analyses of both sets of retained scores revealed that the factor 
pattern for both sets of data was very similar. In both cases, Factor 1 reflected 
ineffective, perseverative responding and summary scores related to 
nonperseverative responding (Conceptual Level Responses, Categories 
Completed, and Learning to Learn) loaded negatively on this factor. Primary 
differences between the scoring conditions related to the variables which showed 
the lowest correlation between scoring conditions, Missed Learning 
Opportunities and Percent Nonperseverative Errors. Both changes were in the 
predicted direction, consistent with greater accuracy in scoring responses 
utilizing verbalized reasoning. 
Factor 2 for both scoring conditions related principally to Unambiguous 
Number responses and Maximum Number responses, with lesser loadings for 
187 
Wrong-Stay, Missed Learning Opportunities, and Total Correct Percent, with a 
negative Joading for Unambiguous Color. This pattern suggested that when the 
proportions of attribute responses (Color, Form, Number) were unequal, whether 
due to ambiguous or unambiguous responses, color and form responses were 
associated with perseveration, while unequal number responses were associated 
with nonperseverative responses. Thus, identifying the number attribute 
appeared to represent a different cognitive process than color or form attributes. 
Factor 3 for both scoring conditions contributed the smallest proportion of the 
variance, and ironically was the only factor which related principally to more 
effective probJem-solving strategies, with high negative loadings for variables 
related to maintaining set. 
This pattern was very different from the factor pattern which emerged for the 
CT. In the latter case, effective problem-solving (Maintaining Set factor scores) 
accounted for the largest proportion of the variance, with Jess relationship for 
ineffective strategies. In contrast, on the WCST, ineffective strategies accounted 
for a much larger proportion of the variance, with less relationship for effective 
strategies. This distinction may be a function of the complexity of the tasks. 
Covariates for WCST Cognitive Process Factors 
Despite the similarity between factors for the two scoring conditions, 
relationships with age, education, and IQ covariates were quite different for 
Factor 1, although the remaining factors showed little relationship with 
covariates under both conditions. Consequently, the relationship of the original 
WCST variables with covariates was analyzed further, regressing covariates onto 
each variable for each scoring condition. Only 7 of 20 comparisons showed very 
similar patterns of covariation, and 3 other variables were somewhat similar. 
This proportion of dissimilar findings across scoring conditions is well beyond 
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chance 1e'v'e1s, and suggested that each set of saxes may be measuring different 
cognitive processes. This view is strengthened by the differential relationship of 
Verbal IQ subtest scores versus Performance IQ subtest scores across scoring 
conditions. This pattern suggested that asking subjects to verbalize reasoning 
may have produced scores which reflected verbal skills rather than problem-
solving skil1s. However, it is not known whether performance varied as a 
function of verbalizing reasoning, or whether only verbal scores varied in 
comparison with conventional scores. 
Comparisons Between the CT and WCST 
It was anticipated that factor scores derived from cognitive process variables 
on each of these tasks would predict a significantly greater proportion of the 
variance on the other task than using conventional scores alone. This prediction 
was tested utilizing multiple regression analysis, regressing all factor scores from 
one test onto each factor score from the other test, and partialing out variance 
due to age, education, and IQ covariates. However, the results of these analyses 
showed even less relationship between tasks than utilizing conventional scores. 
Consequently, no evidence was found that the tasks assessed by these tests are 
comparable. 
It should be noted, however, that these analyses were dependent upon the 
success achieved in fractionating the cognitive processes on each task reflected 
by conventional scores. As noted previously, this assumption is probably not 
warranted in view of the ambiguity of factor and variable scores on CT 
Determinant Shifting. Osman (1992) has suggested that this may well also be 
true for WCST variable scores. Consequently, the relationship between cognitive 
processes reflected by CT and WCST performance remains an open question. 
189 
Conclusions 
Assessment of concept formation and problem-solving skills is an essential 
part of any comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation since these high-level 
skills are among the functions most likely to be impaired following brain 
damage. The Halstead Category Test, or the equivalent form, the Booklet 
Category Test, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test have been found to be 
among the most sensitive instruments for identifying patients with impaired 
problem-solving abilities. However, for development of treatment plans for 
remediating these deficits, it is not sufficient to know that patients are impaired 
with respect to these skills; what is more important is to specify how patients are 
impaired. Heretofore, such information could be obtained only inferentially or 
anecdotally, since both CT and WCST performance have been conventionally 
assessed only by summary error scores, which evaluate only the end product of 
problem-solving. For the purposes of this study, a modified administration 
technique was devised which relied on patient verbalization of reasoning as they 
performed these tasks, which provided a means for observing how patients erred 
on these problem-solving tasks. 
WCST Results 
In the case of the WCST, although most such verbalized scores correlated 
highly with conventional scores, this technique permitted less ambiguous 
quantification of performance. However, patterns of age, education, and IQ 
covariates for each scoring condition were found to be very different, raising 
questions concerning what such verbalized scores measured. In particular, 
verbalized scores correlated more highly with W AIS-R verbal scale subtest 
scores, while conventional scores correlated more highly with WAIS-R 
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performance scale subtest scores. These relationships may suggest that 
verbalized scores reflected ability to accurately describe behavior rather than 
reflecting dimensions of problem-solving abilities. However, since each set of 
scores was based upon the same objective performance (scored once 
conventionally and scored again based on patients' verbal descriptions of the 
reason for their responses), the present data are insufficient for determining how 
verbalization of reasoning may have affected performance. 
Data were obtained from a comparison group to address this question, and 
patterns of covariation for primary scores on the WCST and CT were quite 
different between the comparison group and the experimental group, but the two 
groups were significantly different with respect to age (p < .03), and patterns of 
covariation were different between groups among WAlS-R subtest scores, for 
which no differences in administration conditions were present. Consequently, 
data from the comparison group were not useful for comparing performance 
characteristics of verbalized responses versus nonverbalized responses. Further 
research based upon a prospective design in which subjects are randomly 
assigned to administration conditions, and matched with respect to age, 
education, and IQ is needed to address this question. 
Factor analysis of WCST scores for each scoring condition resulted in almost 
identical three-factor solutions in each case, differentiated primarily on the basis 
of the two scores with the lowest correlation between scoring conditions loading 
somewhat differently. This was in the predicted direction and appeared due to 
reduced ambiguity for these scores, Missed Learning Opportunities and Percent 
Nonperseverative Errors, in the verbalized condition. Factors which emerged for 
both scoring conditions were interpretable and related to (a) ineffective, 




Verbalized responses on the CT were much more difficult to quantify than 
was true for the WCST. Perrine (1984) suggested that the WCST is primarily a 
task of attribute identification, whereas the CT involves both attribute 
identification and rule learning. Perhaps for that reason, the CT represents a 
more complex task and reliable coding of verbal responses is therefore more 
multidimensional. Perrine's model of concept formation, derived from Bourne 
(1965), was utilized to describe a three-part hierarchy of response determinants, 
consisting of (a) concrete perceptual attributes; (b) cognitive organization of 
perceptual attributes into abstract patterns; and (c) relating abstract patterns to 
the corresponding number responses. Decision trees were devised to prescribe a 
set of rules for coding each score. Utilization of this approach yielded adequate 
test-retest reliability for recoding responses. Such an approach permitted 
quantification of the cognitive processes utilized by individual subjects as they 
performed this task. 
For the purposes of quantifying how patients incorporated feedback from the 
examiner as to whether each response was correct or incorrect, concept formation 
scores were transformed to change scores, so that for each CT subtest patients' 
performances could be quantified with respect to the proportion of determinants 
which were repeated following "correct" feedback, proportion of each 
determinant which was changed following "incorrect'' feedback, proportion of 
responses in which only one determinant was changed simultaneously versus 
those in which multiple determinants were changed simultaneously, as well as 
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other more specific summary scores. Sets of variables for each subtest were then 
factor analyzed, with second order factor analysis of all fa_c~ors from each subtest 
in order to determine if common cognitive process scores on each subtest 
described cognjtive process scores on other subtests. 
Results of these analyses revealed similar factor solutions for each subtest, but 
despite the apparent similarity of these factors across subtests, subtest specific 
factors were not predictive of similar factor scores on other subtests, except for 
Subtests V and VI, which are based upon the same principle. Similarly, second 
order factor analysis did not result in general factors across subtests; rather, the 
factors which emerged tended to be specific to, at most, sets of similar subtests. 
For each subtest, Maintaining Set factors predicted most of the variance in 
subtest error scores, and these factor scores were influenced to approximately an 
equivalent degree by age, education, and IQ covariates as were error scores. 
Determinant Shifting factor scores were predictive of error scores to a much 
lesser degree than Maintairung Set factor scores . In fact, it was necessary to enter 
Determinant Shifting variables separately in order to discover any relationship 
with error scores at all. Thus, these change scores appeared to be independent of 
Maintaining Set scores, and also showed much more independence from age, 
education, and IQ covariates. 
These results appear to suggest that fractionating error scores on the CT by 
utilizing a concept formation approach to cognitive processing is a promising 
approach for describing subsets of cognitive failures in a group of brain-injured 
patients. However, the cognitive process scores developed for the present study 
achieved only limited success in accomplishing this goal because the change 
scores utilized were too much dependent upon specific task characteristics and 
too multiply-determined. Further research utilizing careful task analysis for 
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specific categories of responses may be more successful. For example, responses 
following "incidentally correct" responses (responses correct by chance) are 
especially salient in discerning how patients utilize feedback in modifying 
behavior. Responses which receive feedback of "incorrect" within a series of 
"almost conceptually correct" responses will be of value in assessing idea fluency 
and systematic organization of multiple data in problem-solving. These and 
other concept formation scores may perhaps be best derived through item 
analysis of CT responses, utilizing the concept formation approach devised for 
the purpose of this study. 
Comparison of WCST and CT Factor Scores 
Factor scores from the CT were expected to predict a greater proportion of the 
variance in WCST factor scores than the proportion of the variance in WCST 
summary scores predicted by CT error scores. However, this hypothesis was not 
supported. In fact, the relationship between CT and WCST factor scores was 
slightly lower than the relationship between CT error scores and WCST 
summary scores. However, this may have been due to the fact that CT factor 
scores tended to be task specific rather than generalizable across subtests. Since 
these scores were not predictive of factor scores across the much more similar CT 
subtests, it was not surprising that they were also not predictive of WCST factor 
scores. 
Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for 
Further Research 
While the results of this study were promising with respect to the 
development of a reliable coding system for comparing verbalized responses on 
194 
the CT and WCST across subjects and across responses, and in providing greater 
clarification of the processes utilized by brain-injured patients in solving the 
problems represented by these tasks, this study must be considered exploratory. 
As with any study based upon archival data where subjects may not be 
randomly assigned to groups, these results may be confounded by subject 
selection procedures. Perhaps more importantly, recording of verbal responses 
without prior knowledge of scoring procedures may have resu1ted in ambiguous 
responses which would not be coded similarly by other scorers. Thus, although 
adequate test-retest (for recoding) reliability was achieved, interscorer reliability 
is unknown. Further, in view of the questionable comparibility of groups, it 
could not be established in this study to what degree verbalization of reasonjng 
may have affected performance on these tasks. 
Utilization of process scores of unknown reliability or validity also raises 
many questions concerning the significance of these results. Much further 
investigation of the correlates of these scores is needed. In particular, normative 
research is necessary to establish the relevance of these scores for various 
cognitive and demographic correlates, and item analyses of results will be 
needed to derive an appropriate means of measuring cognitive process variables. 
Further, Osman (1992) suggested that WCST perseverative responses also 
reflect a variety of processes, including (a) intrusions of a prior mental set; (b) 
continuation of on-going behavior; (c) loss of mental set; and 4) loss of conceptual 
power. Consequently, he has also utilized a verbalized administration procedure 
for the WCST from which he has developed three additional scores to fractionate 
the cognitive processes reflected by perseverative responses on this task. Further 
research comparing the relationship between CT cognitive process scores derived 
from task analysis of specific categories of CT response items and fractionated 
WCST responses is necessary to address this question. 
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Such research has the potential to clarify the relationship between brain injury 
and executive and problem-solving functions, which is a prerequisite of effective 
remediation of impaired higher level skills in brain-injured patients. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR MODIFIED WISCONSIN 
CARD SORTING TEST 
Modification to standard instructions are in bold print. Allow patients to respond 
verbally to each response prior to providing feedback. Mark verbalized 
responses to the right of the "f' on the answer sheet, and actual responses to the 
left of the"/" . If patients do not spontaneously provide verbal responses, say 
"because . .. "or "and you placed it there because ... ". If you do not 
understand the reasoning, ask the patient to repeat, but do not inquire further. If 
the patient verbalizes a response which is inconsistent with card placement, 
repeat the response, and if the patient spontaneously self-corrects, record the 
correction; otherwise, record the original response. 
THIS TEST IS A UTILE UNUSUAL, BECAUSE I AM NOT ALLOWED TO TELL 
YOU VERY MUCH ABOUT HOW TO DO IT. YOU WILL BE ASKED TO MATCH 
EACH OF THE CARDS IN THESE DECKS TO ONE OF THE FOUR KEY 
CARDS, AND I WILL TELL YOU WHETHER YOU ARE RIGHT OR WRONG. 
YOU MUST ALWAYS TAKE THE TOP CARD FROM THE DECK, AND PLACE 
IT BELOW THE KEY CARD YOU THINK IT MATCHES, AND ALSO SAY THE 
REASON WHY YOU PLACED THE CARD WHERE YOU PLACED IT--THE 
RULE YOU USED WHEN YOU PLACED IT IN THAT PILE. I CAN'T TELL YOU 
HOW TO MATCH THE CARDS, BUT I WILL TELL YOU EACH TIME WHETHER 
YOU PLACED IT IN THE RIGHT OR WRONG PILE, BUT REMEMBER WHEN I 
SAY RIGHT OR WRONG THAT APPLIES TO WHERE YOU PLACED THE 
CARD, NOT TO THE REASON YOU HAVE GIVEN. IF YOU ARE WRONG, 
LEAVE THE CARD WHERE YOU'VE PLACED IT, AND TRY TO GET THE 
NEXT CARD CORRECT. USE THIS DECK FIRST, AND THEN CONTINUE 
WITH THE SECOND DECK. THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT ON THIS TEST. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR MODIFIED BOOKLET 
CATEGORY TEST 
Modifications to standard instructions are in bold print. Allow patients to respond 
verbally to each response prior to providing feedback. Mark verbalized 
responses verbatim in the space to the right of each response on the answer 
sheet. (Do not inquire Subtests I and II). If patients do not spontaneously 
provide verbal responses, say "because . .. ". If you do not understand the 
reasoning, ask the patient to repeat, but do not inquire further. Inquire all 
responses, unless the patient has correctly identified the correct principle for that 
subtest three consecutive times. In that case, it is not necessary to continue 
inquiring, unless the patient makes a mistake, or the item is marked with a"?". If 
the patient spontaneously continues to verbalize reasoning, after three 
consecutive correctly verbalized responses, those responses should be 
recorded. Also all items marked with a "?" should be recorded, even when the 
patient has correctly identified the principle three consecutive times. 
IN THIS BOOKLET YOU ARE GOING TO SEE DIFFERENT FIGURES AND 
DESIGNS. SOMETHING ABOUT THE PATIERN ON A PAGE WILL REMIND 
YOU OF A NUMBER BETWEEN ONE AND FOUR. ON THE STRIP IN FRONT 
OF YOU (pointing), YOU WILL SEE THE NUMBERS ONE, TWO, THREE, AND 
FOUR. FIRST LOOK AT THE PAGE AND DECIDE WHICH NUMBER THE 
PICTURE SUGGESTS, THEN POINT TO THAT NUMBER ON THE STRIP. 
FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT NUMBER DOES THIS REMIND YOU OF? (turn to the 
first page.) If the subject says, "one," ask him which number he should point to. 
After he has pointed to the number 1, say: CORRECT. THAT IS HOW I WILL 
RESPOND EVERY TIME YOU HAVE THE RIGHT ANSWER. I WILL RESPOND 
WITH "INCORRECT" WHEN YOU HAVE THE WRONG ANSWER. IN THIS 
WAY, YOU WILL KNOW EACH TIME WHETHER YOU HAVE THE RIGHT OR 
WRONG ANSWER. HOWEVER, FOR EACH PICTURE ON THE PAGE YOU 
ONLY GET ONE CHOICE. IF YOU MAKE A MISTAKE, WE JUST GO RIGHT 
ON TO THE NEXT PICTURE. 
I. (Proceed with Subtest I) NOW, WHICH NUMBER WOULD YOU CHOOSE 
FOR THIS PICTURE? 
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II. After subtest I, say: THAT WAS THE END OF THE FIRST SUBTEST. THIS 
TEST IS DIVIDED INTO SEVEN SUBTESTS. IN EACH SUBTEST, THERE 
IS ONE IDEA OR PRINCIPLE THAT RUNS THROUGHOUT THE 
SUBTEST. ONCE YOU HAVE FIGURED OUT THE IDEA OR PRINCIPLE 
IN THE SUBTESTS, BY USING THIS IDEA YOU WILL GET THE RIGHT 
ANSWER EACH TIME. NOW WE ARE GOING TO BEGIN THE SECOND 
SUBTEST AND THE IDEA IN IT MAY BE THE SAME AS THE LAST ONE 
OR IT MAY BE DIFFERENT . WE WANT YOU TO FIGURE IT OUT. 
(Proceed with Subtest II.) 
When you reach the first page with circles, say: YOU WILL NOTICE THAT 
WE FIRST SAW SQUARES, THEN LINES, AND NOW CIRCLES . EVEN 
THOUGH THE PATIERNS CHANGE, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO USE 
THE SAME IDEA TO GET THE RIGHT ANSWER. 
Ill. After Subtest II, say: THAT WAS THE END OF THE SECOND SUBTEST 
AND AS YOU PROBABLY NOTICED, YOU DON'T NECESSARILY HAVE 
TO SEE A NUMBER TO HAVE A NUMBER SUGGESTED TO YOU. YOU 
SAW SQUARES, CIRCLES, AND OTHER FIGURES. ALSO, YOU 
PROBABLY NOTICED IN EACH OF THESE SUBTEST, THERE WAS ONLY 
ONE IDEA OR PRINCIPLE WHICH RAN THROUGHOUT. ONCE YOU 
FIGURED OUT THE IDEA, YOU CONTINUED TO APPLY IT TO GET THE 
RIGHT ANSWER. NOW WE ARE GOING TO START THE THIRD 
SUBTEST AND THE IDEA IN IT MAY BE THE SAME AS THE LAST ONE 
OR IT MAY BE DIFFERENT. I WANT TO SEE IF YOU CAN FIGURE OUT 
WHAT THE IDEA IS AND THEN USE IT TO GET THE RIGHT ANSWER, 
AND l'D ALSO LIKE YOU TO SAY THE REASON YOU CHOSE THE 
ANSWER YOU CHOSE-WHY YOU PICKED THAT NUMBER, BUT AGAIN 
WHEN I SAY "RIGHT" OR "WRONG," THAT APPLIES TO THE NUMBER 
YOU HAVE CHOSEN, NOT TO THE REASON YOU HAVE GIVEN. 
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REMEMBER, THE IDEA REMAINS THE SAME THROUGHOUT THE 
SUBTEST. I WILL TELL YOU WHEN WE COMPLETE ONE SUBTEST AND 
ARE READY TO BEGIN A NEW ONE. 
IV. After Subtest 111-V, say: THAT WAS THE END OF THAT SUBTEST . NOW 
WE ARE GOING TO BEGIN THE NEXT ONE. THE IDEA IN IT MAY BE 
THE SAME AS THE LAST ONE OR IT MAY BE DIFFERENT. WE WANT 
YOU TO FIGURE IT OUT. 
VI. In Subtest VI after page #6 (first slide without numbers) say: THIS IS STILL 
THE SAME GROUP, BUT NOW THE NUMBERS ARE MISSING . THE 
PRINCIPLE IS STILL THE SAME. 
VII. After Subtest VI, say: IN THE LAST SUBTEST THERE IS NO ONE IDEA 
OR PRINCIPLE THAT RUNS THROUGHOUT THE GROUP BECAUSE IT IS 
MADE UP OF ITEMS YOU HAVE ALREADY SEEN IN PRECEDING 
SUBTESTS . TRY TO REMEMBER WHAT THE RIGHT ANSWER WAS 
THE LAST TIME YOU SAW THE PATTERN AND GIVE THAT SAME 
ANSWER AGAIN. 
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WISCONSIN CARD SORTING TEST FORM 
ID No __________ ___ Age ____ Sex ____ Date __ _ _ 
Education Occupation ___ ______ __ _ 
Comments _____ _ _______ ____________ _ _ 
Trials C, F,N,C,F,N 
1. CFNO/CFNSe::i&rnPcs Prev £:a; R:f1 Err f\b: U _ 3.3. CFN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev £:a; Fm Err NJt U 
2 CFNO/CFNSe::iSunPcs Prev £:a;FmErr f\b: U _ 34. C FN O /CF N Se::! Sun Pa, Prev £:a; Fm Err NJt U 
3. C FN O / C FN Se::! &rn Pa, Prev £:a; Fm Err f\b: U _ 3.5. C FN O / C FN Se::! &rn Pa; Prev [a; Fm Err NJt U 
4. CFN O / CFN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev £:a; Fm Err f\b: U _ 33. C FN O /CF N Se::! &rn Pa; Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
5. CF NO/ CFN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev £:a; Fm Err f\b: U _ '31. C FN O /CF N Se::! &rn Pa; Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
6. CFNO/CFNSe::i&rnPcs Prev £:a; R:f1 Err f\b: U _ ~ CF NO/CF N Se::! Sun Pcs Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
7. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs Prev Dls Fm Err f\b: U _ $ C FN O /CF N Se::! Sun Pa; Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
8. CF N O / C FN Se::! Sum Pa, Prev £:a; Rln Err f\b: U _ 40. C FN O /CF N Se::! Sun Pa; Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
9. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcsPrevl:esRlnErrf\b:(_j _ 41. C FN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
10. C FN O / C FN Se::! &m Pa, Prev £:a; Fm Err f\b: U _ 42. CFNO/CFNSe::iSunPa; Prev [a; Fm Err NJt U 
11. CFNO/CFNSe::i&rnPcs Prev£:a; FmErrf\ti U _ 43. C FN O / C FN Se::! &rn Pa; Prev [a; Fm Err NJ! U 
12 CFNO/CFNSe::l&rnPcs Prev£:a; FmErr N:x U _ 44. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs Prev Dls FmErr NJ! U 
13. CFN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa; Prev [a; Fm Err N:x U _ 45. CFN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa; Prev Dls Fm Err NJ! U 
14. C FN O / CFN Se::! &rn Pa, Prev [a; RJl Err NJt U _ 46. CFNO/CFNSe::i SumPcs Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
15. CFN O / CFN Se::! &rn Pa, Prev Dls RJl Err f\b: U _ 47. C FN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
16. CF NO/ C FN Se::! &rn Pa, Prev £:a; Fm Err f\b: U _ 48. C FN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev [a; R:11 Err NJt U 
17. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs Prev Dls R:f1Err N:x U _ 49. C FN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa; Prev Dls R:11 Err NJ! U 
,a CFNO/CFNSe::i&rnPcs Prev £:a; Fm Err N:x U _ 50. C FN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa; Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
19. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs Prev Dls RJlErr N:x U _ 51. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs Prev Dls FmErr NJ! U 
20. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs Prev [es FmErr N:x U _ 52. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs Prev Dls FmErr NJt U 
21. C FN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev [a; Fm Err N:x U _ 53. C FN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa; Prev [a; Fm Err NJt U 
22. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcsPrev£:a; FmErr N:x U _ 54. C FN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa; Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
Z3. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcsPrev£:a;R:f1Errf\ti U _ 55. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPa; Prev [a; Fm Err NJt U 
24. C FN O / CFN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev £:a; Fm Err N:x U _ 56. CFN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa; Prev Dls Fm Err N:x U 
25. CFN O / CFN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev [a; Fm Err N:x U _ fil. CFNO / C FN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
a,_ CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPa.Prev£:a; RrlErr N:x U _ 58. CFN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa; Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
27. CFNO/CFNSe::iSunPa.Prev£:a;R:f1Errf\ti U _ $ . CFNO / C FNSe::i Sun Pa, Prev [es Fm Err NJt U 
28. CFN O / CFN Se::! Sum Pa, Prev £:a; R:f1 Err N:x U _ 00. CFN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev Dls Fm Err NJ! U 
29. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPcs Prev £:a; RrlErr N:x U _ 61. CFN O / C FNSe::i Sun Pa; Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
~ - C FN O / C FN_Se::i Sun Pa, Prev [a; Fm Err N:x U _ 62. CFNO/CFNSe::!SunPa; Prev [es RrlErr NJt U 
31. CFNO/CFNSe::i SunPa, Prev [es Fm Err N:x U _ 63. CFN O / C FNSe::i Sun Pa, Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U 
3?. CFNO/CFNSe::i &rnPcs Prev [es Fm Err N:x U _ 64. CFN O / C FN Se::! Sun Pa, Prev Dls Fm Err NJ! U 
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Current Category __ Number in Current Run __ 
Trials C,F,N,C,F,N 
65. CFNO/CFNSa:iSumPa5PrevD:lsFenErrNJt U _ 97. C FN O / C FN Sa:i Sum Pa, Prev D:ls Fm Err f\bt U 
66. CFNO/CFNSa:iSumPa5 Prevll:ls FmErr NJt U _ 98. C FN O / C FN Sa:i Sum Pa, Prev 03s Fm Err NJt U 
ol. CFNO/CFNSa:iSumPa5 Prev D:ls Fen Err NJt (_J _ 99. CFNO/CFNSa:iSumPa5 Prev03s FmErrNJt U 
68. CFNO/CFNSa:i SumPa5 Prev D:ls R3n Err NJt U _ 100. CFNO/CFNSa:i SumPa, Prev 03s Fm Err f\bt U 
69. CFN 0/ CFNSa:i SumPa, Prev D:ls Fen Err NJt (_J _ 101. CFNO/CFNSa:i SumPa, Prev 03s Fm Err f\bt U 
70. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevD:lsRlnErrNJt(_J _ 1CQ CFNO/CFNSEQ SunPa, Prev 03s Fm Err f\bt U 
71. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFmErrNJt(_J _ 103. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, Prev Dls FmErr f\bt U 
72 CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFenErrNJt(_J _ 104. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, Prev03s Fm Errf\bt U 
73. CFNO/CFNSEQ SumPa5 Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U _ 105. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, Prev 03s FmErr f\bt (_J 
74. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsR3nErrNJtU _ 100. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, Prev 03s Fm Err f\bt U 
75. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevD:lsFenErrNJtU _ 107. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5 Prev 03s FmErr f\bt U 
76. CFNO/CFNSEQ SumPa, Prev D:ls Fm Err NJt U _ 100. CFNO/CFNS€QSunPa5 Prev Dls FmErr NJt (_J 
77. CFNO/CFNSEq&rnPa, Prev Dls FenErr NJt (_J _ 100. CFNO/CFNSEq&rnPa, Prev 03s FmErr f\bt (_J 
78. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa,PrevD:lsFenErrNJt (_J _ 110. C FN O / C FN SEQ Sum Pa, Prev 03s Fm Err N:Jt (_J 
79. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, Prev Dls Fen Err NJt (_J _ 111. CFNO/CFNSEQ SumPa, Prev Ces Fm Err f\bt U 
80. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsR3nErrNJt(_J _ 112. CFNO/CFNSEQSumPa, Prev 03s FmErr f\bt U 
81. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFmErrNJt(_J _ 113. CFNO/CFNSEQ SunPa, Prev 03s Fm Err N:lt U 
82. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFenErrNJt(_J _ 114. CFNO/CFNSEQ SumPa5 Prev 03s Fm Err f\bt U 
83. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsfmErrNJtU _ 115. CFNO/CFNSa:i SunPa, Prev D:ls RJlErr NJt U 
84. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDls FmErrNJt (_J _ 116. CFN O / C FN SEQ Sun Pa, Prev 03s Fm Err f\bt U 
85. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFmErrNJtU _ 117. CFNO/CFNSEQ SunPa, Prev 03s Fm Err NJt U 
00. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrellC~FmErrN:iLJ _ 118. CFN O / C FN SEQ Sun Pa, Prev 03s Fm Err N:Jt (_J 
87. CFNO/ CFNSEQ SumPa, Prev Dls Fm Err NJt U _ 119. CFNO/CFNS€Q&rnPa5 Prev 03s RnErr N:x U 
88. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFenErrNJt(_J _ 120. CFNO/CFNSEQ &.mPa, Prev 03s FmErr f\bt U 
89. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevDlsFenErrN:i(_J _ 121. CFNO/CFNSEQSunPa, Prev 03s FmErr f\bt U 
90. CFNO/CFNS€QSumPa5PrevD:lsR:nErrNJtU _ 122 C FN O / C FN SEQ &rn Pa, Prev 03s Rn Err N:x U 
91. CFNO/CFNSEq&rnP'a.PrevDlsR:nErrNJt(_J _ 12.3. . CFNO/CFNSEQ&rnP'a.Prev 03s RnErrN:x(_J 
~ CFNO/CFNSEQSumP'a. Prev Dls FmErr NJt U _ 124. CFNO/CFNSEQ&rnP'a. Prev 03s Fm Err N:x U 
93. CFNO/CFNSEQ &rnP'a. Prev Dls Fm Err N:i LJ _ 125. CFN O / C FN SEQ Sun Pa; Prev 03s Fm Err N:x U 
94. CFNO/CFNSEQ SumP'a. Prev Dls Rrl Err NJt (_J _ 126. CFN O / C FNSEQ Sun Pa; Prev 03s Rrl Err N:x U 
95. CFNO/CFNSEQSumP'a.PrevDlsRrlErrNJt(_J _ 127. CFNO/CFNSEQSunP'a. Prev 03s Rrl Err N:x U 
96. CFNO/CFNSEQSumP'a.PrevDlsFmErrN:i(_J _ 128. CFNO/CFNSEQSunP'a. Prev 03s RrlErr N:x (_J 
Errors ___ Perseverative Responses ____ Categories ___ Learning to Learn ___ _ 
Nonperseverative Errors ___ Perseverative Errors ____ % Perseverative Errors ____ _ 
Trials to Complete 1st Category ___ Failure to Maintain Set ___ % Conceptual Level Response __ 
If Right, Shift% ___ If Right, Stay %c__ ___ lf Wrong, Shift % ____ If Wrong, Stay% __ _ 
APPENDIX D. Modified Scoring And Recording Form For 
The Booklet Category Test 
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SCORING AND RECORDING FORM FOR THE BOOKLET CATEGORY TEST 
Nick A. DeFilippis, Ph.D. and Elizabeth McCampbell, Ph.D. 
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ID Number ____ Date ____ Age. ____ Sex. __ _ 
Education . ___ Occupation, ____ Premorbid Intellectual Level. __ 
Total Number of Errors Subtests I-VII, ___________ _ 
SUBTEST I SUBTEST II SUBTEST II SUBTEST II 
l. I l. D lO. 00 19 . l 
Ed I I I rn:rn I I I I mm I I mm I I I 
2
· m 2 - ODD 11.000 20 - lll 
I I IU:rn I I I IUll I I I IU'.U I I I L:U I
12_ Total No. Errors 3- I 3_ D Q Subtest II 
U:Uil I I I 1:U:U I I I IU:U I I I SUBTEST III 
4
- II Dood1AAAA booo __ _ 
I I IU.HI I I I wrn1 I I I [...I HJ I I I 
5
- :0: 5- II 14 . BBB booo 
I 1:rn:rn I I I 1:UII I I I I rnrn I I I Em I
6
- II 6 - 1111 15CABE 30000 
I I I 1011 I I I IUII I I I m:m rn:m1 I I I 
7
- I 7 - I ¼f so 
1m:m I I I El] I I I · I EU! I I 
8. I 8. II 17. l 
4_ 
DODD 
I I I 1mm1 
I LJ I I I IJJ I I mu I I I I 1.:.:J I I 
Totst No Error, 
9
· 000 U.llll \JQQ6 
SubteS
t 
I - I I WU] I I I I [ml I I I IUi(i 
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SUBTEST Ill SUBTEST Ill SUBTEST Ill 
7 6 LJLJLJ .-------, 66 DD~~ 2~ GJ IBl GJ ~~ 
Fm I I I --- I b~u I I I rn:rn I '--
8. 17. 27. 
Q6QQ QDD/.\ 0D00 
I llT:".1 I I __ l!Ti:I I I I __ I I I 1~~rn __ 
9. 18. 28. 
@@a@ ooa6 wm1Dfill 
I I mm I I I I M~HI -- I I L.U 11--------1 
10. 19. 29. 
QDO/.\ Daoo 0@00 
I I.LU I I 
---
V==I I I I r~n I I I 
-- --11. 20. 30. 
@/SJO!SJ ClDO/.\ ooaD 
I I mm I -- I I l':'!'!i I -- I I I rnrn1 --
12. 21. 31. @aaa 
kim I I I 1-----.----1 
0@00 
I E!J I I 
---
aDoo 






I I I 1rnm -- 1mm I I I -- 1mm1 I I ll-----t 
1DDD 8@00 lDA& 





I I I ll!Wil ....______, I I I [ml -- 1mm1 I I I __ 
25. 35. 
GJ [ID GJ [ID @) @) f!I ~ 
I I 1mm I I I 1mm I..______. 
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SUBTEST III SUBTEST IV SUBTEST IV £[;}LiJ(]_..-----s_ ~ -~1s_ .ce ---
1 IH=i=I I I I rn:n I I I I I M#I ..___ _ 3~GJ~~ fi_ ~ 16- Eb 
I I I rnrn1 I I I IU:U I m;rn I 11-------J 
~ ~D~ 7_ ~ 17_ ~ 
I I rnrn1 I IIC:I I I I W:U:1 I I 11--------J 
lli@&(i) 8 D 18- 0 
I I I rnrni1 I HJ I I I I I HH~I ._______, 
40~GJ@IBJ g_ [? 19_ 0 
I EUI I __ ---I I I IU:U I WlUI I I 11----~ 
Total No . Errors D 20 C' 10_ -
Subtes1: III _ 
SUBTEST IV I 1:rnrn I I I I I~!~!] 11----~ 
L ___B 11- n 21- f . 
~ L. V 
umm I I I __ I I 1mm1 I I umm I I __ 
2_ ~ 12 _ LJ 22_ 0 
I I n:ni I IWWI I I I mmll I I I ._____, 
3. ---.E 13. n 23. O 
~ . _J 
IO:U I I I I I I [II I 1mm1 I I .___~ 
4_ ~ 14_$ 24_ 0 
I I I 1mrn I I IUJ I I I I 1cm L--------1 
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SUBTEST IV SUBTEST IV SUBTEST V 
25_ C. ...----, 35 _ , ~ 4_ D .----.. 
IIEUII IIIU'.UI 111u;,;1 ___ 
26 _ 1111 36- ., 5- o··i 
LJ ... 
ILT:111 IEUlll ILJII ___ 
27_ .J 37-0 6_ D 
111mm IIIIUII 1:U:UIII __ 
28. C. 38. Q 7_ r·q 
: . 
••••••• 
I I trnn I I I IHHU I I I I k :=11 __ 
29- X 39- 0 s_ LO 
mm I I I I I I Ern ll~l~lI I I I --
30_ )( 40-0 9_ cJ 
I I I n:rn I l!Ti'I I I I I rnm1 I--
31. X Total No. Errors 1 O. / / 
Subtest IV _ , ~ 
I•••' 
1 m1rn 1 1 SUBTEST v I rn1m1 1  __ 
1. ·---· [if 32. V I I 11. _,~ ~ D.J 
umm I I I I I I 1mm1 __ 1mm I I 1--
33- ' 2_ m 12_ P7 
L..:] ·----
1 I El;l;I I rn1m1 I I 1-------1 I rnim1 I It------1 
34_ ' 3, ;···: 13- 0 t_[J 
umm I I I I I mm11 I ,..._____. I I I 1mm1 ,..._____. 
SUBTESTV 
14. [!:/ 
I I Wirnl I 1--------l 
,,_ 0
111 LU __ 
16 . / / 
I ~ 

























I I I 1mm1 
25. 
•••I-
I I [:ffl :: :::: I 
26 . I I • • • • • • • • 
I mmm I I 
27 _ I I I I 
I I I F:::1 
28 . I I • I • • • j I 1mrn1 I 
29 . I • • • • • I • • • • • • 
1mrn1 I I I 
30. I I I I 
I I I mim1 
31. I • I • • • • • • • 
I WiWI I I 
32 . • I • • • • • • • • • • • 
W!lill I I I 
33. I • I I • • • 
I I IJ.UI I 
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SUBTEST V 





Wiiiil I I I 
35. , .. 
.. J 
I I rnm1  I 
36 . .ii •• , 
• • 
• • , .. , 
I Wirnil I I 
37 . 0 
I I I IH?I 
38 . 
I . .. ,.._ 
I I 1wm1 I 
39_ 
I I I 
I I I l1M1ll 
40. 
I ..... a I 
I 11mm I I 
Total No. Errors 
Subtest V 
SUBTEST VI 
1. ·---· I I 
I o.~ 
W!li!I  I I 
2. [!::/ 
I I WWil I 
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SUBTEST VI SUBTEST VI SUBTEST VI 
3_ ,-------, 13 _ 0 _----, 23 - _ ___,, 
···•··· Mi• .. :• .. 
--. 
----·· ~~ .... 
1rnrn1 I I 11--------l I I I !OIi I l:;;;:;l I I 
4_ II II 14_ (?, MM 
I I I Ffl .--I ~, ;......Em~, 11------1 I I I LJ 
s _ :~ 1s_ I 
; I -·- _nnru•! 
•• • I "· 
2S. 
•••• 
I 1mm1 I ' -- I I I KU] 1--------1 I I IU,i:I I 
6. 16_ I 26. 
....... ., ... u-t; .. :fl 
I I I 
I I I L..J 1------1 
I • • - • • • • .. 







I I umm I__ 1rnrn1 I I I__ 1mm1 I I I --
10. a-· ... , 20. I 3o. 
-···· .nnnn. 
.• I 
.--I ..,.,..,,mrn1---,..---., I I 1mm1 I ._______. I I I rn:rn ._______. 
11. Eu 21_ I 31~ .........._ 
.... _ , ' , ' 
: ' , 'a. , 
"'• . -~ ""'"' I I EU! I I mm~, I 11-------1 I Imm! I I ._______. 
' , , .... , 






1rnrn1 I I I .______, 
32. 
............ o···· 
...... , .... " ..... -
........ 0 .......... .. 
.. . ,... .. . ,_ .... , . 
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SUBTEST VI SUBTEST VII SUBTEST VII 
33 0 ~----. \:io D ~----. '!iJ@@!iJ ~~ 
I I LUI I I IU:U I LUI I I _---f 
34. • - 3. 13. 
. -
--
=' :-:::::: AAAA 
hiJ I I I __ ICU I I I __ I I I IUII __ 
35.::::o 00 4. O 14. 
oo o:::: GJ [ID D [ID 
11rnrn1 llllm!rn IILUII __ 
36. a c··~ 5. 15_ n 
:::(6 Q6CJQ - _I 
11~/HI 11 __ I L...I 11 __ I I bd 
--
H- w ' 1111 lfi. :t:t 
1111.1.u __ 111rnw1 1mmm11 __ 
3s_ 1. O ~'*'·4, 11. I 
W HE·.,,,·· ......... ····=··· ~--·" ~·· .. 
,...,.,.~ ....... " -
I I LU I -- rn!WI I I -- imrn I I ' ----f l'-w M ·-oJ l8. X 
I I I lm!J I mm1 I I -- I I I IUJ_---f 40_\ \ ,_ ee 1,. V !ti N eo ~ 
I I l+!J I 1mm I I I 




SUBTEST VII I tmml I I __ I I mm I..____. 
1. 
DODD .l\f:M 
Em I I I .______. I I IW!m I .______. 
Total No. Errors 
Subtest VII _ 
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APPENDIX E. Decision Tree For Coding Configural Attributes On BCT 
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DECISION TREE FOR CODING CONFIGURAL ATTRIBUTES ON BCT 
1. Are only perceptual 
elements which are unique or 
share common perceptual 
features included in the 
response? 
2. Do the descriptions refer to a 
relevant perceptual feature 
which differentiates elements in 
the response? 
,____ 1. Are those characteristics 
described in the response? 
3. Does the response include 
the BACKGROUND of the 
figure among the perceptual 
elements identified? 
5. Are perceptual characteristics of 
all figures or elements in the stimulus 
described in the response? 
Score 
verbal 
4. Are all perceptual 
elements (including missing 
quadrants or the interior of 
the design) included in the 
response? 
1-----ll 7. Are elements 
in the response 
differentiated on 
----i the basis of 
dissimiarity? 
6. Is the response based 
upon perceptual 
characteristics which 
describe only part of the 
elements in the stimulus? 8. Are unlike 
elements treated 
as equivalent? 
~- 9. Are the elements which are included in the 
response "PULLED OUT" of the stimulus 
configuration, leaving behind elements which share 
that perceptual attribute? 
1. Does the element included in the response 
..._ __ ,. represent a remote point or location pointed to 





Does the response 
include only a missin 
element? 
2. Do the elements included in th 
response consist only of 
ACHROMATIC FIGURES (which 
may be contrasted with chromatic 
figures)? 
3. Are the elements which are included in the 
response differentiated from all other perceptual 
elements on the basis of CHROMATIC COLOR 
of perceptual elements? 
5. Are the elements which are included in the 
response differentiated from all other perceptual 
elements on the basis of SOLID or OPEN or 
DOTTED perceptual elements? 
6. Does the stimulus include solid 
(or filled) perceptual elements? 
7. Are only the solid 
(filled) perceptual 
elements included in 
the response? 
4. Are the elements which are included in the 
8. Are only solidly 
outlined (hollow) 
elements included 
in the response? 
._ ____ response differentiated from all other 
perceptual elements on the basis of SIZE of 
the figures or perceptual elements? 
1. Are the elements which are included in the 
response differentiated from all other 
perceptual elements on the basis of a specific 
SHAPE or form? 
2. Are the elements which are included in the 
___ response differentiated from all other perceptual 
elements on the basis of MISSING or inferred lines of 
perceptual elements? 
R----1 
3. Does no single perceptual 
, __ ----11 feature differentiate the elements 
included in the response from all 
other perceptual elements? 
Score combination of 
features, in order of 
priority, necessary to 
differentiate elements 
in the response 
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APPENDIX F. Decision Tree For Coding Abstract Attributes On BCT 
DECISION TREE FOR CODING ABSTRACT ATTRIBUTES ON BCT 
Does the response include all configural elements in 
___ ..,. the stimulus or differentiate among dissimilar 
elements included in the response? 
Are only physically contiguous elements which are identified as a 
single form included in the response? 
237 
Is each set of individual 
elements sharing common 
configural features treated 
individually? 
Is the rule applied to 
individual unit(s) as a whole , 
without further subdivision? 
Is the rule applied to the 
individual elements within 
each unit comprised of 
common configural features? 
Is at least one unit or 
category comprised of 
more than one element? 
Is the position of specified configural elements within 
the stimulus array relevant to the response given? -----~ 
Does the number response given reflect the 
correct position of a specified quadrant or fourth 
of the stimulus array? 
Does the number response given reflect an alternate 
numbering scheme of a specified quadrant or fourth of the 
stimulus array? 
Is an additional step necessary to 
transform the position of the configural 
elements to a number response? 
Is the response from Subtest Ill (including 
__ __,, Subtest Ill items in Subtest VII) or before? 
..._ __ ~II Go to Shape, Page 2 Go To Page2 
From Pa e 1 
Does the response consist of one unique 
configural element (or set of identical configural 
elements) which is described as "different" from 
----4 or unlike other configural elements not included 1-------ll 
in the response? 
Are the configural elements included in the 
response described as the "same" as other 
configural elements, but the other configural 
elements are in the previous response? 
Are configural elements included in the 
response described as the "same" as other 
configural elements in the stimulus? 
Are the configural elements included in the response 
___ compared to those not included on the basis of 
characteristics other than physical similarity? 
Is a specific configural feature ( or set of configural features 
identified which differentiates elements included in the 
response from those which are not included or which is 
shared by all perceptual elements? 
Is more than one element included in the response? 
Are the configural elements 
specified described as a shape 
representing a number value? 
Are the configural elements specified described as a 
concrete, non-geometric shape other than a number? 
Are the configural elements WHICH ARE 
PHYSICALLY PRESENT described as "missing"? 
-~ Go To Page 3 
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From Pa e 2 1--------
Do all configural elements included in the response 
occupy space which corresponds to quadrants or 4th's of 
the stimulus configuration, or multiples thereof? 
Are any other configural elements specified which do not 
occupy space corresponding to quadrants or 4th's? 
Is the space occupied by two or more individual quadrants 
combined into a single perceptual element? 
Score a 
Do any configural elements specified represent 
component parts other than quadrants or 
fourths, or multiples thereof? 
239 
240 
APPENDIX G. Decision Tree For Coding Abstract Attributes On BCT 
DECISION TREE FOR CODING SCORING RULES ON BCT 
1. Is the number response given based on a 
"Guess" or "I don't know"? 
YES 
Score R 
..__,. 2. Is the number response given 
based on a previous response without 
clarifying the reasoning? 
YES 
Score M 
..__ .. 3. Is the number response given based on 
counting abstract attributes identified? YES 
Score C 
Is the number response given based upon the 
location of the abstract attribute identified? 1------. 
4. Does the number response given correspond to 
the linear placement of the abstract attribute identified 
on items from Subtest Ill? 
~-5. Does the number response given correspond to the 
clockwise placement of the quadrant of the stimulus 
containing the relevant abstract attribute? 
YES 
. oes t e num er response given correspon to a 
location numbering scheme other than clockwise 
placement of the quadrant of the stimulus containing the 
relevant abstract attribute? Score Le 
1. Is the number response given based upon the 
'--------lN proportion of the whole stimulus which was 
identified as the abstract attribute? 
2. Does the number response given 
correspond to the numerator of the 
fraction when the denominator=4? 
NO 3. Is the number response given 
based upon a mathematical 
procedure other than simple 
counting of abstract attributes? ----YES 1---~ 
---- Does the number response given based upon correspond 




APPENDIX H. Definitions For CT Ratio And Summary Variables 
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DEFINITIONS FOR CT RA TIO AND SUMMARY VARIABLES 
VARIABLE 
1. MSIS: Maintain Set 
Within Sets 
2. MSBS: Maintain Set 
Between Sets 
3. LR: Learning Rate 
4. SLR: Maintain Set 
following Learning 
5. RKC: Keep Concrete 
Score If Correct 
6. RKA: Keep Abstract 
Score If Correct 
7. RKR: Keep Rule If 
Correct 
8. RPCK: Percent Scores 
Kept When Correct 
9. WSC: Shift Concrete 
Score If Wrong 
10. WSA: Shift Abstract 
Score If Wrong 
11. WSR: Shift Rule If 
Wrong 
12. WSl: Shift 1 Score If 
Wrong 
13. WS2: Shift 2 Scores If 
Wrong 
14. WS3: Shift 3 Scores If 
Wrong 
15. WPCS: Percent Scores 
Shifted When Wrong 
16. NC3: Percent Near 
Correct Subtest III 
17. NC4: Percent Near 
Correct Subtest IV 
18. PRAC4: Percent 
Subtest IV Practice 
Correct 




Percent of responses in which all 3 determinants did not change 
following feedback of correct, when test stimuli remained consistent. 
Percent of responses in which all 3 determinants did not change 
following correct response, when test stimuli did change. 
Mean item number across subtests which represents the third 
consecutive response utilizing all 3 correct determinants. 
Percent of responses following Leaming Rate item in which all 3 
determinants were correct. 
Percent of responses in which the Concrete Score remained 
unchanged following a correct response. 
Percent of responses in which the Abstract Score remained 
unchanged following a correct response. 
Percent of responses in which the Rule remained unchanged 
following a correct response. 
Percent of total determinant scores which remained unchanged 
following a correct response. 
Percent of responses in which the Concrete score shifted following 
an incorrect response. 
Percent of responses in which the Abstract score shifted following 
an incorrect response. 
Percent of responses in which the Rule shifted following an incorrect 
response . 
Percent of responses in which one determinant score changed 
following an incorrect response . 
Percent of responses in which two determinant scores changed 
following an incorrect response. 
Percent of responses in which three determinant scores changed 
following an incorrect response. 
Total percent of determinant scores changed following an incorrect 
response. 
Percent of responses in Subtest HI in which Location comprised the 
Abstract score rather than the Rule . 
Percent of responses in Subtest IV in which quadrant location was 
not based on clockwise rotation. 
Percent of first six responses in Subtest IV (where quadrants are 
labeled) which are correct. 
Percent of responses in Subtests V & VI in which the Rule (Lor Le) is 
perseverated from Subtest IV. 
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DEFINITIONS FOR WCST RATIO AND SUMMARY VARIABLES 
VARJABLE 
1. CAT: Categories 
Completed 
2. CLR: Conceptual 
Level Responses 
3. FfMS: Failure to 
Maintain Set 
4. LTL: Learning to 
Learn 
5. MLOP: Missed 
Learnjng Oppor. 
6. NPSVE: Percent 
Non perseverati ve 
Errors 
7. PSVE: Percent 
Perscverative Errors 
8. PSVR: Percent 
Perseverative 
Responses 
9. TE: Percent Total 
Errors 
DEFINITION 
Number of sets of 10 consecutive correct responses. 
Percent of responses which are correct occurring in runs of 3-10 
cards. 
Number of sets of 5-9 consecutive correct responses, followed by an 
incorrect response. 
Mean of the summed error rate for each category. 
Sum of correct unambiguous responses and incorrect ambiguous 
responses (which provide sufficient information to deduce principle) 
Percent of responses which are incorrect and do not meet criteria 
for perseverations. 
Percent of respon ses which are incorrect and are also perseverative. 
Percent of responses which meet the following criteria: a) would 
have been correct in the previous category; b) match the first 
incorrect unambiguous response prior to completion of the first 
category; c) is an ambiguous responses that is both preceded and 
followed by unambiguous perseverative responses; or d) is the 2nd 
or subsequent of three consecutive incorrect unambiguous responses 
which establish a new "perseverate-to" principle for that category, 
although ambiguous perseverative responses may be interspersed 
among those three consecutive perseverative responses. 
Percent of responses which are incorrect. 
10. TC: Percent Correct Percent of correct responses which are not included in criteria runs. 
11. MAX C: Percent Percent of responses utilizing the color determinant. 
Color Resp. 
12. MAX F: Percent 
Form Resp. 
13. MAX N: Percent 
Number 
Percent of response utilizing the form determinant. 
Percent of responses utilizing the number determinant. 
14. MAX SD: S.D. of Standard deviation of Color, Form, and Number responses (measure 
Determinant of difficulty shifting). 
Responses 
15. SIN C: Unambiguous Percent of responses using unambiguous color determinant. 
Color 
16. SIN F: Unambiguous Percent of responses using unambiguous form determinant. 
Form 
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VARIABLE DEFINITIO N 
17. SINN : Unambiguou s Percent of respon se using unambiguou s number determinant. 
No. 
18. STN SD: S.D. Single 
Determinant Resp . 
19. R SH: Right-Shift 
Respon ses 
20. WRG ST: Wrong-
Stay Responses 
Standard deviation of unambiguou s color, form, and numb er 
responses. 
Number of respon ses in which the det erminant that was correct in 
the pr eviou s respon se shifted. 
Number of respon ses which repeat ed the det erminant s incorr ect in 
the pr eviou s respon se. 
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M.A., Clinical Psychology 
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• Conduct group and individual psychotherapy for outpatients and inpatients 
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referred by Division of Parole and Probation 
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249 
fuly, 1973 - July, 1984 
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post-sentence psychological evaluations for youthful offenders and adults 
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individual therapy and performed psychological evaluations for offenders 
convicted of capital crimes or presenting management problems 
• Correctional Treatment Specialist, Diagnostic Center: Performed social 
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• Parole Officer, Community Services: Supervised youthful offenders released 
to parole supervision 
• Correctional Treatment Specialist, Youth Center II: Provided case 
management services for youthful offenders sentenced under the Federal Youth 
Corrections Act 
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• Dissertation research in progress, A Cognitive Process Approach to 
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